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Kurzfassung: Abnormale Gewinne und deren Persistenz: Eine Analyse   
der europäischen Lebensmittelindustrie 
 
Die vorliegende Dissertation untersucht die europäische Lebensmittelindustrie im Hinblick 
auf  Unternehmensgewinne, welche von der Wettbewerbsnorm abweichen. Hierbei wird im 
Rahmen dreier wissenschaftlicher Papiere sowohl das Auftreten solcher ‚abnormalen‘ 
Gewinne zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt als auch deren Persistenz über längere Zeitperioden 
analysiert. Da es sich um eine der ersten Studien dieser Art handelt, welche sich 
ausschließlich mit Firmen der europäischen Lebensmittelindustrie befasst, liefert diese 
Dissertation einen wichtigen Beitrag zur Literatur.   
Im Anschluss an eine ausführliche Einleitung wird im ersten Papier der Einfluss von 
Firmen-, Industrie-, Jahres- und Ländereffekten auf das Ausmaß der abnormalen Gewinne 
analysiert. Die Schätzung der Effektklassen erfolgt hierbei sowohl auf Basis konventioneller 
Methoden wie ANOVA oder Varianzkomponentenanalyse als auch durch ein hierarchisches, 
lineares Modell (HLM). Der HLM-Ansatz bietet darüber hinaus die Möglichkeit den Einfluss 
struktureller Firmen- und Industrievariablen auf das Ausmaß der abnormalen Gewinne zu 
schätzen. Die drei Methoden führen zu dem gemeinsamen Ergebnis, dass Firmeneffekte der 
wichtigste Einflussfaktor sind wohingegen Industrieeffekte eine vernachlässigbare Rolle 
spielen. Unter den strukturellen Firmen- und Industrievariablen stellt sich die Firmengröße als 
positiver Einflussfaktor heraus, während Firmenrisiko, das Alter der Firmen und die 
Wachstumsrate der Industrie einen negativen Einfluss auf die Höhe der abnormalen Gewinne 
haben. 
Während im ersten Papier das Auftreten abnormaler Gewinne zu einem bestimmten 
Zeitpunkt analysiert wird, befasst sich das zweite Papier mit der Persistenz abnormaler 
Gewinne über längere Zeitperioden. Diese Analyse basiert sowohl auf autoregressiven 
Modellen (AR) sowie einem dynamischen Panelmodell. Beide Ansätze ermöglichen es 
zusätzlich den Einfluss struktureller Firmen- und Industrievariablen auf die Höhe der 
Profitpersistenz zu bestimmen. Die Analyse führt zu dem Ergebnis, dass eine hohe Anzahl an 
Firmen langfristig abnormale Gewinne erwirtschaftet. Jedoch führen starker Wettbewerb und 
eine hohe Konzentration im Lebensmitteleinzelhandel dazu, dass das Ausmaß der Persistenz 
geringer ausfällt als in anderen Industriesektoren. Des Weiteren stellen sich das Firmenrisiko, 
Firmenalter sowie der F&E Aufwand der Industrie als negative Einflussgrößen heraus. Die 
Firmengröße hingegen hat einen positiven Einfluss auf das Ausmaß der Persistenz.  
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Die ersten beiden Papiere basieren auf einer Stichprobe von 5.494 
Lebensmittelproduzenten aus den fünf Ländern Belgien, Frankreich, Italien, Spanien und 
Großbritannien. Im dritten Papier wird hingegen eine Stichprobe von 590 Firmen des 
Milchsektors im Hinblick auf Profitpersistenz analysiert. Der Milchsektor wurde hierbei zum 
einen aufgrund seiner hohen wirtschaftlichen Relevanz im Ernährungsgewerbe als auch 
aufgrund seiner speziellen strukturellen Charakteristika ausgewählt. Zu diesen zählen u.a. eine 
hohe Anzahl an Genossenschaften sowie eine starke Regulierung durch die Gemeinsame 
Agrarpolitik (GAP) der EU. Die AR Modelle führen zu dem Ergebnis, dass 
Genossenschaften, welche in etwa einen Anteil von 20 % der Firmen im Sektor ausmachen, 
nicht in erster Linie gewinnorientiert sind. Analog zur gesamten Lebensmittelindustrie deuten 
die Ergebnisse auf eine hohe Wettbewerbsintensität, da das Ausmaß der Persistenz auch nach 
einem Ausschluss der Genossenschaften aus der Analyse gering ausfällt. Auch im 
Milchsektor stellt sich Firmengröße als positiver Einflussfaktor heraus, wohingegen 
Firmenrisiko, -alter sowie das Wachstum und die F&E Aufwendungen des Sektors einen 
negativen Einfluss haben. Gleiches gilt für die Konzentration im Lebensmitteleinzelhandel, 
welche als Indikator für dessen Verhandlungsmacht gesehen werden kann.  
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Abstract: Abnormal profits and profit persistence: evidence from the  
   European food industry 
 
This thesis comprises three papers that aim to analyze the phenomenon of firm profits in the 
European food industry that differ from the competitive norm either at a specific point in time 
or over longer time periods. The thesis adds to existing literature as it is one of the first studies 
of this type that directly focuses on the European food industry. Following an extended 
introduction, the first paper estimates the relative importance of firm, industry, country and 
year effects as drivers for profit deviations from the competitive norm at a specific point in 
time which are also commonly named ‘abnormal profits’. Besides conventional approaches 
such as ANOVA or components of variance, a hierarchical linear model (HLM) is 
implemented. The HLM approach additionally provides the possibility to estimate the impact 
of structural firm and industry variables on the degree of abnormal profits. All three 
approaches lead to the result that firm effects are the most important driver for abnormal 
profits while industry effects only play a minor role. Among the structural firm and industry 
variables it is in particular the size of firms’ that positively influences the degree of abnormal 
profits. On the other hand, firm risk and age as well as the growth rate of the industry in 
which firms operate have a negative impact. 
While the first paper focuses on abnormal profits at a specific point in time, the second 
paper analyzes the persistence of abnormal firm profits over longer time periods. This 
analysis is based on autoregressive models (AR) as well as Arellano-Bond dynamic panel 
estimation. Both approaches additionally allow for the identification of the firm and industry 
characteristics that determine the degree of profit persistence. The estimation reveals that a 
significant number of firms generate abnormal profits that persist in the long run. However, as 
competition among food industry firms is strong and concentration in the downstream market 
is high, persistence in abnormal profits in the food industry tends to be lower in comparison to 
other manufacturing sectors. Further characteristics that have a negative influence on the 
degree of persistence are firm age and risk as well as the industries R&D intensity. Similar to 
the occurrence of abnormal profits at a specific point in time, firm size is estimated to have a 
positive impact on the persistence of such profits.  
The first two papers of the thesis are based on a sample of 5,494 food processors from 
the five countries: Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. The third paper 
also uses AR models and dynamic panel estimation to analyze a sample of 590 dairy 
processors from the same five countries. Here the dairy industry was chosen not only because 
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of its economic importance within the food industry but also due to its special structural 
features such as a high number of cooperatives and a strong regulation of economic activity 
by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The AR models reveal that cooperatives, which 
account for approximately 20 % of all firms in the sector, are not predominantly profit 
oriented. Similar to the entire food industry the results indicate strong competition as the 
degree of persistence remains low even when cooperatives are removed from the sample. 
Again firm size turns out to be an important driver for persistence. Firm age and risk as well 
as growth and R&D investment of the sector have a negative impact. The same holds for the 
level of concentration in the retail sector which is an indicator of the retailers’ bargaining 
power.  
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Chapter 1: Extended introduction 
 
1. Motivation and relevance 
 
The examination of firm profits that deviate from the competitive norm is one of the 
fundamental fields of study within economics. From a theoretical perspective the analysis of 
such deviations, which are often also referred to as ‘abnormal profits’, has its origin in 
industrial organization (e.g. Bain, 1956, 1968) and strategic management research (e.g. Porter, 
1980; Barney, 1991). Starting with the contributions of Schmalensee (1985) and Rumelt 
(1991) a considerable number of studies empirically analyzing the occurrence of abnormal 
firm profits at a certain point in time has emerged. A complementary field of research focuses 
on the examination of persistence in abnormal profits over longer time periods. Mueller 
(1986, 1990) is considered as the initiator of this continuously growing research area and an 
extensive literature focusing on the persistence of abnormal profits has evolved following his 
groundbreaking contributions.  
Besides its high relevance within academics, the investigation of persistence in 
abnormal firm profits is most likely of great interest for firms and stakeholders (Ruiz, 2003). 
Particularly throughout the last two decades firms have had to face economic conditions 
which are heavily influenced by intensified globalization. For the European continent this is 
reflected by the continuous expansion of the European Union (EU) and the formation of a 
single market for goods and services. Due to the concomitant reductions in entry barriers 
these developments provide the possibility for firms to operate in previously hardly accessible 
foreign markets. However, the deregulation of international trade has also led to a significant 
intensification of competition (Goddard et al., 2005). Therefore, the examination of profit 
persistence and the resultant entrepreneurial strategies, which are necessary to successfully 
participate in markets characterized by strong competition, are expected to take on even 
greater significance in the future. In addition, while firms and stakeholders are primarily 
interested in the drivers of persisting abnormal profits as a basis for entrepreneurial success, 
for governmental competition authorities the degree of persistence in abnormal firm profits 
can be used as an index for assessing the need of anti-trust measures in specific sectors.  
Although there is already a considerable number of studies focusing on many different 
aspects of firm profits in various economic sectors, literature that solely concentrates on firm 
profits in the European food industry and its subsectors is still scarce. Only a few studies 
exist, concentrating on various issues of firm profits in the European food industry (e.g. 
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Sutton, 1991; Sexton, 2000; Weiss and Wittkopp, 2005; Szymański et al., 2007; Dorsey and 
Boland, 2009). However, previous studies that analyze the occurrence and persistence of 
abnormal firm profits almost exclusively focus on whole economies or entire manufacturing 
sectors of specific countries. A single exception is the study of Schiefer and Hartmann (2009) 
who analyze the occurrence of abnormal profits in the EU food industry.
1
  
Thus, alongside the food industries important economic position within the European 
economy - which is highlighted below - the incentive for the present thesis is based on an 
apparent lack of research concentrating on firm profits in the European food industry. This 
thesis is therefore one of the few studying the occurrence of abnormal firm profits at a 
specific point in time and the first to analyze the persistence in abnormal firm profits in the 
EU
2
 food industry. Additional objectives of this study are to identify the structural firm and 
industry characteristics that are responsible for the occurrence and the degree of persistence in 
abnormal profits as well as to apply improved econometric methodologies in comparison to 
the previous literature. 
The present thesis consists of an introductory paragraph followed by three papers 
focusing on the occurrence and persistence of abnormal profits in the EU food industry. The 
first paper, which concentrates on the food industries of the five EU member countries 
Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom (UK), analyzes the factors responsible 
for the occurrence of abnormal profits at a specific point in time. Paper number two 
determines the magnitude and the structural drivers of persistence in abnormal profits within 
the food industries of the five countries under investigation for the period of 1996 to 2008. 
The third paper focuses on profit persistence in the dairy industries of the five countries and 
can be viewed as complementary to the second paper. Here, the dairy industry was chosen due 
to its high economic importance within the EU food industry
3
 and its special structural 
characteristics. Economic activity in this industry is still regulated by the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) comprising a quota system that will remain effective until 2015. 
Furthermore, a high number of cooperatives are operating in the dairy industry and it can be 
expected that the specifics of this legal form will have a significant impact on the results. 
As mentioned above, the three papers concentrate on five countries: Belgium, France, 
Spain and the UK. These countries were chosen due to economic relevance and data 
                                                          
1
 For the U.S. food economy literature focusing on the occurrence and persistence of abnormal firm profits is 
also scarce. Here, Schumacher and Boland (2005 and 2005a) are the solitary exceptions. 
2
 As only EU member countries are analyzed in this thesis the term EU food industry is used instead of European 
food industry from now on. 
3
 The dairy industry is the third largest sector within the EU food industry following the meat and the beverage 
sector, contributing 14 % of total food industry turnover in 2010 (Eurostat, 2012).  
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availability. In addition, the country selection represents the contrast of more formally 
oriented northern countries and more informally oriented southern countries where informal 
contracts are of greater importance (Poppe et al., 2009) as well as the contrast between 
continental and Anglo-Saxon countries.  
All three papers are based on a similar theoretical framework, similar methodologies 
and on the same data source. In order to get a better overview and to facilitate reading of 
individual parts of this thesis, a description of these issues as well as detailed information on 
the EU food industry is provided in the remainder of this introductory chapter. The following 
subchapter therefore defines important terms that are used throughout the thesis. Subchapter 3 
specifies the theoretical bases regarding abnormal profits while subchapter 4 gives a 
description of the econometric models on which the empirical analyses are based. Subchapter 
5 provides a description of the EU food economy, highlighting its structural characteristics 
and economic relevance within EU manufacturing as well as recent developments. A 
description of the data used is provided in subchapter 6 while subchapter 7 reviews the 
literature. Chapters 2 through 4 comprise the three papers. 
 
2. Definitions of abnormal profits and profit persistence 
 
The term ‘abnormal profit‘ refers to the difference between a firm’s profit rate and the 
competitive norm in a specific period. Microeconomic theory generally states that the 
competitive norm of a market or industry equals zero. The majority of studies analyzing the 
occurrence of abnormal profits at specific points in time, and thus also the analysis in 
chapter 2 of the present thesis, follow this procedure. However, most of the previous studies 
analyzing the persistence of abnormal profits use the mean profit rate across all analyzed 
firms as a more realistic proxy for the competitive norm (e.g. McGahan and Porter, 2003; 
Schumacher and Boland, 2005a). The estimation of persistence in chapters 3 and 4 is 
therefore also based on this procedure. It should be pointed out that - according to the above 
definition - the term ‘abnormal profits’ can either refer to profits in excess of the competitive 
norm or to profits below this norm and that a firm with negative abnormal profits does not 
necessarily incur financial losses whenever the competitive norm exceeds zero. 
In general the term ‘persistence’ can be interpreted as ‘the continuance of an effect 
after the cause is removed’ (Yourdictionary, 2012). In regards to ‘persistence in abnormal 
firm profits’, the literature provides several definitions. Barney (1991) gives a broader 
definition that neglects the use of calendar time as a reference, by stating that profit 
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persistence constitutes profits above the competitive norm that continue to exist even after 
efforts to copy the advantages that lead to these profits have been implemented. While this 
definition is theoretically precise, it is hard to quantitatively operationalize it in a reasonable 
way. Schumacher and Boland (2005a) define profit persistence as the percentage of a firm’s 
profit in one year that remains in the following year. According to Geroski and Jacquemin 
(1988) a persistently successful firm is one for which the fact that profits in period t-1 are 
above (below) the competitive norm increases the likelihood that profits are above (below) the 
norm in period t as well. While the definitions mentioned so far focus on persistence from 
period to period and thus on the short run, Wiggins and Ruefli (2002) define profit persistence 
based on longer-term considerations by specifying that abnormal profits persist if they are 
sustained over a long-term period. In this context, however, a vast discussion has emerged 
regarding the question on how long this time span must be. While Wiggins and Ruefli define 
‘long’ as ten years or more, other authors argue that one has to look at time spans of up to 50 
years
4
 in order to get a correct picture of the degree of profit persistence. Therefore, according 
to the above definitions two persistence measures - one for short-run and one for long-run 
persistence - will be derived in the econometric models used to estimate profit persistence in 
the present thesis.  
It must be noted, that the phenomenon of persistence is naturally not restricted to 
microeconomic factors such as firm profits but can as well play an important role in the 
analysis of macroeconomic factors such as inflation or unemployment (e.g. Barro, 1988). 
Persistence in unemployment or inflation, for example, refers to the adhesion of the 
unemployment or inflation rate at a given level (Blanchard, 2009). Furthermore, the 
phenomenon of persistence is also an established field of research in scientific areas outside 
economics such as in biology or chemistry. Here the term persistence is, for example, used 
‘[…] to describe the continuing existence of certain insecticides […]’ or other organic 
chemicals with biological activity (Greenhalgh, 1980: 2565). An example is the examination 
of chemicals with a long residence time, such as some pesticides, which may accumulate in 
the food chain (FAO, 2011).  
In contrast to persistence of abnormal firm profits, the ‘occurrence’ of abnormal 
profits refers to the deviation of firm profits from the competitive norm only at a specific 
point in time i.e. in a single year. However, as will be shown below, most empirical studies 
which actually focus on the occurrence of abnormal profits at a specific point in time are 
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 See, e.g., Gschwandtner (2012) who analyzes profit persistence in U.S. manufacturing over the period 1950-99. 
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nevertheless based on profit time series of 3 to 5 years for each firm in order to increase the 
reliability of the results.   
 
3. Theoretical bases for the occurrence and persistence of abnormal profits 
 
Since the middle of the 20
th
 century, the analysis of abnormal firm profits from a theoretical 
point of view has established as one of the pivotal fields of economic research. As 
neoclassical economic theory, and in particular the model of perfect competition, does not 
allow for abnormal profits due to the assumption of perfectly functioning markets
5
, industrial 
organization theory, initiated by the contributions of Bain (1956; 1968), provides the first 
concepts aiming to explain the phenomenon of abnormal firm profits. While concepts from 
industrial organization focus on structural characteristics of the industries as the driver for 
firm’s abnormal profits, during the 1980s the focus shifted to the firm itself (e.g. Porter, 
1980). Within this so-called strategic management research, a variety of concepts have 
emerged that concentrate on specific firm-internal characteristics as the main determinants for 
abnormal profits. For instance, according to the ‘resource based view’ (e.g. Barney, 1991), 
firms endowed with specific valuable, rare and inimitable resources are more competitive, 
enabling these firms to generate profits above the competitive norm. 
The remainder of this chapter illustrates the most important theoretical concepts in 
greater detail starting with the neoclassical model of perfect competition. Subsequently, 
theoretical concepts from industrial organization that focus on industry characteristics as 
determinants for abnormal profits will be depicted. Thereafter, approaches of strategic 
management, that focus more on the firm itself, such as the ‘market-based view’, the 
‘resource-based view’ or the ‘knowledge-based view’ will be presented. In addition to the 
textbook versions of these approaches amendments from up to date research are presented for 
individual approaches. 
It must be pointed out, that the neoclassical model of perfect competition as well as the 
models of industrial organization and strategic management mentioned so far solely focus on 
the long-run equilibrium value of abnormal profits. Hence, these models are of static nature 
and do not account for the dynamics of abnormal profits over time. These approaches can 
therefore only be used to model the occurrence of abnormal profits at a specific point in time
6
 
                                                          
5
 Within the neoclassical framework abnormal profits can only occur in the short run as it is assumed that entry 
of new firms immediately drives profits back to the competitive norm. 
6
 In order to describe the occurrence of abnormal profits at a specific point in time it has to be assumed that the 
analyzed industry is in a long-run equilibrium at the analyzed moment (Schwalbach et al., 1989).  
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or the persistence of abnormal profits in a long-run equilibrium (Geroski, 1990). However, as 
will become apparent, for the analysis of persistence in abnormal profits, the process of 
adjustment of abnormal profits to the long-run level plays an important role as well. The final 
subsection of this chapter therefore gives an insight into the theoretical approaches of 
dynamic competition.  
 
3.1. Model of perfect competition 
 
In real markets the occurrence of abnormal profits at a specific point in time as well as the 
persistence of such profits is seemingly the general case while perfect competition as 
described by the model in this chapter is rarely observed. However, the model of perfect 
competition as one of the cornerstones of neoclassical economic theory provides the 
foundation for further theoretical concepts as well as a helpful benchmark for the empirical 
assessment of real markets. Thus, the following paragraph is dedicated to the conditions 
necessary for perfect competition within an industry. The model is based on the following 
assumptions (Carlton and Perloff, 2005: 56 ff; Herdzina and Seiter, 2009: 153 ff): 
 
1. Perfect market transparency: Consumers and firms have complete information 
regarding the structure of the market. For consumers this implies perfect information 
regarding firms, the quality of goods as well as the price. For firms this implies perfect 
information regarding the market structure, production conditions and costs.  
2. Homogeneity of goods: Firms produce and sell an identical good which implies that 
consumers are indifferent between products of different firms. 
3. Perfect divisibility of products: Firms can produce and consumers can buy marginal 
amounts of the good and demand/supply therefore continuously varies with the price. 
4. Absence of transaction costs: Neither consumers nor firms incur costs from 
participating in the market.
7
 
5. Large number of firms and consumers: A large number of firms and consumers are 
active in the market with the consequence that firms and consumers are price takers.  
6. Profit maximization: Each firm’s objective is to maximize its profits. 
7. Absence of externalities: Firms have to carry the entire costs that arise during 
production. This means that they cannot pass on externalities such as pollution to other 
market participants. 
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8. Free entry and exit: There are no barriers to entry or exit meaning that firms can at any 
time enter or exit the market at no costs. 
 
If assumptions 1 through 8 hold, it follows - according to Jevon’s law of indifference - 
that there only exists one single price within the market (Herdzina and Seiter, 2009). If 
individual firms would raise the price above the given market level they would lose all their 
customers. Similarly, due to the assumption of profit maximization, no firm will be willing to 
sell at a price below the given market level (Carlton and Perloff, 2005). Therefore, firms do 
not have an incentive to deviate from the given competitive market price. In addition, if it is 
assumed that all firms in the market produce at identical costs, they will produce an equal 
amount of the good
8
 and thus will generate identical profits (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2009).  
Due to the assumption of free entry and exit the phenomenon of perfect competition 
can easily be applied to an entire economy with many markets/industries. If in some market 
prices and thus profits are above the competitive norm of the economy
9
 firms will 
immediately move their capital to this more profitable market and offer the same product at a 
lower price. This process continues as long as profits in this market exceed the competitive 
level. Similarly, profits below the competitive level encourage firms to move their capital to 
more profitable markets (Schohl, 1990). Consequently, a general competitive equilibrium 
across all markets in the economy results. This equilibrium implies that differences in the 
profit level can neither occur within single industries nor between firms in different industries 
and that each firm’s profits must be equal to the competitive norm in the long run.10 
 
3.2. Concepts of industrial organization 
 
The central idea of industrial organization theory is that structural industry characteristics are 
the main driver of firm performance. In contrast to the model of perfect competition, 
industrial organization theory allows for imperfect market structures that are determined by 
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 In perfect competition it follows that firms produce an output which ensures that its marginal costs are equal to 
the given market price (i.e. its marginal revenue).  
9
 Within the theoretical frameworks described in this chapter as well as in the literature analyzing the occurrence 
of abnormal profits at a specific point in time, the competitive norm in general refers to zero profits. This implies 
that the term abnormal profit simply refers to profits or losses in these cases. However, the empirical estimation 
of persistence in abnormal profits generally uses average profitability of firms as a measure for the competitive 
norm. 
10
 Within this framework, abnormal profits can theoretically occur in the short-run since it can be assumed that 
firms cannot easily build up new plants and enter an industry in the short run (Carlton and Perloff, 2005). 
However, if it is assumed that entry can occur indefinitely fast, which implies that abnormal profits are 
immediately driven back to the competitive norm, deviations from the competitive norm cannot occur in the 
short run either. 
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barriers to entry or exit as well as other factors that can be related to the magnitude of 
competition in the industry such as the degree of concentration or vertical integration of firms 
(Carlton and Perloff, 2005).
11
 Firms operating in industries characterized by imperfect market 
structures can generate abnormal profits in the long run. However, this approach does not 
account for differences in the magnitude of abnormal profits among firms within the same 
industry.
12
 
 As industrial organization focuses on the structural characteristics of the industry as 
the main driver of abnormal profits, this branch of research is often referred to as the industry-
view (IV). 
 
3.2.1. The industry structure as a driver for abnormal profits 
 
Within microeconomic theory the structure of an industry is generally defined according to 
the number of operating firms and the extent of entry and exit barriers. In what follows, the 
most common market structures are described together with the respective implications for 
abnormal profits.  
As illustrated above, a structure characterized by perfect competition occurs in 
markets with a large number of firms and consumers as well as an absence of barriers to entry 
and exit. In industries characterized by full competition, firms produce an amount of output 
that ensures marginal costs are equal to the given market price (i.e. its marginal revenue) and 
due to the absence of entry barriers generate profits equal to the competitive norm in the long 
run.
13
  
In contrast, a monopolistic structure is characterized by a single firm - the monopolist - 
that operates in a market characterized by barriers to entry and a large number of consumers. 
As opposed to price-taking firms operating in industries with perfect competition, the 
monopolist does not have to fear an undercut by competitors and can therefore directly 
influence the price through its output decision. He therefore faces a declining demand curve. 
Similar to perfect competition, the monopolist produces a level of output which ensures that 
marginal revenues equal marginal costs in order to maximize profits. As opposed to perfect 
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 Other factors that can determine the industry structure are e.g. the available technology, the availability of raw 
materials, the elasticity of demand, or government regulations that affect the degree of competition in the 
industry such as antitrust measures or specific taxes and subsidies (Carlton and Perloff, 2005). 
12
 An exception is the Stackelberg model which is described below. Here firms can achieve higher abnormal 
profits compared to other firms in the same industry through the creation of first mover advantages. 
13
 In the short run it is possible that the price exceeds average costs, which implies that firms make abnormal 
profits. However, new entry is induced by abnormal profits, which leads to an outward shift of the industry 
supply curve and a price that is equal to the minimum level of average costs.  
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competition the resulting amount of output is lower while the price exceeds marginal as well 
as average costs. This implies that the monopolist, due to the existence of barriers to entry, 
generates profits above the competitive norm of the economy in the long-run equilibrium. The 
level of abnormal profits thereby depends on the price-elasticity of demand (Carlton and 
Perloff, 2005; Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2009).
14
 
 An industry structure of monopolistic competition is characterized by an absence of 
entry barriers and a large number of firms. However, unlike in perfect competition the 
products of individual firms are differentiated and therefore imperfect substitutes. 
Consequently, similar to a monopoly, firms that operate in monopolistic competition have a 
certain degree of market power and are facing a downward sloping demand curve. In the 
short run the price exceeds marginal costs as well as average costs meaning that firms 
generate abnormal profits.  Nonetheless, due to the absence of entry barriers, abnormal profits 
will induce entry of new firms and as a consequence decreasing market shares that are 
reflected in a downward shift of each firm’s demand curve. This process continues to the 
point until the demand curve is tangent to the average cost curve and thus the price equals the 
average costs. The result is that firms operating in monopolistic competition are unable to 
generate abnormal profits in the long-run equilibrium. However, as the products of firms 
remain differentiated even in the long run, firms always face a declining demand curve and 
have a certain degree of market power. The price therefore exceeds marginal costs even in the 
long-run equilibrium where all firms achieve profits equal to the competitive norm (Pindyck 
and Rubinfeld, 2009). 
Oligopolistic structures occur when a small number of firms operate in an industry 
protected by entry barriers. In general this market form can be divided into cooperative and 
non-cooperative oligopolies. In cooperative oligopolies or cartels, a small number of firms 
arrange their actions in a way that maximizes joint profits. In the ‘ideal’ case, where all firms 
join the cartel, the result will be that of a monopolist where the joint profit is divided among 
the cartel members. As the number of cartel members decreases, due to the fact that some 
firms decide to violate the cartel agreement by raising the amount of output above the optimal 
cartel level, overall industry profits decrease. The overall profit level and its pattern of 
division on firms in the industry depend on the allocation of cartel members and non-cartel 
firms as well as on the overall number of firms in the industry. However, as only a limited 
number of firms operate in the oligopolistic industry, and new entry is restricted, firms are 
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 The degree of monopoly power - i.e. the ability to profitably set the price above marginal costs - increases as 
demand becomes less elastic. This relationship can easily be derived by rearranging the condition for profit 
maximization (e.g. Carlton and Perloff, 2005: 91ff). 
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always able to achieve profits above the competitive norm of the economy in the long-run 
equilibrium (Carlton and Perloff, 2005). 
Non-cooperative oligopolies are similarly characterized by a small number of firms 
operating in an industry that is protected by entry barriers. However, in contrast to 
cooperation, in non-cooperative oligopolies firms operate independently and have to consider 
the behavior of competing firms when making their own decisions. Non-cooperative 
oligopolies are usually described by game-theoretical models which differ in the decisions 
that firms can make (e.g., setting either the price or the level of output), the order in which 
firms make their decisions (e.g., which firm can set the price first) or the duration of the game 
(one period vs. many periods). The degree of abnormal profits that individual firms can 
achieve in non-cooperative oligopolies depends on these issues. For simplicity it is usually 
assumed that firms produce an identical good and can solely decide on the price or the level of 
output (Carlton and Perloff, 2005). In what follows, the three most important models of non-
cooperative oligopolies are summarized.  
The Cournot-model assumes that firms simultaneously set the production quantity 
whilst taking into account possible reactions of their competitors. The profit maximizing level 
of production of each firm decreases as the expected quantity produced by other firms 
increases. This relationship can be described by means of a best-response function that, for 
each firm, specifies the profit maximizing production level as a function of the other firm’s 
production quantity. In the Cournot equilibrium each firm’s expectation of its competitors’ 
output decisions proves to be true and all firms produce the amount of output that maximizes 
their own profits, given its correct expectation of the other firms’ output decision.15 The 
degree to which firms can set the price above marginal costs and generate abnormal profits 
depends on the number of firms operating in the industry. In an industry with only one firm 
the Cournot-model describes the monopoly situation. As the number of firms increases the 
Cournot equilibrium converges to the competitive equilibrium where price equals marginal 
costs. Thus, the Cournot-model allows for any degree of abnormal profits between zero 
(competitive level) and the monopoly level (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2009). 
The Bertrand-model operates on the assumption that all firms simultaneously decide 
on the price. As each firm produces an identical product, consumers will always buy from the 
firm with the lowest price. Thus, firms will undercut each other until each firm’s price equals 
marginal costs (competitive level). In this situation no firm has an incentive to deviate from 
the competitive price since any increase leads to a loss of all its customers. As a consequence, 
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the Bertrand equilibrium is equal to the competitive equilibrium which implies that no firm is 
able to generate abnormal profits (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2009).
16
  The Bertrand-model can 
be extended by the assumption that firms have limited production capacities.
17
 To illustrate 
this issue it is assumed that two firms operate in the market and both firms are limited to 
produce half the amount of output which is demanded in the competitive situation where price 
equals marginal costs.
18
 In this situation the Bertrand equilibrium where the price equals 
marginal costs would be a feasible result as the combined output of both firms would meet the 
market demand at this price level. Nevertheless, if capacity constraints are present, this 
solution is not an equilibrium. If firm one raises its price above marginal costs all consumers 
want to buy from the second firm. However, the second firm can only serve half the market 
due to its limited capacity. Firm one thus faces a positive residual demand and maximizes its 
profits with respect to this residual demand similar to a monopolist, charging a price above 
the competitive level. By acting like a monopolist firm one now makes positive profits 
without exploiting its entire capacities. The second firm, however, can now charge a price 
marginally below the monopoly price of firm one and still attract all the consumers in the 
market. While firm one - which acts like a monopolist - does not exhaust its entire capacities, 
the second firm can now sell its entire capacities at a price that is only marginally below the 
monopolistic price of firm one. This implies that the second firm now makes higher profit 
than firm one. However, by similar argumentation, firm one could now set a price slightly 
below the price set by the second firm in order to increase its profits. This underbidding 
continues until a price level
19
 is reached where it is not worthwhile anymore for a firm to 
further underbid the price but rather more profitable to set the monopolistic price which was 
initially set by firm one. Therefore, in the presence of capacity constraints there is no static 
equilibrium with a single price. The result is rather a sequence also referred to as an 
Edgeworth cycle where prices first rise, then fall, and afterwards rise again (Carlton and 
Perloff, 2005). 
The Stackelberg leader-follower model is based on the assumption that firms set the 
production quantity, however, one firm (the leader) is able to set its quantity before the other 
firms (the followers) can decide. The followers have to take the leader’s decision as given and 
therefore maximize profits based on their Cournot best-response functions. When making its 
decision, the leader is aware of the fact that the followers decide based on their Cournot best-
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 However, if the products of individual firms are to some degree differentiated, abnormal profits are possible. 
In this case firms maximize their profits based on the other firms’ price decision. 
17
 With this additional assumption the model is usually referred to as the Edgeworth-model. 
18
 For a numerical example of the Edgeworth Model see Carlton and Perloff (2005: 174 f). 
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 This price is between the competitive price level and the monopolistic one initially set by firm one. 
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response functions. He can therefore determine the total level of industry production and sets 
the quantity which maximizes his own profit. In the Stackelberg equilibrium, the leader as 
well as the followers achieve abnormal profits. As the algebraic depiction of the leader’s ( L ) 
and followers’ ( F ) equilibrium profits in equations (1) and (2) shows, the degree of 
abnormal profits depends on the total number of firms that operate in the industry (n).
20
 As 
soon as there is at least one follower operating in the industry, the profits of the leader fall 
below the monopolistic level ( M ). 
 
(1) nML    
(2) ²)1( nnMF    
 
It can also be seen that the leader generally achieves higher abnormal profits than the 
following firms. The Stackelberg-model therefore postulates that firms should create first 
mover advantages in order to achieve higher degrees of abnormal profits (Carlton and Perloff, 
2005).  
The preceding section has indicated that a long-run equilibrium with firms generating 
abnormal profits can emerge whenever a small number of firms are operating in an industry 
protected by entry barriers. In particular, this was shown for a monopolistic industry structure 
as well as oligopolistic structures in which the core of firms’ strategy consists of setting the 
profit maximizing level of output (Cournot- and Stackelberg-model).  
Based on the textbook theory on oligopolies a variety of studies exist that provide 
theoretical extensions. Ghosh and Mitra (2010) illustrate, for example, how the outcomes of 
the Bertrand- and Cournot-model change if it is assumed that a profit-maximizing private firm 
competes with public firms. While the standard theory supposes that prices and profits are 
lower and quantities and welfare are higher in the Bertrand- compared to the Cournot-model 
Ghosh and Mitra (2010) show that these outcome rankings can be reversed in mixed markets 
with private and public firms. Another strand of studies empirically analyzes the presence of 
cooperative and non-cooperative oligopolies in several sectors. As regards the food sector 
Severová et al. (2011) analyze whether the Czech food retail industry is characterized by an 
oligopolistic structure where a dominant firm competes with several fringe firms. However, 
they do not find evidence for the presence of a dominant firm but rather for strong 
competition among a few firms that operate in this sector.  
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3.2.2. The Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm 
 
The ‘Structure-Conduct-Performance’ (SCP) paradigm was initially developed by Mason 
(1939, 1949) and later empirically assessed by Bain (1956, 1968). It can be seen as the core of 
classical industrial organization (Welge and Al-Laham, 2008). This classical SCP paradigm 
assumes a close relationship between the structure of an industry, the conduct of firms 
operating in the industry and the resulting performance. As Figure 1 indicates, the industry 
structure is assumed to influence the joint conduct or strategy of firms within this industry 
while the strategy in turn determines the collective performance of firms (Porter, 1981). 
 
 
Figure 1: Classical Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm 
 
Source: Porter (1981: 611) 
 
 
The structure encompasses the stable industry factors that determine the degree of 
competition within the industry. Among these factors are: the number and size distribution of 
firms (i.e. concentration), the degree of product differentiation and vertical integration as well 
as the existence of entry barriers (Porter, 1981; Carlton and Perloff, 2005). However, as Bain 
(1971) shows, there is a strong interaction between these factors as entry barriers are amongst 
others determined by the degree of product differentiation and vertical integration. As a 
consequence, Bain mainly focuses on the existence of entry barriers as the factor that 
determines the industry structure.
21
 According to Bain (1971), entry barriers refer to the extent 
to which established firms can persistently raise the price above the competitive level of 
minimum average costs and thus generate abnormal profits. The existence of such barriers 
thereby depends on the following three factors: 
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 Although Bain (1971) assumes that entry barriers are the most important structural characteristic he shows that 
industry concentration can as well be an important structural issue as it has an influence on the effectiveness of 
entry barriers. In industries characterized by collusion due to strong concentration firms will collectively set a 
price that most effectively deters entry subject to the given entry barriers. In less concentrated industries firms 
most likely do not collude and individually set a price. This price, however, might be set in a way that makes 
new entry worthwhile. Thus, in industries with strong concentration barriers to entry are assumed to be more 
effective.   
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1. Absolute cost advantages of incumbent firms:  Such advantages arise if established 
firms are equipped with superior production techniques, rare resources or better 
access to factor markets
22
, and can thus produce at lower costs. New firms 
anticipate the need to cover higher production costs when entering the market and 
can thus be deterred from entry even if the price within the market exceeds the 
competitive level (Bain ,1971; Carlton and Perloff, 2005).    
 
2. Product differentiation advantages: If there are significant differences in 
consumers’ preferences between established and new products, established firms 
may have the ability to sell a similar product at higher prices without losing all 
customers. Thus, new firms would have to bear marketing costs in order to entice 
customers away from the established firms. These costs can deter new firms from 
entering the market despite a price above the competitive level (Bain, 1971; 
Carlton and Perloff, 2005).    
 
3. Economies of scale: If economies of large scale are present in the industry and a 
new firm enters the market at sufficient scale this will either lead to a decrease in 
price or to a decrease in the market share of all firms in the industry. In both cases 
new entry would lead to a decrease in profits. Even if the price exceeds the 
competitive level, a potential entrant anticipates the effects of its entry and may be 
deterred from entering whenever he assumes that it does not pay off (Bain, 
1971).
23
     
 
The conduct refers to the strategic options of a firm, that are feasible within the given 
industry structure, such as the firms’ pricing behavior, the production level and quality as well 
as the degree of advertising or research and development expenditure (Porter, 1981; Carlton 
and Perloff, 2005). However, the general perception of classical SCP research by Bain/Mason 
is that the conduct section can be classified as negligible and that a direct connection of the 
industry structure and its performance can be assumed (Porter, 1981).
24
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 The access to factor markets or to rare resources among others depends on the degree of vertical integration in 
the industry. 
23
 It has to be noted that exit barriers, e.g., sunk costs in the form of specialized production technique which is 
needed in order to operate in the industry but hard to resell, can also deter firms from entering the market in the 
first place (Carlton and Perloff, 2005). 
24
 Most empirical SCP research also focuses on a direct relationship between structural characteristics such as 
concentration ratios and performance. 
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Performance within the SCP paradigm is defined rather broadly and can be comprised 
of measures such as profitability, technical efficiency (i.e. the ability to minimize costs) or 
innovativeness (Porter, 1981). 
Due to the direct influence of structure on performance and a focus on entry barriers as 
the main determinant of industry structure, it can be concluded that it is the presence of such 
entry barriers that leads to abnormal profits within an industry as it enables firms to set prices 
above the competitive level without inducing new entry. Consequently, firms are able to 
generate abnormal profits whenever they operate in industries that are either characterized by 
absolute cost advantages, product differentiation or economies of large scale.  
 The classical SCP paradigm provides a very general approach to organize the field of 
industrial organization and can therefore be thought of as a summary of the standard 
microeconomic approaches presented in the previous subchapter (Carlton and Perloff, 
2005).
25
 However, the classical SCP paradigm mainly ignores the conduct component and 
thus the strategic actions of individual firms. Abnormal profits are therefore solely explained 
by means of a firm’s industry membership. As a consequence, the degree of abnormal profits 
generated in industries protected by entry barriers is the same for all firms operating in such 
industries. The classical SCP paradigm therefore does not provide an explanatory approach 
for differences in the degree of abnormal profits between individual firms within the same 
industry.
26
  
Starting with Bain (1951) many studies have empirically analyzed the relationship 
between profits, concentration and a variety of variables measuring entry barriers.
27
 
Bain (1951) finds that the rate of return is higher in industries characterized by stronger 
concentration. In a subsequent study Bain (1956) provides evidence that profits are higher in 
industries with strong concentration and high entry barriers. Weiss (1974) provides a survey 
of empirical SCP studies and concludes that there is a significant impact of concentration and 
entry barriers on profit rates. Nevertheless, later studies (e.g. Salinger, 1984) find only weak 
or no evidence for the hypothesis that concentration and entry barriers are related to 
profitability (Carlton and Perloff, 2005).
28
 As Carlton and Perloff (2005) point out most of the 
mentioned studies either suffer from biases in the measures for concentration and profitability 
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 As the previous subchapter has shown, within standard microeconomic theory, the structure and thus the 
degree of abnormal profits in a long-run equilibrium is as well determined by the existence of entry barriers and 
by the number and size distribution of firms in an industry (i.e. concentration). 
26
 However, as was shown in the framework of the Stackelberg-model, firms can create first mover advantages in 
order to achieve higher degrees of abnormal profits than other firms in the same industry (Carlton and Perloff, 
2005).  
27
 Commonly used measures for barriers to entry are: minimum efficient firm size or advertising and capital 
intensity (Carlton and Perloff, 2005). 
28
 See e.g. Viaene and Gellynck (1995) for an empirical SCP study of the European food industry.   
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or are conceptually flawed as it is generally assumed that concentration is an exogenous 
variable.
29
 This would imply that concentration affects profitability and not vice versa. 
However, it might very well be possible, that the more profitable firms are the ones that 
expand and make the industry more concentrated. For this reason subsequent research has 
focused on more dynamic extensions of the classical SCP approach. Some of these 
approaches are presented below.  
 
3.3. Concepts of strategic management  
 
At the beginning of the 1980’s a branch of research referred to as strategic management has 
evolved within business economics. Strategic management research focuses on management 
decisions that are aimed at best utilizing a firm’s resources in accordance with its external 
environment. The external environment comprises all economical, social, political and 
technological issues that are relevant to the establishment of the firm’s strategies and to its 
performance. However, it is usually the industry in which a firm operates that is considered as 
the most relevant external factor (Grant and Nippa, 2006).  
Approaches of strategic management thus focus on industry characteristics and on the 
firm’s strategies in successfully operating in these industries as drivers for abnormal profits. It 
will therefore become apparent that the firm with its strategic decisions and resources 
becomes the focus of attention of research. 
 
3.3.1. Porter’s ‘five-forces’ framework / Market-based view 
 
Porter (1980) provides a framework that relates the level of firm profits to the state of 
competition in the industry where the firm operates. He claims that the degree of competition 
in an industry is determined by the following five forces of competition (cf. Figure 2): 
1. Threat of potential entrants: If new firms enter the industry, prices and as a 
consequence profits decrease. The magnitude of new entry depends on the existence 
and effectiveness of entry barriers. 
2. Competition among existing firms: Rivalry among incumbents occurs if some of the 
existing firms take measures to improve their position within the industry. However, 
such competitive actions by one firm have an influence on the behavior of its 
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competitors and may initiate a series of reactions. This can lead to a decrease in profits 
of all firms in the industry.  
3. Threat of substitutes: All firms in an industry compete with other industries that 
produce substitute products. These substitutes can lower the profit level within the 
industry if they are offered at more attractive prices.  
4. Bargaining power of suppliers: Strong bargaining power of suppliers results if 
concentration among suppliers is stronger than concentration in the considered 
industry. As a consequence suppliers can raise prices or reduce the quality of provided 
goods. This can lead to a decrease in profits of firms in the industry if these firms are 
restricted in raising their own prices.
30
 
5. Bargaining power of buyers: If the downstream sector is characterized by strong 
bargaining power firms in this sector can force down prices and thus also profits of 
firms in the considered industry. Similar to suppliers, bargaining power of the 
downstream sector increases with the degree of concentration.  
 
As Figure 2 shows it is the collective effect of these five forces that finally determines 
the degree of competition and thus the attractiveness of an industry. Within the ‘five-forces’ 
framework, firms can achieve abnormal profits if they either manage to position themselves in 
industries with favorable forces of competition or if they are able to find a position within the 
industry that enables them to effectively defend themselves against the collective strength of 
the five forces of competition (Porter, 1980). Thus, although the competitive forces of the 
industry are the crucial factor that determines the level of firm profits within this framework, 
it is also the firms themselves that can influence their profit level through individual strategic 
behavior (Porter, 1980; Grant and Nippa, 2006). Therefore, contrary to the classical SCP 
paradigm, the conduct component and hence the strategic behavior of the firm is of crucial 
importance within this approach. 
The ‘five-forces‘ framework therefore not only provides an explanatory basis for inter-
industry differences in profit levels but can also serve to explain differences in the profit 
levels of firms that operate in the same industry. 
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Figure 2: Porter’s ‘five-forces’ framework  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Porter (1980: 4, Figure 1-1)  
 
 
As the ‘five-forces’ framework primarily focuses on the market and the strategic 
positioning of firms within this market as the main driver for abnormal profits, it is usually 
also summarized as the market-based view (MBV) (Welge and Al-Laham, 2008). Figure 3 
indicates that the MBV can in general be seen as a dynamic extension of the classical SCP 
paradigm. Firms can favorably influence the structural characteristics of the industry and thus 
the forces of competition through strategic behavior. Examples are the positioning in 
industries with a favorable structure or strategies of vertical integration such as the acquisition 
of (or collusion with) suppliers and buyers which leads to a decrease in pressure from the 
upstream or downstream markets. Through collusion with other participants in the industry 
firms can influence the concentration ratio and thus the degree of competitive rivalry within 
the industry. Via innovation or product differentiation strategies firms can reduce the threat of 
new entrants or substitute products (Porter, 1980; 1981).  
In addition, the performance of firms is assumed to have an impact on their strategic 
behavior as firms adapt their strategies subject to their achieved performance (Welge and Al-
Laham, 2008). 
Regarding empirical evidence on the MBV Setiawan et al. (2012) analyze the 
Indonesian food and beverage industry and extent the classical SCP approach by challenging 
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the single-direction-of-causality assumption running from structure to performance. They find 
evidence for a positive bi-directional relationship between structure measured by 
concentration and performance.  
 
 
Figure 3: Market-based view 
 
 
Source: Porter (1981: 616) 
 
 
3.3.2. The resource-based view 
 
During the 1990’s the focus of strategic management research has further shifted from 
external industry specific sources of firm profitability to sources that can be found within the 
firm itself. The ‘resource-based view’ (RBV) summarizes those concepts of strategic 
management which focus on firm’s idiosyncratic resource endowments as the main driver of 
persisting abnormal profits (Welge and Al-Laham, 2008). Therefore, a major contribution of 
the RBV is the fact that it provides a basis to explain long-lasting abnormal profits that cannot 
be attributed to specific industry characteristics (Peteraf, 1993).  
The RBV (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993) states that differences in firm profitability 
within the same industry are the consequence of firms’ heterogeneous resource endowments. 
Each firm can in general be considered as a portfolio of unique and strategically important 
resources that enable it to implement strategies that generate persistent abnormal profits 
(Barney, 1991; Welge and Al-Laham, 2008). According to Barney (1991) these resources can 
be classified into three categories:
31
  
 
1. Physical capital resources: The physical technology used by a firm such as the firm’s 
buildings and machinery, its geographic location or its access to raw material markets. 
2. Human capital resources: These include the experience, intelligence and skills of a 
firm’s managers and workers.  
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3. Organizational capital resources: These are a firm’s planning, controlling and 
incentive systems, information- and communication systems as well as its 
organizational- and management structure. 
 
Barney (1991) shows that such resources can serve as a driver of persisting abnormal 
profits if they are heterogeneously distributed and imperfectly mobile
32
 between competing 
firms in an industry. Barney assumes that the following four resource characteristics 
determine the degree of resource heterogeneity and immobility: 
 
1. Valuable: Resources are valuable if they provide a firm with the possibility to 
implement strategies that enhance the firm’s efficiency and effectiveness.  
2. Rare: A resource is rare if it is not possessed by a large number of competing firms. A 
valuable resource that is possessed by many firms would provide each of these firms 
with the possibility of implementing efficient strategies thus giving no firm a 
competitive advantage that leads to abnormal profits. 
3. Imperfectly imitable: Valuable and rare resources can only be a driver of abnormal 
firm profits if other firms that do not possess these resources cannot copy them.   
4. Not substitutable: There are no strategically equivalent resources which are valuable 
but either not rare or imitable. If there were strategically equivalent resources that are 
either not rare or imitable many other firms could implement the same efficient 
strategy thus leaving none of the firms with the possibility of generating abnormal 
profits. 
 
Opposed to the industry-view or the classical SCP paradigm, the resource-based view 
drops the assumption that firms within an industry are identical regarding their resources and 
strategies. Individual firms within industries can implement strategies on the basis of 
valuable, rare, inimitable and non substitutable resources that lead to persisting abnormal 
profits. Thus, contrary to the industry-view or the classical SCP paradigm, the RBV has the 
advantage that it allows for persisting differences in abnormal profits across firms in the same 
industry. Due to its focus on firm characteristics the RBV is often also referred to as the firm-
view. However, despite providing new theoretical insights regarding firm profitability the 
RBV has the disadvantage that - compared to the SCP paradigm or the MBV -  it completely 
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neglects the impact of external sources of firm profits and therefore does not account, e.g., for 
influences of the industry structure on firm profits. 
In the course of its development the RBV has been intensively criticized amongst 
others due to the lack of a temporal component (Priem and Butler, 2001). Armstrong and 
Shimizu (2007), based on a review of the empirical RBV literature, propose that in order to 
further develop the resource-based theory issues such as industry conditions and development 
over time need to be incorporated. Kraaijenbrink et al. (2010) suggest that future research on 
the RBV should aim at merging this theory with the inherently dynamic framework of 
Austrian economics
33
. 
 
3.3.3. The knowledge-based view 
 
The term ‘knowledge-based view’ (KBV) summarizes a category of concepts that focus on 
the firms’ idiosyncratic knowledge as the driving resource for abnormal profits. At this it is 
distinguished between explicit and tacit knowledge. Explicit knowledge mainly comprises 
facts and theories that can easily be documented. It is therefore reproducible at low costs and 
without high effort can be transferred between individuals or firms. Tacit knowledge on the 
other hand is defined as knowledge that can only be acquired through time-consuming 
learning processes and is thus not easily transferrable between individuals or firms (Grant and 
Nippa, 2006; Welge and Al-Laham, 2008). It is therefore hard to imitate by competitors and is 
hence the kind of knowledge that is of high strategic relevance for firms in order to generate 
abnormal profits (Welge and Al-Laham, 2008). 
Knowledge-based concepts can be seen as extensions of the classical RBV as they 
provide a clear substantiation of the resource-term. In addition, it is assumed that the firms’ 
ability to extend its knowledge, through learning processes, significantly contributes to the 
firms’ ability of generating abnormal profits (Welge and Al-Laham, 2008). Hence in contrast 
to the classical RBV, the KBV also incorporates dynamic processes that focus on the creation, 
extension and accumulation of knowledge. It is therefore also referred to as ‘dynamic-
resource approach’ (Welge and Al-Laham, 2008). An additional approach within the 
knowledge-based theory is the so called ‘core-competency approach’ by Prahalad and 
Hamel (1990). This approach is based on the hypothesis that abnormal profits are a result of a 
firm’s unique competencies and capabilities that enable the firm to use its resources in a way 
that leads to competitive advantages. It is therefore not the firm’s resource endowment itself, 
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but rather its knowledge and competence in efficiently using its resources that enables a firm 
to achieve competitive advantages and generate abnormal profits (Welge and Al-Laham, 
2008). 
Similar to the RBV, approaches of the KBV can serve as an explanatory basis for 
abnormal profits of individual firms within the same industry. Nevertheless, in accordance 
with the RBV the KBV neglects the impact of external sources such as industry structure on 
firm profits. However, in comparison to the RBV, a clear improvement of the KBV is its 
dynamic perspective. As the following subchapter shows, dynamic processes are of crucial 
importance when analyzing the development and persistence of abnormal profits over time. 
 
3.4. A dynamic view of competition 
 
The theoretical approaches presented so far are mainly of static nature as they focus on the 
long-run equilibrium state of abnormal profits. These models can thus either serve to model 
the occurrence of abnormal profits at a specific point in time
34
 or to explain the persistence of 
abnormal profits in a long-run equilibrium. However, it is also the development of abnormal 
profits from period to period which - besides the value of abnormal profits in the long-run 
equilibrium - serves as an important indicator for persistence in abnormal profits.
35
 It is 
therefore also important to gain insight into the dynamics of competition over time from a 
theoretical point of view.  
The theoretical perspective that focuses on dynamic competition is referred to as 
Schumpeter’s (1934, 1950) theory of competition.36 Schumpeter describes competition as a 
dynamic process where firms introduce innovations that are subsequently imitated by 
innovations of other firms. In the extreme case, the initial innovating firm has a monopoly 
position where it can generate a respective degree of abnormal profits. This, however, attracts 
other firms to copy the initial innovation, initiating a process of imitation that leads to an 
erosion of the initial abnormal profits. Thus, a cross-section of firms at any point in time 
consists of both innovating as well as imitating firms. It can therefore be assumed that firm 
profits within an industry deviate from each other at each point in time. It could indeed very 
well be expected that the process of innovation and imitation, which is also referred to as 
‘creative destruction’, drives the profits of all firms towards the competitive norm in the long 
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run (Cable and Mueller, 2008). However, within this framework it is instead assumed that a 
stringing together of first mover advantages that arise from initial innovations deter at least 
some of the firms from ever arriving at the competitive norm (Baaij et al., 2007; Cable and 
Mueller, 2008). Therefore, a continuous disequilibrium can occur where some firms generate 
persistent abnormal profits (Wiggins and Ruefli, 2005).  
Hence the focus of the Schumpeterian perspective is on the properties of the process of 
abnormal profits over time and not on the characteristics of the long-run state (Geroski, 1990). 
In general, the sequences of innovation and imitation can lead to complex time paths of 
profits with phases of persistent divergence from the competitive norm, periods with 
convergence to the norm or intervals where profits persist at a level close or even equal to the 
competitive norm (Cable and Mueller, 2008). 
According to the two views of competition described in this subchapter, the following 
section will present econometric models that incorporate both a long- as well as a short-run 
measure for persistence that accounts for the dynamics of abnormal profits between periods.  
 
4. Econometric models  
 
In order to estimate the factors that determine the magnitude of abnormal profits at a specific 
point in time the majority of previous studies (e.g. Schmalensee, 1985; Rumelt, 1991) either 
use analysis of variance (ANOVA) or the components of variance (COV) method. Therefore, 
the first paper of the present thesis (chapter 2) also implements ANOVA and COV in order to 
provide a basis for comparison to previous research. However, the emphasis of the first paper 
is put on a hierarchical linear model (HLM). Addressing some of the econometric drawbacks 
of classical ANOVA and COV, HLM is a rather new and more sophisticated econometric 
method to determine the drivers of abnormal firm profits at a specific point in time. 
Additionally, while ANOVA and COV only enable the estimation of entire effect classes 
(e.g., firm or industry effects), the HLM method allows for estimating the impact of structural 
firm and industry characteristics on the degree of abnormal profits (Hough, 2006; Misangyi et 
al., 2006). A detailed description of ANOVA, COV and HLM is given when these approaches 
are implemented in the first paper (chapter 2). Thus, in order to avoid repetitions, ANOVA, 
COV and HLM are not presented again at this point.  
In the profit persistence literature a two-step methodology has become the standard 
method for the estimation of the degree of persistence and its drivers. In the first step the 
degree of profit persistence is estimated using simple autoregressive models. The second step 
Extended introduction 
24 
is aimed at estimating the drivers of profit persistence by regressing structural firm and 
industry characteristics on the persistence parameters derived in the first estimation step (e.g. 
Mueller, 1990; Yurtoglu, 2004; Gschwandtner, 2005). This thesis additionally implements a 
dynamic panel model in order to overcome some of the econometrical shortcomings of the 
two-step standard approach. As will become apparent below, the dynamic panel model is a 
more sophisticated approach for the estimation of profit persistence and therefore serves as an 
improvement of the methodology used in the literature so far. Both models are explained in 
greater detail when implemented in papers two and three of the present thesis. However, as 
these approaches are not as straightforward this subchapter provides additional information in 
particular regarding the interpretation of the estimation results.  
 
4.1. The autoregressive model 
  
Starting with Mueller (1986, 1990)
37
 a simple autoregressive model of order one (AR(1)) has 
become the standard econometric approach for the estimation of profit persistence:  
 
(3) titiiiti ,1,,     
 
where it  is firm i’s profit at time t and ti,  is an error term with zero mean and constant 
variance. 
In this thesis, profitability of firm i at time t ( ti, ) is measured as the deviation of a 
firm’s return on assets (ROA) from the competitive norm which is approximated by mean 
sample ROA in t:
38
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where n is the number of firms in the analyzed sample. As ti,  measures the deviation of firm 
i’s profits from the competitive norm it can be interpreted as abnormal profits.39 For example, 
a firm with abnormal profits of 11.0, ti  is generating ROA’s that exceed the competitive 
norm by 11 percentage points in period t. 
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The estimation of equation (3) leads to two persistence measures for each firm i . The 
first one is 
iˆ , which in the literature is often referred to as short-run persistence. The value of
iˆ , is a proxy for the speed at which the forces of competition drive abnormal profits to the 
long-run value of the AR process.
40 In addition, the smaller 
iˆ  the less past abnormal profits 
are related to today’s abnormal profits and the higher the fluctuations of abnormal profits 
between periods. Thus, as iˆ  captures the dynamics of abnormal profits between periods it 
can be interpreted as a measure for competition in the Schumpeterian sense (Geroski, 1990; 
Yurtoglu, 2004). Most previous profit persistence studies use the mean value of iˆ  across all 
firms in an analyzed sample as an indicator for the degree of short-run persistence within it.  
The second persistence measure is the long-run value to which, according to the 
model, a firm’s time series of abnormal profits is approaching when t . This long-run 
persistence value which can be interpreted as a measure of permanent rents that are not eroded 
by the competitive process is defined by the limit of equation (3): 
 
 
 
(5) )ˆ1(ˆˆ iiip    
 
The value of ipˆ  can therefore be easily derived from the estimates of equation (3) iˆ  
and iˆ .
41
 As ipˆ  indicates the value of firm i’s abnormal profits when t  it can be seen as 
a proxy for the long-run equilibrium value of abnormal profits. For example, according to the 
neoclassical model of perfect competition, ipˆ  should be equal to zero for all firms as this 
model does not allow for abnormal profits in the long-run equilibrium. Therefore, 
significantly positive or negative values of ipˆ  can be seen as an indicator of abnormal profits 
in the static neoclassical sense (Geroski, 1990; Yurtoglu, 2004).  
In the literature it is usually the fraction of    ’s significantly different from zero in a 
given sample of firms which is used as the indicator of the degree of long-run profit 
persistence within this sample. 
Gschwandtner (2005) introduces an extension of the classical methodology. This so-
called ‘best lag model’ extends the simple autoregressive process of order one by estimating 
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autoregressive models up to fourth order and afterwards choosing the ‘best lag’ for each firm 
by means of the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBC).
42
 With this extension 
equation (3) becomes:   
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where L
 
is the number of lags of the ‘best’ autoregressive process.   
Short-run persistence is now measured by the sum of the individual regression 
coefficients 

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L
j
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1
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The ‘best lag model’ is an important extension of the standard methodology as several 
studies have shown that the adjustment path of profits might be more complex than a simple 
AR(1) can capture (Gschwandtner, 2012). For example, Glen et al. (2001) show that AR(2) is 
a more sophisticated method to model profitability over time. Cable and Jackson (2008) use 
structural time series analysis on a sample of 53 UK companies and find evidence for cyclical 
behavior which might not be adequately captured by a simple AR(1) process.  
In summary, the ‘best lag model’ is better suited to adequately capture the dynamics in 
profit time series than a simple AR(1). At the same time this extension still allows 
comparability with most of the previous literature based on the standard AR(1) model. 
 
4.2. Interpreting the two persistence measures iˆ  and ipˆ  
 
While iˆ  
is consistent with the general interpretation of the term ‘persistence’ in time series 
analysis (e.g. Baltagi and Griffin, 2006), Mueller (1986) was the first to emphasize the 
importance of ipˆ  
as an additional measure for profit persistence. Gschwandtner (2012) 
stresses, that it is important to consider both persistence measures jointly. She emphasizes that 
there might be firms whose profits converge very slowly to a low long-run value. This would 
imply a high short-run persistence value ( iˆ ) while long-run persistence as measured by ipˆ  is 
rather low. Vice versa firms might exist that are characterized by fast convergence of 
abnormal profits on a high long-run value implying a low iˆ  
and a high value of ipˆ . 
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Therefore, in order to correctly assess a firm’s competitive position and its degree of profit 
persistence it seems reasonable to consider a combination of the two persistence measures.  
The following examples shall serve to illustrate the interpretation of the two 
persistence measures. Figure 4 provides an example of the application of the ‘best lag model’ 
to a Belgian dairy.
43
 For this firm’s profit time series, the autoregressive process of order two 
resulted in the ‘best’ model based on the SBC. The estimation yields a long-run persistence 
value of 0.152. Therefore, according to the model, this firm is earning long-run profits 15.2 
percentage points above the competitive norm. The short-run persistence value (    ) turns out 
to be 0.224. As the decay of abnormal profits that occur in the initial period takes place 
according to    ,    
 
,    
 
,…,   
 
 over periods, a     value of 0.224 implies that around 5 % of 
abnormal profits initially generated remain after two periods. By and large this firm can be 
considered as a rather persistent firm especially regarding long-run persistence. 
 
 
Figure 4: Application of the ‘best lag model’ to a firm with high ipˆ    
 
Data source: Own calculations based on AMADEUS (2010) database. 
Notes: iˆ  = short-run persistence; ipˆ  = long-run persistence; ti,  = time series of abnormal profits 
 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the application of the ‘best lag model’ to a small French company 
with around 20 employees active in NACE 1581 ‘Manufacture of bread; manufacture of fresh 
pastry goods and cakes’ (AMADEUS, 2010). For this firm the AR process of order one turned 
out to be the ‘best’ model. This firm’s long-run value of 032.0ˆ ip  indicates that the firm is 
estimated to earn long-run profits of only around 3 percentage points above the competitive 
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norm. As the long-run persistence value is close to zero this firm seems to be characterized by 
strong competition in the static neoclassical sense. For this firm abnormal profits fluctuate 
heavily around the long-run value which is reflected by a large negative 
iˆ  
value of -0.765.
44
 
Given these facts, this company can be considered as an example for a firm characterized by 
low profit persistence. 
 
 
Figure 5: Application of the ‘best lag model’ to a firm with negative 
iˆ   
 
Data source: Own calculations based on AMADEUS (2010) database. 
Notes: iˆ  = short-run persistence; ipˆ  = long-run persistence; ti,  = time series of abnormal profits 
 
 
Figure 6 shows the application of the AR(1) model to a French wine processor. This 
firm can also be considered as less persistent with a iˆ  value of 0.049 and a ipˆ  
value of -
0.05. The short-run value indicates that only 4.9 % of abnormal profits initially generated 
remain one period later and that initial profits are almost completely eroded two periods later 
with only 0.24 % of the initial value remaining. The ipˆ  
value indicates that this firm is 
generating profits 5 percentage points below the competitive norm in the long run. At this 
point it must be noted that negative abnormal profits, even when persisting in the long run, do 
not necessarily have to drive a firm out of the market as the competitive norm can be larger 
than zero which implies that the firm may still generate positive profits. 
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Figure 6: Application of the ‘best lag model’ to a firm with negative ipˆ    
 
Data source: Own calculations based on AMADEUS (2010) database. 
Notes: iˆ  = short-run persistence; ipˆ  = long-run persistence; ti,  = time series of abnormal profits 
 
The French chocolate manufacturer which is presented in Figure 7 can be considered 
as a firm characterized by strong profit persistence especially regarding the short-run value 
which is estimated as 91.0ˆ i . The exceptionally high value indicates that even after ten 
years 38.9 % of initial abnormal profits remain. Thus, this firm seems to realize permanent 
advantages in the Schumpeterian way of competition. In addition long-run persistence is 
estimated as 053.0ˆ ip  indicating that this firm generates profit 5.3 percentage points above 
the norm in the long run. 
 
Figure 7: Application of the ‘best lag model’ to a firm with high iˆ      
 
 
Data source: Own calculations based on AMADEUS (2010) database. 
Notes: iˆ  = short-run persistence; ipˆ  = long-run persistence; ti,  = time series of abnormal profits 
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4.3. Estimation of the drivers of profit persistence 
 
While in the first step of the standard-method the magnitude of profit persistence is examined, 
the second step of the estimation is aimed at explaining the drivers of iˆ
 
and ipˆ . Specific 
variables that are either related to the firms themselves or to the industries in which the firms 
operate are regressed on the two persistence parameters iˆ
 
and ipˆ :  
 
(7) i
k
j ijji
Xc    1 ,ˆ   
  
and   i
k
j ijji
Xcp    1 ,ˆ   
 
where the jX ’s are k industry and firm variables and i  is an error term with zero mean and 
constant variance. Hence the impact of the jX ’s on the profit persistence measures can be 
quantified by the jˆ ’s. 
 Additionally, in order to improve the standard two-step methodology, a dynamic panel 
model based on Arellano and Bond’s (1991) GMM estimator is implemented. The dynamic 
panel model is a rather new approach in the profit persistence literature and has so far only 
been implemented in a few studies (e.g. Goddard et al., 2005; Gschwandtner, 2012). The 
improvements along with the shortcomings of this method in comparison to the standard two-
step approach are described in detail when implemented in chapters 3 and 4. In what follows, 
a brief description of the approach is given. The dynamic panel model is based on the 
following equation: 
 
(8) tititij
j
jtitij
j
jti XX ,1,,,1,,,, )()(      
 
Equation (8) estimates a short-run persistence measure ( ˆ ) as well as the impact of 
the structural variables jX  on this short-run measure (by means of the jˆ ’s) in one 
estimation step. Contrary to the standard two-step approach which yields short-run persistence 
measures for each individual firm and then takes the mean across the sample as a measure for 
short-run persistence, the dynamic panel approach yields a single short-run persistence 
measure ( ˆ ) that applies for all firms in the analyzed sample. The short-run persistence 
measures ˆ  and the mean iˆ  of the standard AR approach are, however, not directly 
comparable due to methodological differences in the methods.  
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The dynamic panel approach does not yield a long-run persistence measure 
comparable to the ipˆ  of the standard approach. However, as jˆ  reflects the impact of jX on 
abnormal profits over the entire time period analyzed, it can be assumed that the direction of 
this impact prevails in the long run. It is therefore possible to assess the direction of change in 
long-run profit persistence for a given change in the variables jX  by means of the algebraic 
signs of the jˆ ‘s.  
 
5. The EU food economy 
5.1. Relevance of the EU food industry 
 
The food industry
45
 is one of the most important sectors within EU manufacturing. 287,230 
firms were active in the food industry in 2010 creating a turnover of €954 billion and 
providing employment for 4.3 million people (Eurostat, 2012). A large variety of economical 
activities are covered by the food industry, ranging from the processing of bakery products to 
a diverse meat sector to the production of a very heterogeneous range of beverages. This 
implies that the industry is the basis for the daily diet of consumers across the EU. 
Furthermore, despite a continuous decline in the share of EU exports in world markets within 
recent years (24.6 % in 1998 to 17.5 % in 2008), the EU is still the world’s leading exporter 
of food and beverages followed by the U.S., Brazil, China and Canada (CIAA, 2010). 
 
 
Table 1: Shares of food industry
a
 in total manu- 
               facturing
b 
(2010) 
Turnover 
Value added  
Employment 
Enterprises 
 
14.88 % 
12.82 % 
15.07 % 
13.48 % 
 
Data source:  Own calculations based on Eurostat (2012) 
a
 Manufacture of food products and beverages excluding 
tobacco according to NACE
 
Rev. 1.1 division DA15 
b
 Total manufacturing according to NACE Rev 1.1 Section D 
 
 
                                                          
45
 Manufacture of food products and beverages excluding tobacco in the EU-27. According to NACE
 
Rev. 1.1 
division DA15 or NACE Rev. 2.0 divisions C10 and C11. NACE (Nomenclature generale des activites 
economiques dans les commumautes Europeeanes) is the statistical classification of economic activities in the 
European Community. 
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As indicated by Table 1 the food industry constitutes one of the largest economic 
sectors within the European economy contributing around 15 % to total manufacturing 
turnover and around 13 % to total manufacturing value added in 2010. The 2010 shares of 
food industry employment and enterprises in total manufacturing are around 15 and 13 %, 
respectively.  
The economic importance of the food industry becomes even more apparent when it is 
compared to other important manufacturing sectors. As Table 2 shows, the food industry 
contributes the largest share to total manufacturing turnover followed by the manufacture of 
motor vehicles, the manufacture of machinery and the manufacture of coke and petroleum. 
Regarding the shares in total manufacturing value added and employment the food industry 
takes first place as well followed by the manufacture of machinery. The last column of Table 
2 indicates that the food industry also has the largest share with regard to the number of 
enterprises. The issue of firm size is very important in the food industry and will be described 
in more detail below.  
 
 
Table 2: The food industry
a
 in comparison with other manufacturing sectors.     
               Shares of leading industries in total manufacturing
b
 (2010)
 
Subsector
c
 Turnover Value added Employment Enterprises 
Manuf.
d
 of food and bev.
 
Manuf. of motor vehicles 
Manuf. of machinery 
Manuf. of coke & petroleum 
14.88% 
11.55% 
8.52% 
7.80% 
12.82% 
8.87% 
10.86% 
1.48% 
15.07% 
7.64% 
9.78% 
0.45% 
13.48% 
0.96% 
4.60% 
0.05% 
Data source:  Own calculations based on Eurostat (2012) 
a
 Manufacture of food products and beverages excluding tobacco. According to NACE
 
Rev. 1.1 division DA15 
b
 Total manufacturing according to NACE Rev 1.1 Section D 
c
 Abbreviated industry description. For a detailed industry description see Table 31 & Table 32 in the appendix. 
d
 Manuf. = Manufacture 
 
 
Table 3 depicts the economic contributions of the EU member countries to the food 
industry by listing each country’s share of food industry turnover in total EU food industry 
turnover. As mentioned above, the five countries analyzed in the present thesis were - along 
with general availability of data - chosen based on their economic relevance measured by 
these shares. Germany is the European leader regarding food industry turnover with a 
contribution of 18.6 % followed by France (18.4 %), the UK (11.4 %), Spain (10.3 %) and 
Italy (10.1 %). However, for German firms data availability during the analyzed period is 
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sparse due to a lack of legal requirements to publish balance sheet data.
46
 Nevertheless, with 
France, the UK, Spain and Italy four of the top five countries regarding turnover are included 
in the analysis. Belgium, the fifth country included, takes eighth place with a share of 3.7 % in 
total EU food industry turnover. Thus, the five countries included in the sample together 
contribute around 54 % to total EU food industry turnover. This implies that a large fraction 
of the EU food industry is covered by the analysis.  
 
 
Table 3: Contributions of countries to the EU food industry
a
 (2007)
 
Country 
% share of country in total 
EU food industry
 
turnover
 
 
Country 
% share of country in total 
EU food industry
 
turnover
 
 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Germany 
Estonia 
Ireland 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Italy 
Cyprus 
Latvia 
3.72 
0.42 
0.97 
2.12 
18.55 
0.15 
2.57 
1.33 
10.30 
18.44 
10.14 
0.15 
0.19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Hungary 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Slovenia 
Slovakia 
Finland 
Sweden 
United 
Kingdom 
0.32 
n.a. 
1.21 
n.a. 
5.48 
1.93 
4.67 
1.44 
1.08 
0.23 
0.28 
0.95 
1.76 
11.39 
 
 
Data source:  Own calculations based on Eurostat (2010) 
Note: This table is based on 2007 data as this is the last year for which sufficient data for all countries is 
available. Data for Czech Republic from 2001, for Denmark, Finland, Italy and Slovakia from 2002. 
a
 Manufacture of food products and beverages excluding tobacco. According to NACE
 
Rev. 1.1 division DA15 
 
 
Table 4 lists the shares of food industry turnover in total manufacturing turnover per 
country. As the table shows, the food industry is of major economic importance in Cyprus, 
Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Greece and Ireland, where the share of food industry turnover in 
total manufacturing turnover exceeds 20 %. Additionally, the food industry tends to play an 
important role in those countries which more recently joined the EU in 2004
47
 and 2007
48
. 
Here, in seven of those ten countries for which data is available the share is larger than 15 %. 
On the contrary, the food industry is of less economic importance in Austria, Germany and 
Finland where its contribution to total manufacturing turnover is less than 10 %. Regarding 
                                                          
46
 For Germany the obligation for non-publicly quoted firms to publish financial statements is only effective 
since 2007 (due to §325 HGB. Available e.g. at: http://www.buzer.de/gesetz/3486/a48769.htm, accessed last: 
16. Oct. 2012). 
47
 Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary, Malta and Cyprus. 
48
 Romania and Bulgaria. 
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the five countries analyzed in the present thesis, the food industry contributes between 11.5 % 
(Italy) and 17.0 % (Spain) to total manufacturing turnover.  
 
Table 4: Shares of food industry turnover in total manufacturing
a
 turnover   
               per country (2007) 
Country 
% share of food industry
b 
turnover within country
 
 
Country 
% share of food industry
b 
turnover within country 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Germany 
Estonia 
Ireland 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Italy 
Cyprus 
Latvia 
13.48 
16.34 
n.a. 
25.70 
8.69 
15.97 
20.86 
20.93 
17.04 
14.56 
11.51 
36.85 
24.01 
 Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Hungary 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Slovenia 
Slovakia 
Finland 
Sweden 
United 
Kingdom 
21.37 
n.a. 
12.60 
n.a. 
18.01 
9.85 
18.81 
16.20 
16.79 
8.22 
13.34 
8.38 
n.a. 
14.44 
 
Data source:  Own calculations based on Eurostat (2010) 
Note: This table is based on 2007 data as this is the last year for which sufficient data for all countries is 
available. Data for Czech Republic from 2001, for Denmark, Finland, Italy and Slovakia from 2002. 
a
 Total manufacturing according to NACE Rev 1.1 Section D 
b
 Manufacture of food products and beverages excluding tobacco. According to NACE
 
Rev. 1.1 division DA15 
 
 
5.2. Structure and developments of the EU food industry 
 
As mentioned above, the food industry is the sector that has by far the largest share in total 
manufacturing regarding the number of enterprises (13.5 %, cf. Table 2). This is mainly due 
to the industries firm size structure with the majority of enterprises being micro and small 
sized. Table 5 shows the allocation of firms within food manufacturing with regard to size 
classes. As can be seen, micro and small sized firms make up 95 % of all food industry 
enterprises in the EU. However, the economic relevance of these firms is rather small as they 
only account for 22 % of total food industry turnover while the bigger part of turnover (51 %) 
is generated by a small number of large firms (Eurostat, 2011a).
49
 Among these firms a 
considerable number of large world leading enterprises can be found.  
                                                          
49
 Although the fact that the majority of enterprises are micro and small sized is a frequently mentioned 
characteristic of the food industry a similar firm size structure can also be found in many other manufacturing 
industries. Within the entire manufacturing sector 96 % of the firms are micro and small sized with fewer than 
50 employees while only 0.8 % are large enterprises with more than 250 employees. 60 % of the total 
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Table 5: Firm size distribution in the EU food industry
a
 (2009) 
Size class
b
 No. of firms         % Turnover  (bn. €)           % 
Micro 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
Total 
216,196 
44,740 
10,780 
2,550 
274,266 
78.83  
16.31  
3.93  
0.93  
100.00 
65.110    
  137.705  
 248.988  
 471.921  
 923.724  
7.05  
14.91  
26.95  
51.09  
     100.00 
Data source:  Own calculations based on Eurostat (2011a) 
Note: 2009 is the last year for which data per size classes is available on Eurostat. 
a
 Manufacture of food products and beverages excluding tobacco. According to NACE
 
Rev. 1.1 division DA15. 
b 
Size classes according to the SME definition of the European Commission (2005): Micro: <10 employees and 
total assets <EUR 2 million; Small: <50 employees and total assets <EUR 10 million; Medium: <250 
employees and total assets <EUR 43 million. Due to data availability firms are only size-classified by the 
number of employees.  
 
 
Regarding structural differences between the food industry and the entire 
manufacturing sector, it can be observed that profit margins calculated as the ratio of gross 
operating surplus to turnover are lower in the food industry (9.1 %) as compared to the entire 
manufacturing sector (9.6 %) (Eurostat, 2010). This is most likely due to a lower processing 
depth in the food industry in comparison to the entire manufacturing sector (Schiefer, 2011). 
Furthermore, average capital intensity per firm measured by the ratio of fixed assets and 
employees is with €145,875 higher in the food industry in comparison to the entire 
manufacturing sector where average capital intensity per firm is only €105,317.50 Another 
difference regards personnel costs such as wages and employers’ social security costs which 
are lower in the food industry in relation to the entire manufacturing sector. While annual 
personnel costs per employee in the entire manufacturing sector amount to €34,406 the 
respective value for the food industry is only €26,121 (Eurostat, 2010). Concerning wages, the 
average employee in the food industry obtains €20,267 annually as compared to €26,567 in 
the entire manufacturing sector (Eurostat, 2010).
51
 This is indicative of a higher share of low-
qualified workers in the food industry as compared to the entire manufacturing sector 
(Schiefer, 2011).  
As mentioned above a considerable number of large world leading enterprises operates 
in the EU food industry. To provide an overview of these firms, Table 6 lists the leading EU 
food producers ranked by total assets based on data from AMADEUS, a commercial trans-
European database of financial information, and the Forbes ‘Global 2000 Leading 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
manufacturing turnover is generated by these large firms while micro and small firms only contribute 19 % 
(Eurostat, 2011a; data for 2010). 
50
 Values are for 2008 and refer to the five countries Be, Fr, It, Sp and UK as the respective balance sheet items 
are only sufficiently available for these countries. Values were constructed from AMADEUS (2010).  
51
 Values for personnel costs and wages for 2007. 
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Companies’ list52. The largest corporation regarding total assets, turnover and number of 
employees is the Dutch food processor Unilever followed by Danone (France). Together with 
the U.S. firms ‘Kraft Foods’ and ‘Archer Daniels Midland’ as well as the Swiss food 
 
 
Table 6: The largest firms in the EU food industry
a
 (2008/2009) 
Firm  Country Industry 
Total assets 
(bn. €) 
Turnover 
(bn. €) 
Number of 
employees 
Unilever  
Danone 
Pernod Ricard 
 
SABmiller 
Heineken  
Diageo  
 
Carlsberg 
Anyslam 
Associated British 
Foods Plc 
Cadbury  
Allied Domecq 
Südzucker  
Inbev Belgium 
Parmalat Spa 
 
Arla Foods Amba 
 
NL 
FR 
FR 
 
UK 
NL 
UK 
 
DK 
UK 
UK 
 
UK 
UK 
DE 
BE 
IT 
 
DK 
Diverse 
Diverse 
Manuf. of alcoholic 
beverages 
Manuf. of beer 
Manuf. of beer 
Manuf. of alcoholic 
beverages 
Manuf. of beer 
Prod. of alcohol 
Diverse 
 
Manuf. of cocoa 
Manuf. of wine 
Manuf. of sugar 
Manuf. of beer 
Oper. of dairies & 
cheese making 
Oper. of dairies & 
cheese making 
36.14 
26.87 
24.88 
 
23.79 
20.56 
20.19 
 
19.48 
11.78 
10.26 
 
9.30 
8.19 
7.71 
7.65 
4.37 
 
3.98 
40.52 
15.20 
7.20 
 
11.36 
14.35 
10.22 
 
8.15 
n.a. 
10.38 
 
5.64 
n.a. 
5.83 
1.15 
4.63 
 
6.73 
175,000 
100,995 
17,926 
 
68,635 
54,004 
24,373 
 
45,505 
n.a. 
95,816 
 
46,517 
n.a. 
17,939 
2,715 
14,444 
 
15,927 
Data source: Own research based on the AMADEUS database and Forbes ‘Global 2000 Leading Companies’. 
Notes: Manuf. = Manufacturing; Prod. = Production; Oper. = Operation 
a
 Manufacture of food products and beverages excluding tobacco. According to NACE
 
Rev. 1.1 division DA15. 
 
 
processor Nestlé
53
 these two firms are the largest food processors globally. While the top two 
firms are active in a variety of food industry subsectors and/or in ‘fast moving consumer 
goods (FMCG)’ industries a significant number of firms active in the manufacturing of beer, 
                                                          
52
Available online at: http://www.forbes.com/global2000/, accessed last: 12. Sep. 2012 
53
 Nestlé is a Swiss corporation and thus - according to the above definition based on EU NACE codes - not 
active in the EU food industry. 
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wine or distilled potable alcoholic beverages from the UK (Sabmiller, Diageo, Anyslam and 
Allied Domecq), the Netherlands (Heineken), France (Pernod Ricard), Denmark (Carlsberg) 
and Belgium (Inbev) can be found among the largest firms in the EU food industry. 
Additionally, two enterprises operating in the ‘operation of dairies and cheese making’ 
(Parmalat and Arla Foods), the German sugar processor Südzucker and the UK cocoa 
processor Cadburry are among the largest firms.
54
 
 
 
Figure 8: Development of EU food industry
a
 turnover (2003-2010) 
 
Data source:  Own calculations based on Eurostat (2010, 2012).  
a
 Manufacture of food products and beverages excluding tobacco according to  
NACE
 
Rev. 1.1 division DA15 
 
 
The food industry has, especially as a consequence of the 2008 global financial crisis, 
experienced a downward trend in the number of firms.
55
 While in 2003 313,522 firms were 
operating in the industry this number has declined to 287,230 in 2010 (Eurostat, 2010; 2012). 
However, Figure 8, which illustrates the development of food industry turnover for the period 
2003 to 2010, shows that the industry has overall experienced fairly stable economic 
development in recent years with average annual turnover growth rates of 4.3 % between 
2003 and 2008.
56
 However, in between 2008 and 2009 the global financial crisis led to a 
decrease in turnover of almost 7 % (Eurostat, 2012). Nonetheless, the impact of the financial 
                                                          
54
 It has to be noted, that for some firms AMADEUS only provides primary 4-digit NACE codes while no 
information on the diversification of those firms in further economic sectors is provided by the database. This 
implies that some of the firms listed in Table 6 are most likely active in further 4-digit NACE industries. 
55
 According to Eurostat (2012) 16,291 firms have left the market between 2008 and 2009. This value only refers 
to NACE Rev. 2.0 division C10 (Manufacture of food products) as the respective values for C11 (Manufacture 
of beverages) are not available. 
56
 Nevertheless, as BVE (2009) illustrates for Germany, the bigger part of growth in turnover has - besides 
growing export trade - to be ascribed to consumer price increases as a result of increasing commodity prices. 
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crisis on the food industry was essentially lower than its impact on the entire manufacturing 
sector which experienced a decrease in turnover of almost 19 % between 2008 and 2009 
(Eurostat, 2012). Thus, the food industry tends to be a rather crisis-proof sector which is less 
affected by the business cycle, a fact that can be mainly attributed to a more or less static 
demand for food products (Lienhardt, 2004). 
Figure 9 shows the development of the food industry’s share as well as the shares of 
other leading manufacturing industries in total EU manufacturing turnover for the period 2003 
to 2010. From this it can be observed that - despite the growing nominal level of turnover in 
the pre-crisis period - the relative importance of the food industry measured by turnover has 
declined between 2004 and 2007.
57
 A similar development can be found for the motor vehicle 
sector while the machinery sector’s share of turnover has increased between 2003 and 2007. 
The development of the coke and petroleum sector in the pre-crisis period is characterized by 
an increase in the turnover share between 2003 and 2005 followed by a decline that lasted 
until 2007. However, of even greater interest is the development following the global 
financial crisis. As Figure 9 indicates the food industry’s share in manufacturing turnover 
increased from around 14 % in 2008 to almost 16 % in 2009 while the shares of the three 
other sectors considered were declining in the same period. This reinforces the assertion that 
the food sector is more crisis proof than other manufacturing sectors. 
 
Figure 9: Development of the food industry’sa and other leading industries’   
                shares of turnover in total manufacturing
b
 (2003-2010) 
 
Data source:  Own calculations based on Eurostat (2010; 2012) 
a
 Manufacture of food products and beverages excluding tobacco. According to NACE
  
Rev. 1.1 division DA15. 
b
 Total manufacturing according to NACE Rev 1.1 Section D. 
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 This is likely due to the fact that the EU food industry is a highly saturated market. 
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The economic development of the food industry is also heavily dependent on the up- 
and downstream sectors. As will be described in subsection 5.5, the retail sector as the main 
distribution channel for the food industry is characterized by a high level of concentration and 
a high share of private labels leading to strong bargaining power vis-à-vis the industry. As the 
distribution channels - and in particular the retail sector - determine the business environment 
for the food industry developments within the retail sector will be crucial for the overall 
functioning of the food chain (Wijnands et al., 2007). 
However, the input markets that provide raw materials for the food industry have also 
been subject to important developments in recent years. Since mid-2007 volatility of 
agricultural commodity prices in the EU has increased significantly and recently peaked at a 
new record level (European Commission, 2012). Driving forces of the rise of input costs are 
an increase in the demand for agricultural commodities due to a growing and increasingly 
wealthier population and a rising utilization of agricultural commodities for the production of 
biofuel. While there is increasing demand for agricultural commodities, supply is on the 
contrary generally characterized by inelasticity. The result is an overall increase in prices for 
agricultural commodities (European Competition Network, 2012). Nevertheless, due to the 
high bargaining power of retailers the industry is not in the position to pass on such price 
increases to the retailers and final consumers hence implying further pressure on the profit 
margins of producers (BVE, 2009).   
As regards technological developments in the food industry, special focus is placed on 
genetically modified organisms (GMO’s), information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) as well as on processing issues (Wijnands et al., 2007). In recent years, an intensive 
debate regarding the use of GMO’s has emerged. While more than 70 % of the food products 
offered in U.S. supermarkets contain genetically modified ingredients, the ethical acceptance 
among consumers and politicians is considerably lower in the EU (Wijnands et al., 2007). As 
Wijnands et al. (2007) show, the low acceptance of GMO’s is along with the extensive 
regulatory issues regarding the market approval of novel foods
58
 the main impediment to 
innovation among firms in the EU food industry.  
Recent examples of ICT developments are the replacement of traditional barcodes by 
wireless sensors such as Radio Frequency Identification tags (RFID)
59
. RFID tags lead to a 
higher efficiency of traceability systems as compared to classical barcodes (Wijnands et al., 
                                                          
58
 Novel foods are defined as food products that were up to the introduction of the novel food regulation in 1997 
not used for human consumption to a large extent within the EU (Wijnands et al., 2007). 
59
 RFID is a system based on radio-frequency electromagnetic fields, which is used to transfer information from 
a chip that is affixed to products, in order to simplify traceability.  
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2007). Another development regarding ICT’s is the direct delivery of food products to the 
consumer through internet mail-order trade. According to Kolbrück (2012) it can be expected 
that online food trade will achieve a market share of up to 2 % in the next 4 years. Current 
developments in the field of processing include improvements in food separation and 
fragmentation processes that allow a more efficient use of natural resources. Furthermore, 
there is a development from thermal-based processes to more energy efficient non-thermal 
processing and preservation methods
60
 (Wijnands et al., 2007; Tiwari et al., 2009).  
Although a continuously stable demand for food products provides a rather favorable 
basis for the economic development of the EU food industry, industry development in the 
coming years will depend on the developments of input markets and the retail sector. 
Furthermore, changes in the legal and political framework will play an important role in 
shaping the industry in the future. Especially micro and small sized firms in the food industry 
are strongly affected by legal burdens. For instance, pre-market approval regulations for new 
additives, novel foods or GMOs are out of reach for the majority of small food processors in 
the EU (Wijnands et al., 2007). Moreover, demographic changes will have an influence on the 
shape of the food industry. Although population growth in the EU-27 is lower as compared to 
its main competitors (U.S., Brazil, Australia and Canada)
61
, suggesting a more favorable 
future demand situation in these countries, it is estimated that the number of consumers in the 
EU will be rather stable in future years (Eurostat, 2012b).
62
 However, the population in the 
EU is becoming increasingly older
63
 (Eurostat, 2012b), a fact that will most likely lead to 
changes in consumer preferences. It can be expected that older people will have a stronger 
interest in healthier foods ranging from functional foods
64
, allergen-free food or special 
hospital diets. In addition, the share of one-person households is increasing and the time spent 
for the preparation of meals is declining inducing a further increase in the demand for 
convenience food and food service (Wijnands et al., 2007). 
 
 
                                                          
60
 Recent developments in food processing and preservation technologies include the application of pulsed 
electric fields (PEF) as well as procedures that are based on high-pressure or ultrasound (Tiwari et al., 2009). 
61
 While the EU-27 has experienced an average annual population growth rate of only 0.4 % between 2003 and 
2007 (Eurostat, 2012a), the respective growth rate exceeds 1 % in other leading food producing countries such as 
the U.S., Brazil, Australia and Canada (World Bank, 2012). 
62
 According to Eurostat (2012b) population in the EU-27 will continue to grow from 501 million in 2010 to 524 
million in 2050. For the period after 2050 a decline in the population is estimated. 
63
 See Figure 11 in the appendix. 
64
 Foods with an additional function regarding health promotion. 
Extended introduction 
41 
5.3. Food industry subsectors 
 
Based on the 3-digit NACE industry classification system ten different subsectors can be 
identified within the EU food industry. Table 7 specifies these subsectors by turnover, value 
added and the number of firms. It can be seen, that the bigger part of turnover is created by 
the meat production (NACE 151), the manufacture of other food products (NACE 158), the 
manufacture of beverages (NACE 159) and the dairy sector (NACE 155). Together, these four 
sectors account for 65 % of total food industry turnover. However, it should be noted that the 
’manufacture of other food products’ (NACE 158) takes second place only due to its broad 
definition including a variety of large subsectors such as the ‘manufacture of cocoa; chocolate 
and sugar confectionary’ and the ‘processing of tea and coffee’. The four largest sectors in 
terms of turnover are also among the largest sectors regarding value added. However, with 
almost 20 % the ‘manufacture of bakery products’ has the highest share in total food industry 
value added. The last column of Table 7 shows the shares in the total number of food industry 
firms of each subsector. Regarding the top five sectors, this ranking corresponds with the 
turnover ranking, with the exception of a switch between the ‘manufacture of bakery 
products’ and the dairy sector. 
 
 
Table 7: Importance of subsectors in the EU food industry
a
 (2010) 
Subsector (NACE Rev. 1.1) 
Share in total 
EU-27 food 
industry 
turnover (%) 
Share in total 
EU-27 food 
industry value 
added (%) 
Share in total 
EU-27 food 
industry no. of 
firms (%) 
Production, proc. & pres. of meat & meat pro. (151) 
Manuf. of other food pro. (158) 
Manuf. of beverages (159) 
Manuf. of dairy pro. (155) 
Manuf. of bakery & farinaceous pro. (1581 & 1582)
b
 
Manuf. of prepared animal feeds (157) 
Proc. & pres. of fruit & vegetables (153) 
Manuf. of vegetable & animal oils & fats (154) 
Manuf. of grain mill pro., starches & starch pro. (156) 
Proc. & pres. of fish & fish pro. (152) 
20.03 
16.46 
14.68 
13.63 
11.40 
6.89 
6.08 
4.31 
4.11 
2.39 
15.30 
19.03 
18.15 
8.83 
19.95 
4.51 
6.18 
2.12 
3.60 
1.93 
13.93 
8.46 
8.04 
4.09 
5.37 
1.79 
3.58 
3.01 
2.18 
1.25 
Data source:  Own calculations based on Eurostat (2012) 
Notes: Proc. & pres. = processing and preserving; Manuf. = manufacture; Pro. = products 
a
 Manufacture of food products and beverages excluding tobacco. According to NACE
 
Rev. 1.1 division DA15. 
b 
While NACE Rev. 1.1 lists the bakery sector as two subsectors (1581 and 1582) that are reported under the 
miscellaneous category ‘Manufacture of other food products’ it is reported as a separate single sector in the new 
classification NACE Rev. 2. For this reason NACE 1581 and 1582 are also reported as a separate single sector 
here. 
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As Table 8 indicates there are also significant differences in the capital intensity of the 
food industry subsectors. Capital intensity per firm measured by the ratio of fixed assets and 
the number of employees is in 2008 with €429,927 on average highest in the ‘Manufacture of 
beverages’ followed by the ‘Manufacture of oils and fats’ (€312,455). Less capital intensive 
subsectors are the ‘Production of meat’ and the ‘Manufacture of other food products’ where 
the values are with €100,381 and €92,717 below the average value for the entire food industry 
(€145,875). 
 
 
Table 8: Capital intensity of subsectors in the food industry
a
 (selected countries: Be, Fr,   
               It, Sp and UK) (2008) 
Subsector (NACE Rev. 1.1) 
Average capital intensity 
per firm (€)  
(fixed assets / employees) 
Manufacture of beverages (159) 
Manufacture of vegetable & animal oils & fats (154) 
Manufacture of grain mill products, starches & starch products  (156) 
Processing & preserving of fruit & vegetables (153) 
Manufacture of prepared animal feeds (157) 
Manufacture of dairy products (155) 
Processing & preserving of fish & fish products (152) 
Production, processing & preserving of meat & meat products (151) 
Manufacture of other food products (158) 
Total food industry (DA 15) 
429,927 
312,455 
204,526 
188,077 
156,954 
131,817 
110,280 
100,381 
92,717 
145,875 
 
Data source: Own calculations based on AMADEUS (2010) 
Notes: This table refers to the five analyzed countries (Be, Fr, It, Sp and the UK) and not to the entire 
EU-27 food industry as data availability of the required balance sheet items in AMADEUS is only 
sufficient for these countries.  
a
 Manufacture of food products and beverages excluding tobacco. According to NACE
 
Rev. 1.1 division 
DA15. 
 
 
The dairy sector is not only of high economic importance within the food industry but 
also a food industry subsector highly influenced by interventions regulated by the ‘Common 
Agricultural Policy’ (CAP). Additionally, a high number of cooperatives operate in the 
industry, a fact which will most likely influence the occurrence and persistence of abnormal 
firm profits in the sector. The dairy sector therefore constitutes an interesting case for analysis 
within the EU food industry, not only because of its economic importance but also due to its 
structural features and dynamic developments (Drescher and Maurer, 1999). Thus, following 
a detailed analysis of the entire food industry in the first two papers (chapters 2 and 3), paper 
number three (chapter 4) focuses explicitly on the dairy sector in order to determine which 
influence the special characteristics of this sector have on the persistence of abnormal firm 
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profits. For a basis, a description of the dairy industry, highlighting its economic 
characteristics, is given in the following section. 
 
5.4. The dairy industry 
 
Following the meat and the beverage sector, the dairy industry is the third largest sector 
within the EU-27 food industry
65
 with a contribution of around 14 % to total food industry 
turnover in 2010 (cf. Table 7). The dairy industry has experienced a continuous decline in the 
number of firms in recent years (Eurostat, 2010, 2012) due to a wave of mergers and 
acquisitions.
66
 A famous example is the merger of the German firms Humana and Nordmilch 
bringing about the sixth largest European dairy producer (N-tv, 2011). The decrease in the 
number of firms has been intensified by the global financial crisis in 2008 which has forced 
many firms into bankruptcy. In addition, the dairy sector has lately been heavily affected by 
the so-called ‘milk crisis’. Due to increasing demand in recent years, prices for dairy 
commodities on the world market
67
 have experienced a significant increase with a peak in 
2007 (Milchindustrie, 2012). This price increase was reinforced by a drop in the production of 
important dairy exporters such as Australia and New Zealand due to drought and other 
climate change issues (Kershaw and Gaffel, 2008; Milchindustrie, 2012). The increase in 
prices in turn has led to a decrease in demand and thus an oversupply of milk products. The 
consequence was a dramatic decline in prices in early 2008 (Milchindustrie, 2012) while at 
the same time input costs, especially for feed and energy, significantly increased (European 
Competition Network, 2012).
68
 
In 2008 around 134 million tons of cows’ milk were processed into a variety of 
products in the EU-27 (Eurostat, 2011). The main products manufactured by the dairy 
industry are fresh milk, cheese, yoghurt, butter, milk powder, condensed milk as well as 
industrial raw materials for further reprocessing (Tacken, 2009). Due to their relative short 
shelf life products such as fresh milk or yoghurt are particularly produced for local markets 
(Poppe et al., 2009). Furthermore, the majority of trade with dairy products is taking place 
                                                          
65
 After exclusion of the miscellaneous sector NACE 158 ‘Manufacture of other food products’. 
66
 The number of firms active in the dairy industry has decreased at an average rate of 1.7 % annually between 
2003 and 2010. While 13,296 firms were active in the industry in 2003, only 11,755 are reported for 2010 
(Eurostat, 2010, 2012). 
67
 While the increase in demand, which can mainly be attributed to a growing and increasingly richer population, 
could initially be absorbed through the reduction of inventories, after mid 2007 processing firms had to purchase 
dairy commodities on the world market, which has induced the increase in prices (Milchindustrie, 2012). 
68
 However, the effect of the ‘milk crisis’ on the occurrence and persistence of abnormal profits cannot be 
assessed by the present thesis since data is only available for the pre-crisis period. 
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within the EU. In 2010 EU-internal exports of dairy products accounted for $32.6 billion
69
 
(FAOSTAT, 2011). However, there is still a great amount of extra-EU trade taking place with 
the EU-27 being the world’s leading exporter of dairy products (Tacken, 2009). In 2010 the 
EU-27 exported $9.7 billion (FAOSTAT, 2011) in form of dairy products with long shelf 
lives such as cheese, butter or milk powder to countries outside the EU-27 (Tacken, 2009).   
Since the end of the 1960’s, the EU dairy market is regulated by the CAP with the 
objective to support the raw milk price, and hence the incomes of dairy farmers (OECD, 
2011). In order to achieve this objective, the CAP includes a variety of elements such as 
intervention prices, import tariffs and export subsidies as well as a quota system which was 
introduced in 1984 (European Commission, 2006). The quota system has put an efficient limit 
on the quantity of milk that dairy farmers in EU countries produce each year.
70 Within the 
framework of the quota system, dairy farmers are financially penalized through so-called 
‘superlevys’ if the amount of milk delivered in a specific year exceeds the year’s quota rights. 
At this, the levy is set at a rate that renders the delivery of amounts above the quota 
financially inefficient (European Commission, 2006). However, as Drescher and Maurer 
(1999) show, the quota can impede necessary structural adjustments at the farm level which in 
turn may lead to inefficiencies in the supply of raw inputs for the dairy industry. Wijnands et 
al. (2007) note that such inefficiencies in the supply of raw production materials can have a 
significant impact on the international competitiveness of the industry. Since its introduction 
in 1984, the quota system has been adjusted several times by EU agrarian reforms. The CAP 
reform in 2003 included a 25 % reduction in intervention prices over four years starting in 
2004. At the same time direct payments to farmers have been introduced in order to 
compensate for these reductions (European Commission, 2000; OECD, 2011). Furthermore, 
in 2008 the CAP ‘health check‘ decisions of the European Commission resulted in a yearly 
increase of the quota by 1 % for the period of transition up to its final abolition in 2015 
(European Commission, 2009). These reforms imply that the dairy sector is set on a more 
market-oriented course and that competitive market forces are becoming an increasingly 
important driver in the sector (European Commission, 2006). As a consequence, milk prices 
have become more aligned with world market prices and volatility in the milk price has 
increased (Keane and Connor, 2009).  
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 Based on FAOSTAT data available on: http://faostat.fao.org/. Calculated as the difference between total dairy 
exports of all EU-27 countries ($42.3 billion) and extra EU-27 trade ($9.7 billion). 
70
 In 2005 total milk quotas accounted for 137 million tons in the EU-25 (European Commission, 2006). See 
European Commission (2006: 13) for an overview of the 2005 milk quotas per EU-25 member states. 
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The processing and distribution of milk in the EU is in many cases organized in the 
form of farmer-owned cooperatives (European Commission, 2006). According to AMADEUS 
the share of cooperatives operating in the EU-27 dairy industry is 11 % and thus higher than 
in other subsectors of the food industry.
71
 The respective share in the dairy industries of the 
five countries under consideration in the present thesis is with 19 % above the respective EU 
average. Cooperatives usually pay out part of their profit to farmers, through the price of raw 
milk. This fact will most likely influence the results on profit persistence in the dairy sector 
(Tacken, 2009). 
Another feature of the dairy industry is its high quantity of innovations which lead to 
new product placements. As Tacken (2009) shows, between 2003 and 2008 the EU-27 
accounts for 61 % of all dairy innovations worldwide. However, similar to other sectors of the 
food industry, innovation is mainly limited to the introduction of product extensions such as 
the use of new additives or new flavors as well as packaging innovation, while the launch of 
entirely new products is rather uncommon (Poppe et al., 2009). 
As pointed out above the food retail sector is of significant importance for the business 
environment in the food industry and the overall functioning of the food chain. The following 
subsection therefore highlights the structural characteristics and the developments of this 
sector. 
 
5.5. The food retailing sector 
 
While the importance of direct sales by producers has considerably decreased since the 
1970’s, the food retail sector is the main link between the food industry and the final 
consumer today (Wijnands et al., 2007). The EU food retail sector is composed of non-
specialized stores in the form of supermarkets as well as specialized stores such as 
greengroceries, specialized retail sale of meat and beverage retailers. Table 9 depicts the 
structure of the retail sector for the EU-27 and the five countries covered by the present thesis 
based on turnover and the number of enterprises. With around €900 billion about 87 % of 
turnover is generated by supermarkets in the EU while specialized stores only account for 
around 13 % of total food retail sector turnover (€135 billion). Both at the EU-27 as well as at 
the country level (with exception of the UK), the number of non-specialized firms is lower 
compared to specialized stores. Therefore, for non-specialized retailers, the ratio of turnover 
to the number of firms is on average much higher than for specialized retailers. 
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 In other sectors the share of cooperatives is only around 1 %. For example, in the meat sector the share of 
cooperatives at the EU-27 level is 1.4 %. 
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Table 9: Structure of the EU-27 food retail sector
a
 (2009) 
Subsector 
Turnover 
(bn. €) 
# of firms 
Average 
turnover 
per firm 
(1000 €)  
Retail sale in non-specialised stores with food, 
beverages or tobacco predominating (NACE 47.11) 
   
EU-27 
Belgium 
France 
Italy 
Spain 
UK 
900.00 
29.09 
175.85 
100.79 
69.62 
148.79 
 426,102 
6,689 
22,586 
52,982 
37,289 
28,695 
 2112.17 
4348.93 
7785.80 
1800.40 
1867.04 
5185.22 
 
Retail sale of food, beverages and tobacco in 
specialized stores  (NACE 47.2) 
                                                                                   
EU-27 
Belgium 
France 
Italy 
Spain 
UK 
134.73 
4.47 
18.28 
17.39 
23.94 
13.17 
 476,457 
10,591 
51,129 
106.405 
108,346 
26,543 
 282.77 
422.06 
357.53 
163.43 
220.96 
496.18 
 
Data source: Eurostat (2010) ‘Annual detailed enterprise statistics on manufacturing subsections DA-DE 
and total manufacturing’. 
a
 Retail sale of food products and beverages including tobacco. According to NACE
 
Rev. 2 group G 47.2 
and class G 47.11. 
 
 
The relevance of specialized retail stores has declined compared to non-specialized 
supermarkets in recent years. Table 10 illustrates this development based on turnover for both 
subsectors for the period 2003 to 2009. While turnover for non-specialized stores increased by 
21 % between 2003 and 2009, the respective growth rate for specialized retailers was only 
around 11 %.  
 
 
Table 10: Turnover of specialized and non-specialized retailers
a
  
     in the EU-27 (2003 and 2009) 
Subsector 
Turnover (bn. €) 
2003                       2009 
Non-specialized retailers 
(NACE 47.11) 
743.53 900.00 
Specialized retailers  
(NACE 47.2) 
120.48 134.73 
Data source: Eurostat (2010) ‘Annual detailed enterprise statistics on 
manufacturing subsections DA-DE and total manufacturing’. 
a
 Retail sale of food products and beverages including tobacco. According 
to NACE
 
Rev. 2 group G 47.2 and class G 47.11. 
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The majority of EU-27 food retailers (99 %) are micro and small sized firms with 
fewer than 50 employees while only 0.14 % are large firms with more than 250 employees. 
However, an important structural characteristic of the sector is that the majority of turnover 
(61 %) is generated by this small number of large firms. The same holds for the five analyzed 
countries where 0.12 % are large firms which generate 64 % of turnover (Eurostat, 2010).
72
 
Table 11 presents the five-firm concentration ratios for the food retailing sectors of the five 
analyzed countries. From this it can be ascertained that concentration among retailers has 
increased during the analyzed time span and - with the exception of Italy - stagnates around 
70 % in the five countries considered.
73
 This indicates high bargaining power of the retail 
sector vis-à-vis the industry. According to Wijnands et al. (2007) it can be expected that 
concentration in the retail sector will continue to increase and that 10 to 15 retail chains will 
dominate the EU market in the near future.  
 
 
Table 11: Food retail
a
 sector concentration ratios  
                (CR5 in %) in selected EU countries 
Country 1996 2000 2004 2006 
Belgium 62 66 77 77 
France 51 61 69 70 
Italy 12 25 41 35 
Spain 32 50 79 65 
UK 73 80 54 63 
Data source: Wijnands et al. (2007, Table 2.13, p.46), Vander 
Stichele and Young (2009) based on Planetretail Global retail 
concentration 2006 data and  
a
 Retail sale of food products and beverages including tobacco. 
According to NACE
 
Rev. 2 group G 47.2 and class G 47.11. 
 
 
In addition to the high degree of concentration, another phenomenon that has recently 
gained attention of antitrust authorities is the increasing market share of retailer’s private 
labels. Private labels which are often also referred to as house brands or own labels enable 
retailers to replace suppliers’ branded products. This further contributes to retailer dominance 
vis-à-vis the producers (Vander Stichele and Young, 2009; Wijnands et al., 2007). The market 
share of private labels already exceeds 25 % in many EU countries. Regarding the five 
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 Data for 2009. 
73
 Wijnands et al. (2007: 46, Table 2.13) show that in all EU-15 countries except Greece, Italy and the UK 
retailer concentration is around 70 % or higher in 2004. 
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countries analyzed in the present thesis the share is highest in Spain (30.9 %) followed by the 
UK (30.5 %) and France (26.1 %). With only 12.2 % the lowest share can be found for Italy
74
 
(Vander Stichele and Young, 2009). In recent years the image of private labels has developed 
from low quality to high quality products which can compete with global supplier brands. In 
many cases private labels are ‘copy cats’ of brands whose labeling and packaging resembles 
the one of branded products. This means that development- and advertising costs for private 
labels are significantly lower compared to brands. Therefore, the key benefit of private labels 
lies in the fact that net margins are in general higher in comparison to branded products 
(Vander Stichele and Young, 2009; Wijnands et al., 2007). This implies a higher profitability 
of private labels and thus further power imbalance between retailers and producers.  
The developments in the retail sector have, however, not gone unnoticed by the 
respective authorities. Thus, as a consequence of its dominance vis-à-vis the food industry, 
the retail sector has recently caught the attention of national cartel offices and the European 
Commission (European Competition Network, 2012). Furthermore, the increasing share of 
retailer’s private labels has opened an additional discussion concentrating on the effect that a 
high and ever increasing market share of private labels has on the functioning of competition 
in the food chain (e.g. Frank and Lademann, 2012). 
 
6. Data 
 
Two data sources have been used in the present thesis in order to empirically estimate the 
occurrence and persistence of abnormal profits as well as the respective drivers. First, firm-
level data was derived from the commercial balance sheet database AMADEUS. Most 
commercial balance sheet databases are either restricted to publicly quoted firms (e.g., 
Standard and Poor’s Compustat databases only contain data for publicly quoted U.S. firms.75) 
or are limited to a specific geographic area (e.g., Hoppenstedt’s firm database, which is 
limited to German firms). Furthermore, most databases imply minimum firm size criteria 
which are either determined by a minimum value of a specific balance sheet item (e.g., total 
assets or sales) or by the fact that only publicly quoted firms, which are usually larger, are 
contained in the database. The presence of a minimum firm size criterion was a very 
important factor when choosing the appropriate database for this thesis because, as mentioned 
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 Data for 2007.  The market share for Belgium is not available. 
75
 Most studies analyzing profit persistence in the U.S. use Compustat as their data source. Examples are: 
McGahan and Porter (1999, 2003); Schumacher and Boland (2005a); Gschwandtner (2005, 2012); Mueller 
(1977, 1986). 
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above, most EU food processors (95 %) are micro and small sized firms with total assets of 
less than €10 million. Choosing a size restricted database would therefore lead to a sample 
that significantly under-represents the population of EU food processors.  
An additional challenge was to find a database from which a sample with both a 
sufficient cross section dimension and a sufficient time series dimension could be derived. 
The former difficulty is a consequence of the fact that this thesis solely focuses on the food 
industry which makes data availability much more complicated in comparison to the vast 
majority of other studies on profit persistence which mainly analyze entire manufacturing 
sectors. A sufficient time series dimension is particularly important for the estimations of 
profit persistence in Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis, as these studies must be based on long 
time periods.
76 
In consideration of the described difficulties, AMADEUS
77
 a commercial, pan-
European balance sheet database compiled by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing was 
chosen as the best available source for firm-level data. AMADEUS contains information on 
over 13 million public and private companies in 41 countries. For each firm 25 balance sheet 
items, 25 profit and loss account items and 26 ratios are recorded in AMADEUS. 
Furthermore, descriptive information including activity codes (for example, NACE 1.1 or 
U.S. SIC
78
), ownership information, trade descriptions or security and price information are 
provided for each firm (BvDEP, 2007). The particular feature of AMADEUS is that it has 
nearly no limitations regarding the inclusion of firms in the database. This made it possible to 
derive a sample with an adequate cross section dimension. However, as AMADEUS was 
launched in 1996, the longest time series dimension that could be obtained is 13 years (1996-
2008)
79
, a value that lies at the lower end of the time spans of previous studies depicted in 
Table 30 of the following chapter. Overall this data source appeared to be the best available 
option to adequately reflect the EU food industry.  
Table 12 compares the total data comprised by AMADEUS with the values for the 
population, which are provided by Eurostat, for the five analyzed countries in 2007. It can be 
observed that between 56 % (Italy) and 79 % (Belgium) of total food industry sales are 
included in AMADEUS, respectively.
80
 This highlights the fact that AMADEUS provides a 
respectable basis for an analysis of the EU food industry. However, regarding the number of 
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 As will be shown in the following chapter (cf. Table 30), most previous persistence studies analyze periods of 
around 20 years. 
77
 AMADEUS is the acronym for Analyse MAjor Databases from EUropean Sources   
78
 Standard Industrial Classification 
79
 Data availability for 2009 and 2010 was sparse making it impossible to include these years in the analysis. 
80
 This comparison had to be based on sales as other values such as total assets are not available on Eurostat. 
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firms, only around 18 % of the whole population of firms is included in AMADEUS. This is 
due to an underrepresentation of micro-sized firms as indicated by Table 13, which provides a 
comparison of the data comprised in AMADEUS with the population by size class for the five 
analyzed countries.  
 
 
Table 12: Food industry sales and no. of firms in AMADEUS compared with Eurostat    
                 sales and no. of firms (2007) 
Country 
Sales of all 
food industry
a
 
firms in 
AMADEUS 
(bn. €) 
Total food 
industry
a
 sales 
according to 
Eurostat 
(bn. €) 
% cov. of 
sales by 
AMADEUS 
Total no. of 
food 
industry
a
 
firms in 
AMADEUS 
Total no. of 
food industry
a
 
firms 
according to 
Eurostat 
% cov. of no. 
of firms by 
AMADEUS 
Belgium 
France 
Italy  
Spain 
UK 
5 countries 
27.40  
94.79  
52.96  
59.32         
           n.a. 
                b
 
 
34.81  
142.79  
94.72  
96.30  
106.43  
              b
 
 
78.71 
66.38 
55.91 
61.60 
        n.a. 
          b
 
 3,113 
13,195 
4,297 
8,975 
3,820 
33,400 
 
7,511 
70,823 
72,691 
28,657 
7,027 
186,709 
 
41.45 
18.63 
5.91 
31.32 
54.36 
17.89 
 
Data source: Own calculations based on AMADEUS (2010) and Eurostat (2010) 
Note: Data on the number of enterprises for Italy refers to 2003. Data on turnover for Italy refers to 2002 and for France 
to 2003.  
Cov. = Coverage 
a
 Manufacture of food products and beverages excluding tobacco. According to NACE
 
Rev. 1.1 division DA15. 
b
 Not reported as AMADEUS data on sales is not available for the UK. 
 
 
 
Table 13: Comparison of AMADEUS data
a
 with the population
b
  
                 by size class
c
 shares in % (2007) 
 
Shares (%) in 
AMADEUS 
Shares for population (%) 
according to Eurostat 
 
Large 
Medium 
Small 
Micro 
 
3.2 
8.0 
20.4 
68.4 
  
0.6 
2.1 
11.5 
85.9 
 
Data source: Own calculations based on AMADEUS (2010) and Eurostat 
(2010). 
a
 All food industry firms recorded in AMADEUS for the countries Belgium, 
France, Italy, Spain and the UK.
 
b
 Population refers to Eurostat data for food industry firms in Belgium, 
France, Italy, Spain and the UK.
 
c 
Size classes according to the SME definition of the European Commission 
(2005): Micro: < 10 employees and total assets < EUR 2 million; Small: < 50 
employees and total assets < EUR 10 million; Medium: < 250 employees and 
total assets < EUR 43 million. Due to data availability, firms in the population 
are size-classified according to the number of employees, while firms in the 
sample are classified by their total assets. 
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Prior to the estimation the sample had to be screened by, amongst others, dropping all 
firms for which fewer than 13 years of ROA observations are available. The screening process 
is explicitly described in the individual papers and thus not reported again in this subchapter. 
Table 14 indicates that overall only 16 % of the firms recorded in AMADEUS remain in the 
final sample. Nevertheless, the final sample contains 5,494 firms and thus is one of the largest 
samples analyzed in the respective literature so far (cf. Table 30).  
 
 
Table 14: Overall no. of firms in AMADEUS compared  
                 with final samples by country (2007) 
Country 
Total no. of food 
industry
a
 firms in 
AMADEUS 
Number of firms 
in final samples 
Belgium 
France 
Italy  
Spain 
UK 
Total 
3,113 
13,195 
4,297 
8,975 
3,820 
33,400 
 
841 
2,786 
596 
1,043 
228 
5,494 
 
Data source: Own calculations based on AMADEUS (2010) 
a
 Manufacture of food products and beverages excluding tobacco. 
According to NACE
 
Rev. 1.1 division DA15. 
 
 
Table 15 gives a comparison of the screened country samples with the population by 
size classes. As can be seen micro sized firms are underrepresented, especially for Italy, the UK and 
Spain while large firms are significantly overrepresented in the UK sample.  
 
 
Table 15: Comparison of the sample
a
 with the population
b
 by size class
c
 and country   
                 regarding shares of number of firms in % (2007) 
 Belgium        France      Italy        Spain     UK      All 
 
Large 
Medium 
Small 
Micro 
 
4.7   (0.8) 
6.5   (3.1) 
18.9 (15.8) 
69.8 (80.4) 
 
3.6   (0.5) 
5.8   (1.5) 
16.7 (8.7) 
73.9 (89.3) 
 
5.5   (0.2) 
35.4 (1.1) 
51.5 (9.3) 
7.6  (89.4) 
 
5.2   (0.8) 
14.9 (3.4) 
37.0 (18.4) 
42.9 (77.4) 
 
30.7 (5.0)  
30.7 (11.4) 
32.0 (28.0) 
6.6  (55.6) 
 
5.4 (0.6) 
11.9 (2.1) 
25.3 (11.5) 
57.4 (85.9) 
Data source: Own calculations based on AMADEUS (2010) and Eurostat (2010). 
Note: Shares for the population in parentheses are derived from Eurostat (2010).  
a
 All firms in the final AMADEUS samples for the countries Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and the UK.
 
b
 Population refers to Eurostat data for food industry firms in Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and the UK.
 
c 
Size classes according to the SME definition of the European Commission (2005): Micro: < 10 employees 
and total assets < EUR 2 million; Small: < 50 employees and total assets < EUR 10 million; Medium: < 250 
employees and total assets < EUR 43 million. Due to data availability, firms in the population are size-
classified according to the number of employees, while firms in the sample are classified by their total assets. 
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A comparison of the sample with the population of all firms by industries is presented 
in Table 16. It can be detected that ‘Manufacture of other food products’ (NACE 158) is the 
largest sector regarding the number of firms in the population and in the sample. However, 
this sector is underrepresented in the sample while the meat industry (NACE 151) and the 
beverage sector (NACE 159) are overrepresented. 
 
 
Table 16: Comparison of the final sample
a
 and population
b
  
                 by industry (2007) 
Industry (NACE)
c 
            Sample                Population 
 
 
No. of  
firms 
              % 
         No. of 
firms 
               % 
151 (Meat) 
152 (Fish) 
153 (Fruit & veg.) 
154 (Oils & fats) 
155 (Dairy) 
156 (Starch) 
157 (Animal feeds) 
158 (Other) 
159 (Beverages) 
1,324 
141 
241 
31 
401 
314 
260 
2,045 
 737 
24.1 
2.6 
4.4 
0.6 
7.3 
5.7 
4.7 
37.2 
13.4 
20,320 
1,693 
5,385 
5,580 
8,157 
2,963 
2,606 
126,705 
11,803 
11.0 
0.9 
2.9 
3.0 
4.4 
1.6 
1.4 
68.4 
 6.4 
Data source: Own calculations based on AMADEUS (2010) and Eurostat (2010) 
a 
All firms in the final AMADEUS samples for the countries Belgium, France, Italy, 
Spain and the UK. 
b
 Population refers to Eurostat data for food industry firms in Belgium, France, Italy, 
Spain and the UK.  
c 
Industries defined by 3 digit NACE Rev. 1.1 groups. See the appendix for a detailed 
industry description according to NACE Rev. 1.1 
 
 
With respect to the dairy industry, Table 17 reveals that overall 27 % of the firms 
operating in the dairy sectors of the five analyzed countries are recorded in AMADEUS. After 
deleting firms with missing ROA observations in at least one year of the analyzed period 
(1996-2008), the final sample, which is analyzed in chapter 4, comprises 590 dairy firms.
81
 
This represents a 27 % share of all firms listed in AMADEUS and a 7 % share of all dairy 
firms operating in the five countries analyzed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
81
 Due to the fact that additional data was available at the time the dairy industry sample was constructed this 
number is larger than the number of dairy firms reported for the total sample according to Table 16.  
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Table 17: Dairy industry
a
 firms in AMADEUS compared  
                 with Eurostat dairy industry data (2007) 
Total no. of dairy industry firms operating in 
Be, Fr, It, Sp and the UK according to Eurostat 
8157 
Total no. of dairy industry firms recorded in 
AMADEUS for Be, Fr, It, Sp and the UK 
2179 
Number of dairy industry firms in final sample 
(sample also refers to Be, Fr, It, Sp and the UK) 
590 
Data source: Own calculations based on AMADEUS (2010) and Eurostat 
(2010) 
Note: Values for sales not reported as data for the UK is not available. 
a
 Manufacture of dairy products. According to NACE
 
Rev. 1.1 group 
DA155. 
 
 
The second data source used is Eurostat’s (2010) ‘Annual detailed enterprise statistics 
on manufacturing subsections DA-DE and total manufacturing’. The Eurostat database is 
freely available via the webpage of the European Commission and provides detailed 
quantitative information on structural industry-level characteristics. 
The remainder of this chapter provides information and descriptive statistics on the 
firm and industry variables used in this thesis. It must be noted that this chapter is solely 
descriptive while the impact that each firm- and industry variable has on the occurrence and 
persistence of abnormal profits is discussed when these variables are implemented in chapters 
2 through 4. 
 
6.1. Information and descriptive statistics on ROA 
 
Similar to most previous studies, return on assets (ROA), calculated by a firm’s profit/loss 
before taxation and interest divided by its total assets, is used as the measure for firm 
profitability (e.g. Goddard et al., 2005; Crespo Cuaresma and Gschwandtner, 2008). It must 
be pointed out, however, that balance sheet profit measures can be error-prone due to profit 
smoothing and cross subsidization and therefore do not necessarily reflect real economic 
performance of firms in an adequate way. This could be a problem especially for large 
multinational firms which cross subsidize less successful subsidiaries.
82
 As an alternative to 
accounting profit data, economic value added (EVA) developed by Stern Steward and Co., 
which measures the economic returns generated for shareholders, might be used as a measure 
for firm performance. However, as Biddle et al. (1997) point out, EVA is also not without 
                                                          
82
 See Fisher and McGowan (1983) as well as Long and Ravenscraft (1984) for a detailed discussion on the 
usefulness of balance sheet profits as a measure for real economic performance. 
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disadvantages. They show, for example, that EVA is outperformed by earnings as a measure 
for firm performance as earnings are found to be more highly correlated with returns and firm 
values than EVA. Thus, in order to assure comparability to previous literature and due to 
better data availability, ROA was used as a measure for firm performance in the present 
thesis. Furthermore, results using the value added (VA) measure reported in AMADEUS
83
 as 
a proxy for firm performance, are not expected to differ significantly from the results based 
on ROA as the correlation coefficients between ROA and VA exceed 0.8 and are statistically 
significant at the 1 % level for each year and country.  
The quality of ROA in reflecting economic performance of large multinational firms 
can additionally be supported by looking at the impact of food scandals on the subsequent 
development of ROA. Figure 10, for example, depicts the ROA of Coca Cola Belgium which 
was affected by a major scandal regarding contaminated carbon dioxide in 1999. The decline 
in Coca Cola Belgium’s ROA in 1999 indicates that this scandal and its consequences for firm 
performance are very well reflected apart from possible cross subsidizations or profit 
smoothing.  
 
Figure 10: ROA of Coca Cola Belgium before and after carbon  
                  dioxide scandal 
 
Data source:  Own calculations based on AMADEUS (2010) 
 
 
Table 18 provides a comparison between the sample used in this thesis and the 
population regarding the mean and standard deviations of ROA for the five analyzed countries 
                                                          
83
 This is the value in AMADEUS that appears most similar to EVA. 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1998 1999 2000 2001 
R
O
A
 (
%
) 
Year 
Extended introduction 
55 
over the period of 1996-2008. As the Eurostat database does not provide ROA measures per 
industry, the values for the population had to be constructed from the AMADEUS database.
84
 
For this, all observations recorded in AMADEUS for the years 1996-2008 were considered.
85
 
Table 18 indicates that the country ranking regarding ROA is mostly identical for the sample 
and the population with French firms generating on average the highest ROA’s (sample: 
7.12 %; population: 6.51 %) and Italian firms generating the lowest ROA’s (sample: 3.76 %; 
population: 3.46 %). For all countries, ROA in the sample exceeds ROA of the population and 
is characterized by lower volatility. This is partly due to the fact that only firms with at least 
13 ROA observations are included in the sample thus removing less successful firms with 
lower and more volatile
86
 ROA’s that, e.g., went bankrupt during the analyzed period and are 
therefore not recorded over the entire 13 year time span. Furthermore, the lower volatility of 
ROA in the samples can be explained by an underrepresentation of micro-sized firms (cf. 
Table 15) which are characterized by higher volatility in ROA (cf. Table 19).
87
  
 
 
Table 18: Mean
a
 ROA and standard deviations for food industry
b
 firms in    
                 AMADEUS: sample vs. population (1996-2008)   
Country 
Mean ROA 
sample
c
 (%) 
Standard 
deviation 
(%) 
 n 
Mean ROA 
population
d 
(%) 
Standard 
deviation 
(%) 
n 
Belgium 
France 
Italy  
Spain 
UK 
All countries 
4.47  
7.12  
3.76  
5.04  
6.76  
5.93  
6.4  
7.4  
3.3  
4.2  
5.7  
6.5  
841 
2,786 
596 
1,043 
228 
5,494 
3.81  
6.51  
3.46  
3.73  
5.39  
4.98  
13.9  
14.0  
8.9  
10.7  
15.9  
12.7  
  3,113 
 13,195 
  4,297 
  8,975 
  3,820 
 33,400 
Data source:  Own calculations based on AMADEUS (2010) 
a
 Mean over the years 1996-2008. 
b
 Manufacture of food products and beverages excluding tobacco. According to NACE
 
Rev. 1.1 
division DA15. 
c 
Sample refers to the screened data set covering the countries Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and 
the UK. 
d
 Population refers to all food industry firms recorded in AMADEUS for the countries Belgium, 
France, Italy, Spain and the UK. For each year the upper and lower 1 % of the observations was 
removed in order to prevent biases due to outliers. 
 
 
 
                                                          
84
 As it is especially micro-sized firms with lower profits (cf. Table 19) that are not recorded in AMADEUS 
these proxies for the population might be somewhat overestimated.  
85
 For each year the upper and lower 1 % of the observations was removed in order to prevent biases due to 
outliers.  
86
 Gschwandtner (2005) shows that firms which are on the verge of exiting the market are usually characterized 
by strong profit fluctuations.  
87
 For the U.S. food industry Gschwandtner (2005) also shows that volatility in ROA is commonly larger for 
smaller firms. 
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As Table 19 reveals, average profitability in the population increases with firm size. 
This also holds for the country level with the exception of France, where micro-sized firms 
generate the highest returns, and Belgium, where medium-size firms are most profitable. It 
can also be observed that volatility in ROA decreases with firm size in all countries but 
Spain.  
 
 
Table 19: Mean
a
 ROA (%) and standard deviations for food  
                 industry
b
 firms in the populationc by size class (2004-2008)   
Country 
Firm size
d
 
micro small medium large 
Belgium 
France 
Italy  
Spain 
UK 
All countries 
3.3  (15.6) 
5.8  (15.1) 
1.2  (13.1) 
2.6  (11.4) 
2.8  (22.9) 
4.3  (14.5) 
5.5  (10.0) 
5.5  (9.5) 
3.4  (7.8) 
4.2  (7.5) 
4.6  (13.3) 
4.4  (8.8) 
5.9  (9.0) 
5.3  (8.9) 
3.9  (6.4) 
5.0  (7.2) 
5.6  (11.4) 
4.8  (8.1) 
5.6  (6.5) 
5.7  (7.8) 
4.6  (5.8) 
6.3  (8.4) 
6.0  (9.8) 
5.7  (8.1) 
Data source:  Own calculations based on AMADEUS (2010) 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.  
a
 Mean over the years 2004-2008. 
b
 Manufacture of food products and beverages excluding tobacco. According to NACE
 
Rev. 1.1 division DA15. 
c 
Population refers to all food industry firms recorded in AMADEUS for the countries 
Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and the UK. For each year the upper and lower 1 % of the 
observations was removed in order to prevent biases due to outliers. 
d
 Size classes according to the SME definition of the European Commission (2005): 
Micro: < 10 employees and total assets < EUR 2 million; Small: < 50 employees and total 
assets < EUR 10 million; Medium: < 250 employees and total assets < EUR 43 million. 
Due to data availability, firms in the population are size-classified according to the 
number of employees, while firms in the sample are classified by their total assets. 
 
 
Table 20 provides identical information for the sample. Again, large firms tend to 
generate on average the highest ROA’s while volatility in ROA is highest for micro firms. At 
the country-level mean ROA is also highest for large firms while volatility is only highest for 
micro firms in Belgium, France and Italy. Spain and the UK show a reverse pattern for 
volatility in ROA as the standard deviations are highest for large firms in these countries. 
Overall, both ROA and its standard deviation are much more equalized across size classes in 
the sample as compared to the population.  
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Table 20: Mean
a
 ROA (%) and standard deviations for food  
                 industry
b
 firms in the samplec by size class (2004-2008)   
Country 
Firm size
d
 
micro small medium large 
Belgium 
France 
Italy  
Spain 
UK 
All countries 
4.3  (6.8) 
5.7  (7.6) 
3.0  (3.4) 
3.7  (3.7) 
3.8  (5.3) 
5.1  (7.0 ) 
4.0  (6.0) 
5.9  (6.3) 
3.2  (3.1) 
4.0  (3.6) 
4.4  (5.2) 
4.5  (5.1) 
4.1  (5.5) 
5.3  (5.9) 
3.1  (2.9) 
4.1  (3.8) 
5.8  (5.2) 
4.3  (4.6) 
4.9  (5.3) 
5.9  (5.8) 
3.6  (2.6) 
4.9  (4.0) 
6.5  (5.6) 
5.5  (5.2) 
Data source:  Own calculations based on AMADEUS (2010) 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.  
a
 Mean over the years 2004-2008. 
b
 Manufacture of food products and beverages excluding tobacco. According to NACE
 
Rev. 1.1 division DA15. 
c 
Sample refers to the screened data set covering the countries Belgium, France, Italy, 
Spain and the UK. 
d
 Size classes according to the SME definition of the European Commission (2005): 
Micro: < 10 employees and total assets < EUR 2 million; Small: < 50 employees and total 
assets < EUR 10 million; Medium: < 250 employees and total assets < EUR 43 million. 
Due to data availability, firms in the population are size-classified according to the 
number of employees, while firms in the sample are classified by their total assets. 
 
 
Table 21 shows the development of mean ROA over time. For both the sample and the 
population, the values reveal a clear downward trend over time that is likely due to the 
continuous formation of a single European market along with increased competition. The 
decline in 2008 can be attributed to the global financial crisis. While volatility in the sample is 
rather constant, due to the fact that the identical sample of firms is considered over the years, 
volatility in the population has increased from 11.2 % in 1996 to 14.3 % in 2008.   
 
 
Table 21: Mean ROA (%) and standard deviations for food industry
a
 firms in     
                 AMADEUS over time. Sample
b
 vs. population
c
 (1996-2008) 
Year 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Sample  
7.0 
(7.0) 
6.9 
(6.6) 
6.9 
(6.5) 
6.8 
(6.5) 
6.4 
(6.3) 
6.6 
(6.3) 
6.5 
(6.4) 
5.9 
(6.2) 
5.7 
(6.2) 
5.1 
(6.1) 
4.6 
(6.0) 
4.9 
(6.1) 
4.0 
(6.7) 
Pop. 
6.2 
(11.2) 
6.2 
(11.2) 
6.2 
(11.7) 
6.0 
(12.3) 
5.4 
(5.4) 
5.5 
(12.8) 
5.8 
(12.5) 
5.3 
(12.3) 
5.3 
(12.3) 
4.3 
(12.6) 
3.6 
(13.2) 
3.9 
(13.3) 
2.9 
(14.3) 
Data source:  Own calculations based on AMADEUS (2010) 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses; Pop. = Population 
a
 Manufacture of food products and beverages excluding tobacco. According to NACE
 
Rev. 1.1 division DA15. 
b 
Sample refers to the screened data set covering the countries Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and the UK. 
c
 Population refers to all food industry firms recorded in AMADEUS for the countries Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and the 
UK. For each year the upper and lower 1 % of the observations was removed in order to prevent biases due to outliers.
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Mean ROA’s per 3-digit NACE industries are reported in Table 22. For both the 
sample and the population, the ‘Manufacture of other food products’ (NACE 158) and the 
meat sector (NACE 151) turn out to have the highest mean values, respectively. On the 
other hand, the beverage sector (NACE 159), the dairy sector (NACE 155) as well as the 
‘Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats’ (NACE 154) show the lowest mean 
ROA’s over time in both the sample and in the population.  
 
 
Table 22: Mean ROA (%) and standard deviations for food industry
a
 firms in  
                 AMADEUS by industry. Sample
b
 vs. population
c
 (1996-2008)  
Industry (NACE)
d 
 
151 
(Meat) 
152 
(Fish) 
153 
(Fruit & 
vegetables) 
154 
(Oils & fats) 
155 
(Dairy) 
156 
(Starch) 
157 
(Animal 
feeds) 
158 
(Other) 
159 
(Beverages) 
Sample 
6.3 
(6.6) 
5.2 
(5.2) 
5.3 
(4.9) 
3.3 
(5.8) 
4.2 
(5.4) 
5.9 
(6.0) 
5.9 
(5.5) 
6.6 
(7.2) 
4.9 
(5.4) 
Pop. 
5.4 
(12.1) 
4.1 
(11.9) 
4.0 
(11.6) 
3.5 
(11.6) 
3.1 
(10.3) 
4.6 
(10.1) 
4.5 
(10.6) 
5.8 
(14.1) 
3.3 
(11.0) 
Data source:  Own calculations based on AMADEUS (2010) 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses; Pop. = Population 
a
 Manufacture of food products and beverages excluding tobacco. According to NACE
 
Rev. 1.1 division DA15. 
b 
Sample refers to the screened data set covering the countries Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and the UK. 
c
 Population refers to all food industry firms recorded in AMADEUS for the countries Belgium, France, Italy, Spain 
and the UK. For each year the upper and lower 1 % of the observations was removed in order to prevent biases due to 
outliers.
 
d 
Industries defined by 3 digit NACE Rev. 1.1 groups. See the appendix for a detailed industry description according 
to NACE Rev. 1.1  
 
 
For the dairy industry, which is explicitly analyzed in chapter 4, Table 23 indicates 
a similar downward trend in ROA over time as for the entire food industry (cf. Table 21). 
Table 23 also highlights the finding that the dairy industry is a less profitable sector, as for 
all years of the analyzed time period mean ROA falls below mean ROA of the entire food 
industry. This holds for the sample as well as for the population.  
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Table 23: Mean ROA (%) and standard deviations for dairy industry
a
 firms in  
                AMADEUS over time. Sample
b
 vs. population
c
 (1996-2008) 
Year 
 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Sample 
4.9 
(6.2) 
4.8 
(6.0) 
4.3 
(5.1) 
4.3 
(4.9) 
3.8 
(4.9) 
4.1 
(5.2) 
4.5 
(5.6) 
4.5 
(5.4) 
4.0 
(5.6) 
3.5 
(5.0) 
4.0 
(5.2) 
4.1 
(5.1) 
3.3 
(5.5) 
Pop. 
4.1 
(10.1) 
4.1 
(10.1) 
3.4 
(9.6) 
3.6 
(10.2) 
3.3 
(10.3) 
3.0 
(10.3) 
3.7 
(9.4) 
3.8 
(10.0) 
2.9 
(9.4) 
2.4 
(10.5) 
3.0 
(9.8) 
2.6 
(10.7) 
2.1 
(13.1) 
Data source:  Own calculations based on AMADEUS (2010) 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses; Pop. = Population   
a
 Manufacture of dairy products. According to NACE
 
Rev. 1.1 group DA155. 
b 
Sample refers to the screened dairy industry data set covering the countries Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and the 
UK. 
c
 Population refers to all dairy industry firms recorded in AMADEUS for the countries Belgium, France, Italy, Spain 
and the UK. For each year the upper and lower 1 % of the observations was removed in order to prevent biases due 
to outliers.
 
 
 
6.2. Information and descriptive statistics on explanatory firm characteristics 
 
In order to explain the occurrence of abnormal profits at a specific point in time as well as the 
persistence of such profits over longer time periods, for each firm in the sample the following 
firm-level variables were constructed from AMADEUS and Eurostat for each year between 
1996 and 2008: Market share, firm size, firm growth, two measures for firm risk as well as 
firm age. Descriptive statistics for these variables are provided in Table 24 through 26.  
 Market share is calculated by the ratio of firm i’s sales according to AMADEUS and 
total sales
88
 of the 4-digit NACE industry in which the firm operates. Table 24 shows that 
mean market share over all countries and years is 2.61 %, where firms in the Belgian sample 
have on average the highest market share over the analyzed time span (4.90 %) and firms in 
the UK sample have the lowest mean market share (1.88 %).  
 Firm size is measured by a firm’s total assets89 and firm growth by the growth rate of 
total assets from year to year. As Table 24 reveals, average firm size over all years and 
countries is €1.27 million. The mean per country is highest for the UK (€15.6 m.) followed by 
Italy (€6.42 m.). This is likely due to an underrepresentation of micro-sized firms in these 
countries (cf. Table 15). As micro-sized firms are represented adequately in the French 
sample (cf. Table 15), the respective mean turns out to be lowest among the five countries 
(€0.68 m.). The average firm-growth rate over all years and countries is 8.36 %. Spanish firms 
                                                          
88
 Total sales are provided by Eurostat and refer to the sales of the 4-digit NACE industry in which the firm 
operates in the respective country.  
89
 The empirical analysis in chapters 2 through 4 is based on the logarithm of total assets. However, for reasons 
of comprehensibility, the descriptive statistic is based on total assets.    
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thereby exhibit on average the highest growth rate per year (13.21 %) while the smallest 
average growth rate per year is found for Belgium (6.11 %).  
 Two risk proxies were constructed from AMADEUS. The first one is the gearing ratio 
that is defined as the ratio of firms’ non-current liabilities (long-term debt) plus loans and 
shareholder funds. The higher a firm's gearing ratio and thus its degree of leverage, the more 
the company is considered as risky. This is due to the fact that firms with higher leverage are 
more vulnerable to declines in the business cycle as firms must continue to pay off debts 
regardless of low profits (Investopedia, 2012). Gearing ratios in excess of two are indicative 
of a high level of leverage and therefore high risk (Hoen, 2010). As the gearing ratio is based 
on long-term characteristics, it is used as an indicator for long-run firm risk. The mean 
gearing ratio over all years and countries is 1.79 with Italian firms exhibiting on average the 
highest long-term risk (3.23) followed by Belgium (2.41). Spanish firms in turn show the 
lowest mean value for this characteristic (1.26).  
 The second risk measure was constructed by means of the firms’ current ratio. This 
ratio is the quotient of current assets and current liabilities (short-term loans and other current 
liabilities). However, as the current ratio decreases when liabilities and thus risk increases, the 
reciprocal was taken in order to simplify interpretation. As this measure is based on short-
term characteristics, it is used as an indicator for short-run risk. Table 24 reveals that short-run 
risk is on average highest for Belgian firms (1.51) and lowest for Italian and Spanish firms 
(0.91 and 0.92, respectively).   
 In 2002, the year in the middle of the analyzed time period, the average firm in the 
sample is 30.6 years old. With a mean value of 51 years, UK food processors are on average 
the oldest companies in the sample while Spanish firms are youngest with an average age of 
27 years. 
 
 
Table 24: Means
a
 of firm characteristics in the sample
b
 by country (1996-2008)   
Country 
Market 
share 
Firm  
size 
Firm 
growth 
Risk 
Age 
Gearing 1/current 
Belgium 
France 
Italy 
Spain 
UK 
All countries 
4.90 % 
2.21 % 
3.37 % 
3.69 % 
1.88 % 
2.61 % 
0.89 m. € 
0.68 m. € 
6.42 m. € 
2.08 m. € 
15.60 m. € 
1.27 m. € 
6.11 % 
7.96 % 
8.00 % 
13.21 % 
7.81 % 
8.36 % 
2.41 
1.51 
3.23 
1.26 
1.54 
1.79 
1.51 
1.43 
0.91 
0.92 
0.98 
1.27 
30.67 
28.96 
37.37 
27.11 
51.16 
30.64 
Data source:  Own calculations based on AMADEUS (2010) and Eurostat (2010) 
Note: Gearing = gearing ratio; 1/current = Reciprocal of the current ratio
  
a
 Means over the years 1996 to 2008. For age the mean was calculated for 2002. 
b
 Sample refers to the screened data set. I.e. all firms for which complete ROA data for the time 
period 1996 to 2008 is available.   
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Table 25 depicts the development of the firm characteristics over time. It can be 
detected that average market share and size across the firms in the sample has increased 
over time. However, the average rate of firm growth shows a declining trend. Similarly, 
both risk measures show a downward trend over time.   
 
 
Table 25: Means
a
 of firm characteristics in the sample
b
 over time (1996-2008) 
Year 
Var. 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Ms 
(%)  
0.38 1.03 0.98 0.45 0.47 0.57 0.91 3.40 4.67 1.90 2.02 1.99 1.99 
FSize 
(m. €) 
0.92 0.98 1.04 1.11 1.18 1.26 1.30 1.35 1.41 1.46 1.52 1.59 1.65 
FGrw. 
(%) 
- 9.10 9.10 10.33 9.67 9.07 5.63 5.63 5.97 5.86 6.21 6.20 5.17 
Gear 
(%) 
2.43 2.41 2.11 1.91 1.75 1.86 1.70 1.63 1.53 1.51 1.53 1.50 1.42 
1/Cur 1.32 1.33 1.37 1.34 1.30 1.27 1.25 1.25 1.19 1.18 1.20 1.28 1.21 
Data source:  Own calculations based on AMADEUS (2010) and Eurostat (2010) 
Note: Ms = Market share; FSize = Firm size; FGrw. = Firm growth; Gear = gearing ratio; 1/Cur = reciprocal of current  
          ratio 
a
 Means over the five countries Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and the UK.  
b
 Sample refers to the screened data set. I.e. all firms for which complete ROA data for the time period 1996 to 2008 is 
available.   
 
 
Means for the firm characteristics by industry are reported in Table 26. Average 
market share is highest for firms in the dairy (3.49 %) and in the beverage sector (2.40 %). 
In contrast, firms in the meat sector have the lowest mean market share (0.24 %). On 
average the largest firms operate in the beverages industry (€4.59 m.) while the 
‘Manufacture of other food products’ comprises on average the smallest firms (€0.51 m.). 
Mean firm growth is between 6 % and 10 % for most sectors with the exception of the 
dairy sector where firms on average only grow by 1.24 % per year. Long-term risk tends 
on average to be highest in the dairy sector (2.52) and lowest in the ‘Manufacture of grain 
mill products, starches and starch products’ (1.29). Regarding short-term risk, the highest 
mean value is found for the ‘Manufacture of other food products’ (1.77) while the 
‘Manufacture of grain mill products’ also exhibits the lowest mean value in this case 
(0.79). With an average age of 41 years, firms in the beverage sector are eldest while the 
‘Manufacture of other food products’ is on average the youngest sector (26 years).  
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Table 26: Means
a
 of firm characteristics in the sample
b
 by industry (1996-2008) 
 Industry (NACE)
c 
Variable 
151 
(Meat) 
152 
(Fish) 
153 
(Fruit & 
vegetables) 
154 
(Oils & fats) 
155 
(Dairy) 
156 
(Starch) 
157 
(Animal 
feeds) 
158 
(Other) 
159 
(Beverages) 
Ms (%)  0.24 1.23 0.82 1.80 3.49 0.79 2.09 0.31 2.40 
FSize (m. €) 1.08 3.02 3.66 2.51 3.50 2.01 2.45 0.51 4.59 
FGrw. (%) 7.00 9.58 9.94 5.66 1.24 6.93 5.85 8.22 8.54 
Gear 1.45 1.53 1.54 1.91 2.52 1.29 1.44 2.09 1.62 
1/Cur 1.10 0.96 0.90 0.82 1.08 0.79 0.80 1.77 0.87 
Age 27.6 29.7 31.1 39.4 37.4 37.7 33.0 26.0 41.1 
Data source:  Own calculations based on AMADEUS (2010) and Eurostat (2010) 
Note: Ms = Market share; FSize = Firm size; FGrw. = Firm growth; Gear = gearing ratio; 1/Cur = reciprocal of 
current ratio 
a
 Means per 3-digit NACE industry over the five countries Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and the UK for the period 
1996-2008. 
b
 Sample refers to the screened data set. I.e. all firms for which complete ROA data for the time period 1996 to 2008 
is available.   
c
 Industries defined by 3 digit NACE Rev. 1.1 groups. See the appendix for a detailed industry description according 
to NACE Rev. 1.1 
 
  
6.3. Information and descriptive statistics on explanatory industry characteristics 
 
Besides firm characteristics the following industry characteristics were employed as 
explanatory variables for the occurrence and persistence of abnormal profits: Industry 
concentration, industry size and growth as well as industry expenditure for research and 
development (R&D). Additionally, the concentration of the retail sector in each of the five 
analyzed countries serves as an explanatory variable. These variables were constructed for 
each 4-digit NACE industry within the ‘manufacture of food products and beverages’ and 
each year between 1996-2008 using Eurostat (2010) and the AMADEUS database. While the 
descriptive statistics in this chapter are based on the 3-digit NACE classification for reasons 
of clarity and comprehensibility, the explanatory industry variables are calculated according 
to the 4-digit classification, as the analyses in chapters 2 to 4 are based on this level. Table 27 
to 29 present descriptive statistics for the explanatory industry variables. 
Concentration is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). For each 4-digit 
NACE industry, the HHI is calculated by the sum of the squared market shares of the 50 
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largest firms that operate in this industry.
90
 HHI values in excess of 0.25 indicate that an 
industry is highly concentrated while the maximum value of 1 is indicative of a monopoly 
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2010). As Table 27 reveals, concentration is on average highest 
in Belgium (0.143) and the UK (0.107) and lowest in Spain (0.054) and Italy (0.033). 
Industry size is measured by the number of firms operating in each 4-digit NACE 
industry, and industry growth is measured by the respective growth rate from year to year. 
The grand mean of the number of firms across all 4-digit NACE industries in all countries and 
years is 1302 firms. As the number of total food industry firms is largest for Italy and France 
(72,691 and 70,823, respectively; cf. Table 12), the average size of each 4-digit NACE 
industry is also largest in these countries (2195 and 2171 firms, respectively). In contrast, the 
number of total food industry firms is smallest in Belgium and the UK (7511 and 7027, 
respectively; cf. Table 12). Hence the average number of firms per 4-digit NACE industry is 
also smallest in these countries (306 firms in Belgium and 250 firms in the UK). With respect 
to the number of firms, the average 4-digit NACE industry across the five countries grows by 
4.17 % per year. Here Italian 4-digit NACE industries are characterized by the highest mean 
growth rate (8.03 % per year) while French 4-digit NACE industries show on average a more 
or less stagnating development (0.56 % per year). 
The research and development (R&D) intensity is measured for each 4-digit NACE 
industry by the ratio of total industry R&D expenditure and total industry value added. Table 
27 shows that this value is on average around 1 % over all countries as well as for individual 
countries and years with the exception of Italy where the average share of R&D expenditure 
in total industry value added is only 0.5 %.    
Concentration of the food retail sector in each country was included as an additional 
explanatory variable. Here concentration is measured by the five-firm concentration ratio as 
the Herfindahl index is not available for this sector. As Table 27 shows, average food retailer 
concentration over all years and countries is 0.57. This implies that the 5 largest firms in the 
retail sector on average generate 57 % of total retail sales. Regarding individual countries, 
Belgium shows the highest average retailer concentration (0.71) while mean concentration in 
Italy is moderate (0.28)  
 
 
 
                                                          
90
 As concentration measures are not provided by Eurostat, this variable had to be calculated manually by means 
of sales of the 50 largest firms in each 4-digit industry reported by AMADEUS and total industry sales given by 
Eurostat.   
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Table 27: Means
a
 of industry characteristics by country (1996-2008)    
Country Concentration
b
 
Industry 
size 
Industry 
growth 
R&D 
Retail 
concentration
c 
Belgium 
France 
Italy  
Spain 
UK 
All countries 
0.143 
0.074 
0.033 
0.054 
0.107 
0.080 
306.2 
2170.5 
2195.3 
970.9 
250.2 
1301.9 
2.37 % 
0.56 % 
8.03 % 
7.35 % 
1.19 % 
4.17 % 
0.70 % 
1.08 % 
0.53 % 
0.90 % 
0.85 % 
0.80 % 
0.71 
0.63 
0.28 
0.54 
0.68 
0.57 
Data source:  Own calculations based on Eurostat (2010) and AMADEUS (2010) 
Note: R&D = Research and development
 
a
 Means over the years 1996 to 2008 except for retail concentration were data is only available 
for 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2006. 
b
 Measured by the Herfindahl index. 
c 
Measured by the five-firm concentration ratio.  
 
 
Table 28 depicts the development of the industry characteristics over time with 
mean food industry concentration measured by the HHI showing an upward trend during 
the analyzed period. While average industry size narrowed by the number of firms 
decreases over time, mean growth fluctuates heavily over years with a minimum average 
value of -1.97 % in 2002 and a maximum value of 16.39 % in 1999. These values appear 
puzzling at first sight as periods with strong average growth per industry are accompanied 
by a decrease in the average number of firms per industry. However, these somewhat 
contradicting values are due to the fact that the mean growth rates are calculated over 
industries with significantly different number of firms ranging from only 2 firms in the 
Belgian production of ethyl alcohol (NACE 1592) up to 49,173 firms in the French 
manufacture of bread (NACE 1581).
91
 In smaller sectors, growth or shrinkage by a few 
firms has a large impact on the growth rate while changes in large sectors, even if many 
firms enter or exit the market, do not necessarily have a significant impact on the growth 
rate. Thus, if small sectors grow by a few firms, while large sectors shrink by a significant 
extent, however, with a small impact on the growth rate, the given results arise.
92
 Mean 
R&D intensity fluctuates over time around its grand mean of 0.8 % with a minimum value 
of 0.3 % in 1996 and a maximum value of 1.3 % in 2000. Average concentration of the 
retail sector has increased between 1996 and 2006 from 46 % to 61 %. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
91
 Values for the years 2007 and 2001, respectively.  
92
 For example, entry of two firms in the Belgian case (NACE 1592) would imply a growth rate of 100 % while 
exit of 1000 firms in the French example (NACE 1581) would only imply a decline of around 2 %. 
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Table 28: Means
a
 of industry characteristics over time (1996-2008) 
Year 
Var. 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Herf. n.a. 0.066 0.064 0.083 0.072 0.080 0.063 0.088 0.088 0.086 0.085 0.087 0.094 
ISize 1485 1386 1410 1281 1216 1191 1459 1280 1302 1289 1272 1293 1162 
IGrw. 
(%) 
- 1.68 14.34 16.39 2.23 0.18 -1.97 7.50 0.86 1.68 4.55 5.22 -0.15 
R&D 
(%) 
0.3 0.8 0.8 0.6 1.3 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.9 n.a. 
CR5 46.0 n.a. n.a n.a 56.4 n.a n.a n.a 64.0 n.a 61.3 n.a n.a 
Data source:  Own calculations based on Eurostat (2010) and AMADEUS (2010) 
Notes: Herf. = Herfindahl Index; ISize = Industry size; IGrw. = Industry growth; R&D = Research and development;    
            CR5 = 5-firm concentration ratio of the food retail sector 
a
 Means over the five countries Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and the UK. 
 
 
The mean values for the industry characteristics per 3-digit NACE industry are 
presented in Table 29. Concentration turns out to have the highest average values in the 
beverage sector (0.123) and in the ‘Manufacture of other food products’ (0.118) and the 
lowest mean values in the fish industry (0.014) and in the ‘Manufacture of vegetable and 
animal oils and fats’ (0.011). As described above, the ‘Manufacture of other food products’ 
and the meat sector are the largest industries regarding number of firms in 2007 (cf. Table 16). 
The same holds for the mean size of these sectors over time. On average the smallest 
industries are the ‘Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables’ (351 firms) and the 
‘Manufacture of prepared animal feeds’ (287 firms). The beverage sector shows the highest 
mean growth rate with 6.28 % per year while growth is on average smallest in the fish 
industry with an average increase in the number of firms of only 1.12 % per year. Mean R&D 
intensity is highest in the ‘Manufacture of grain mill products, starches and starch products’ 
where on average 2.50 % of the total value added is spend on R&D and in the beverage sector 
where the respective fraction is 1.53 %. Less R&D intensive sectors are the oil and fat 
industry as well as the ‘Manufacture of prepared animal feeds’ with fractions of 0.14 % and 
0.20 %, respectively. 
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Table 29: Means
a
 of industry characteristics by industry (1996-2008) 
 Industry (NACE)
b 
Variable 
151 
(Meat) 
152 
(Fish) 
153 
(Fruit & 
vegetables) 
154 
(Oils & fats) 
155 
(Dairy) 
156 
(Starch) 
157 
(Animal 
feeds) 
158 
(Other) 
159 
(Beverages) 
Herf. 0.028 0.014 0.045 0.011 0.070 0.060 0.051 0.118 0.123 
ISize 1536 429 351 523 894 415 287 3241 360 
IGrw. (%) 1.59 1.12 2.43 4.50 1.42 2.01 3.46 5.50 6.28 
R&D (%) 0.55 0.85 1.22 0.14 0.56 2.50 0.20 0.83 1.53 
Data source:  Own calculations based on Eurostat (2010) and AMADEUS (2010) 
Notes: Industries defined by 3 digit NACE Rev. 1.1 groups. 
            Herf. = Herfindahl Index; ISize = Industry size; IGrw. = Industry growth; R&D = Research and development;    
            CR5 = 5-firm concentration ratio of the food retail sector 
a
 Means per 3-digit NACE industry over the five countries Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and the UK for the period 1996-
2008. 
b 
see the appendix for a detailed industry description according to NACE Rev. 1.1 
 
 
A number of additional firm and industry characteristics were used as explanatory 
variables by previous studies (e.g. Kambhampati, 1995; Yurtoglu, 2004; 
Gschwandtner, 2012). Unfortunately data on these characteristics are not available. In what 
follows, some of these variables are specified. Export and imports either at the firm or 
industry level have often been found to have an impact on the degree and the persistence of 
abnormal profits. Firms that are export orientated operate in international markets where the 
forces of competition might be stronger than in domestic markets. For example, Yurtoglu 
(2004) shows that the impact of firms’ export intensity on long-run persistence is negative. 
Regarding imports, a negative impact can be expected as imports are the most direct new 
entry into the domestic market. For example, Gschwandtner (2012) detects a negative impact 
of imports at the industry level on long-run persistence. Advertising can serve as a basis for 
product differentiation and for the creation of entry barriers and should therefore have a 
positive impact on abnormal profits and profit persistence. Kambhampati (1995), for example, 
finds a positive impact of advertising expenditure on short-run persistence. Finally, data 
regarding mergers and acquisitions or variables related to ownership and control are often 
used to explain abnormal profits or profit persistence. Yurtoglu (2004), for example, analyzes 
the impact of business group affiliation and of ownership concentration on profit persistence 
and shows that the former has a positive impact on long-run persistence. 
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7. A review of the empirical literature on profit persistence 
 
Paper number one (chapter 2) which focuses on the occurrence of abnormal profits at a 
specific point in time already comprises a detailed review on the respective literature. Paper 
number two (chapter 3) which focuses on profit persistence in the EU food industry also 
contains a review of the available literature within this strand of research. This review, 
however, is rather concise. The current chapter therefore provides a complementary review on 
the profit persistence literature. 
While the studies analyzing the occurrence of abnormal profits at a specific point in 
time are either based on cross sectional data or on data with a rather short time series 
dimension with a maximum of 5 observations
93
, profit persistence studies are in general based 
on panel data with a time series dimension of around 20 years. Table 30 provides a 
chronological overview of the profit persistence literature. As can be seen from the table, the 
majority of the contributions are based on AR models and analyze panel data comprising on 
average 23 annual profit observations on each firm.
94
 
Mueller (1977) was the seminal study in profit persistence research. However, his 
study is based on a predecessor model of the AR approach referred to as the ‘polynomial 
convergence model’ (PCM).95 The AR(1) methodology was first introduced to the profit 
persistence literature in Mueller’s 1986 book. Following Mueller (1986), a series of 
contributions based on AR models has emerged analyzing profit persistence in various 
economic sectors. To mention just a few of these studies: Odagiri and Yamawaki (1986), 
Geroski and Jacquemin (1988), Cubbin and Geroski (1990), Mueller (1990a), Kambhampati 
(1995), Waring (1996), Goddard and Wilson (1999), Maruyama and Odagiri (2002), Yurtoglu 
(2004), Gschwandtner (2005; 2012). Gschwandtner (2005) was the first study improving the 
AR(1) methodology by using a ‘best-lag’ approach with AR processes up to order four. Table 
30 also provides the mean iˆ  values of the studies based on AR models. While this value is 
approximately between 0.4 and 0.5 for the majority of analyzed countries, Glen et al. (2001) 
show that firms in developing countries have on average lower degrees of profit persistence. 
The mean values for developing countries in their study range between 0.01 in Brazil and 0.42 
in Zimbabwe. Most of the studies based on AR models also implement a second estimation 
step in order to determine the drivers of the short- and long-run persistence values iˆ  and ipˆ . 
                                                          
93
 Schmalensee’s (1985) analysis is based on a single year, Rumelt’s (1991) on a four-year series, and Schiefer 
and Hartmann’s (2009) study on a five-year series for each firm. 
94
 This mean holds for studies that are based on autoregressive models. 
95
 This approach is described in the appendix. 
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Many of these studies find a positive impact of market share (e.g. Szymanski et al., 1993; 
Yurtoglu, 2004), firm size (e.g. Cubbin and Geroski, 1990; Gschwandtner, 2005) and industry 
concentration (e.g. Kessides 1990; Yurtoglu 2004) on profit persistence and a negative 
influence of risk (e.g. Schwalbach and Mahmood, 1990; Gschwandtner, 2005) and industry 
growth (e.g. Odagiri and Yamawaki, 1990; Gschwandtner, 2012).
96
  
Goddard et al. (2005) are the first to use the Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic panel 
approach to estimate profit persistence. Besides a significant degree of profit persistence they 
find evidence for a negative relationship between firm size and long-run profits, and a positive 
impact of market share. They also show that the relationship between firms’ gearing ratio as a 
measure for risk and long-run profit is negative, whilst firms with higher liquidity are 
estimated to be more profitable in the long run. Furthermore, Goddard et al.’s (2005) study is 
the only other analysis based on AMADEUS, the database that is used in the present thesis. 
Gschwandtner (2012) stresses that the results of her dynamic panel model are in general a 
more robust reflection of the results obtained by the AR ‘best-lag’ approach.  
A minority of studies are based on modifications of the standard approach by, e.g., 
estimating the AR model by means of generalized least squares (GLS) instead of OLS (e.g. 
Kessides, 1990) or by implementing an approach that proportions the persistence in abnormal 
profits into a firm and industry component by means of sequential weighted-least-squares 
technique (e.g. McGahan and Porter, 1999, 2003; Schumacher and Boland, 2005a). A few 
studies are also based on structural time series analysis (STSA) (e.g. Cable and 
Gschwandtner, 2008; Cable and Jackson, 2008; Cable and Mueller, 2008). STSA studies 
usually analyze a limited number of firms over long  time spans of up to 50 years.
97
 At this a 
long-run trend of the time series of abnormal profits, that can be compared to the long-run 
value ( ipˆ ) of the AR model, is generated for each firm by means of maximum likelihood 
estimation (Cable and Jackson, 2008). According to Cable and Gschwandtner (2008), STSA 
appears to offer advantages compared to the AR model in cases with complex dynamics in the 
profit times series. The disadvantage of STSA, however, consists in the rather long 
computation time, thus limiting such analyses to small samples or case studies. 
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 Within this thesis many other factors are estimated to have an impact on profit persistence. These are 
described in the data section and discussed together with the respective results of papers two and three. 
97
 E.g. Cable and Mueller (2008) analyze 4 U.S. firms and 4 UK firms over the periods 1950-99 and 1968-99, 
respectively. 
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Table 30: Chronological overview of empirical studies of profit persistence 
Authors Countries Time span Industry No. of firms  Method Mean 
iˆ
a 
 
Mueller (1977)  
 
U.S. 
 
1949-72 
 
unknown 
 
472 
 
PCM & TPM 
 
n.a. 
 
Mueller (1986) 
 
U.S. 
 
1950-72 
 
 Manufacturing 
 
  1000 
 
PCM & AR1 
 
0.43 – 0.55
c 
 
Odagiri & Yamawaki 
(1986) 
 
Japan 
 
1964-80 
 
 Manufacturing 
 
294 
 
PMC & AR1 
 
0.47 
 
Cubbin & Geroski 
(1987) 
 
U.K. 
 
1951-77 
 
48 industries
b 
 
217 
 
AR1 
 
n.a. 
 
Geroski & Jacquemin 
(1988) 
 
U.K. 
France 
Germany 
 
1949-77 
1965-82 
1961-81 
 
8 Manufacturing 
sectors 
 
           51 
           55 
           28 
 
AR3 
 
UK: 0.49 
France:0.41 
Germany: 0.41 
 
Schwalbach et. al 
(1989) 
 
Germany 
 
1961-82 
 
Manufacturing 
 
299 
 
AR1 
 
0.49 
 
Cubbin & Geroski 
(1990) 
 
 
U.K. 
 
1948-77 
 
48 industries
b
 
 
243 
 
AR1 
 
0.48 
 
Jenny & Weber 
(1990) 
 
 
France 
 
1965-82 
 
Manufacturing 
 
450 
 
AR1 
 
0.36 
 
Kessides (1990) 
 
U.S. 
 
1967-82 
 
Manufacturing 
 
n.a. analysis 
at industry 
level with 344 
industries 
 
GLS AR1 
 
0.43 
 
Khemani & Shapiro 
(1990) 
 
Canada 
 
1964-82 
1968-82 
 
Manufacturing and 
mining 
 
161 
 
 
AR1 
 
0.43 
 
Mueller (1990a) 
 
U.S. 
 
1950-72 
 
Manufacturing 
 
551 
 
 
AR1 
 
0.18 
 
Odagiri & Yamawaki 
(1990) 
 
 
Japan 
 
1964-82 
 
Manufacturing 
 
376 
 
AR1 
 
n.a. 
 
Schwalbach & 
Mahmood (1990) 
 
Germany 
 
1961-82 
 
Manufacturing 
 
299 
 
AR1 
 
0.27 – 0.67
d 
 
Schohl (1990) 
 
Germany 
 
1961-84 
 
Manufacturing 
 
283 
 
PCM & AR1 
 
0.51 
 
Droucopoulos & 
Lianos (1993) 
 
 
Greece 
 
1963-88 
 
Manufacturing 
 
500 
 
AR1 
 
0.69 – 0.90
c
 
 
Kambhampati (1995) 
 
India 
 
1970-85 
 
42 Industries
b 
 
n.a. analysis 
at industry 
level 
 
AR1-2 
 
n.a. 
 
Waring (1996) 
 
U.S. 
 
1970-89 
 
68 industries
b
 
 
      12,986 
 
AR1 
 
0.66 
 
Goddard & Wilson 
(1999) 
 
U.K. 
 
1972-91 
 
Manufacturing 
 
         796 
 
AR1 
 
0.45 
 
McGahan & Porter 
(1999) 
 
 
 
 
U.S. 
 
1981-94 
 
All but financial and 
government 
 
7,005 
 
Sequential 
weighted-
least-squares 
technique 
 
n.a. 
Glen et al. (2001) Brazil 
India 
Jordan 
Korea 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Zimbabwe 
1985-95 
1982-92 
1980-94 
1980-94 
1983-94 
1984-94 
1980-94 
Manufacturing 
 
          56 
          40 
          17 
          82 
          62 
          39 
          40 
AR2 0.01 
0.23 
0.35 
0.32 
0.35 
0.22 
0.42 
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Table 30 (continued): Chronological overview of empirical studies of profit persistence 
Authors Countries Time span Industry No. of firms  Method Mean 
iˆ
a 
 
Maruyama & Odagiri 
(2002) 
 
 
Japan 
 
1964-97 
 
 
 
Manufacturing 
 
 
 
357 
 
AR1 
 
0.54 
 
Wiggins & Ruefli 
(2002) 
 
U.S. 
 
1972-97 
 
40 Industries
b
 (Not 
restricted to 
manufacturing) 
 
6,772 
 
Event History 
Analysis and 
Ordinal Time 
Series 
Analysis 
           
           n.a 
 
McGahan & Porter 
(2003) 
 
U.S. 
 
1981-94 
 
All but financial and 
government 
 
7,005 
 
Sequential 
weighted-
least-squares 
technique 
 
n.a. 
 
Yurtoglu (2004) 
 
Turkey 
 
1985-98 
 
13 industries
b 
          
         172 
 
AR1 
 
0.38 
 
Goddard et al. (2005) 
 
Belgium 
France 
Italy 
Spain 
        UK 
 
1993-2001 
 
NACE
e
 15-36  
             and 
NACE 50-74 
 
1,348 
4,620 
2,173 
2,030 
1,511 
 
 
Dynamic 
panel 
 
n.a. 
Gschwandtner (2005) 
 
U.S. 1950-99 Manufacturing 85 survivors              
72 exitors 
AR ‘best lag’ Exitors: 0.23 
Survivors: 0.34 
 
Schumacher & 
Bohland (2005a) 
 
 
U.S. 
 
1980-2001 
 
Food Industry 
 
465 
 
Sequential 
weighted-
least-squares 
technique 
 
n.a. 
 
Cable & 
Gschwandtner (2008) 
 
 
U.S. 
 
1950-99 
 
Manufacturing 
 
156 
 
AR1 and 
STSA 
 
            n.a  
Cable & Jackson 
(2008) 
 
U.K. 1968-99 Manufacturing and 
service 
           53 STSA n.a. 
Cable & Mueller 
(2008) 
U.K. 
U.S. 
U.S.: 1950-99 
UK: 1968-99 
Manufacturing            4 
           4 
AR1-2, STSA 
and case 
histories 
n.a. 
 
Crespo Cuaresma & 
Gschwandtner (2008) 
 
U.S. 
 
1950-99 
 
Manufacturing 
 
156 
 
AR1 
 
0.47 
 
Gschwandtner (2012) 
 
U.S. 
 
1950-66 
1967-83 
1984-99 
 
Manufacturing 
 
567 
980 
 1099 
 
AR ‘best lag’ 
and dynamic 
panel 
 
0.49 
0.42 
0.36 
Source: Own literature research based on Wiggins & Ruefli (2005), Table 1, p. 890 ff. and Gschwandtner (2012),  
             Table 1, p. 180 
a For studies based on AR models. 
b Not described more precisely.  
c 
Depending on the analyzed subsample / industry. 
d Depending on the profit measure used. 
e 
NACE (Nomenclature generale des activites economiques dans les commumautes Europeeanes) is the statistical 
classification of economic activities in the European Community. 
Notes: ROA=Return on assets; ROC=Return on capital; ROEC=Return on equity capital; ROS=Return on sales; 
AR(ρ)=Autoregressive model of order ρ; TAR=Threshold autoregressive; GLS= Generalized least squares; OLS=Ordinary 
least squares; PCM=polynomial convergence model; STSA=Case studies based on structural time series analysis; 
TPM=transition probability model 
 
 
Table 30 also reveals that the majority of profit persistence studies focus on entire 
manufacturing sectors. Evidence regarding profit persistence in the food and agribusiness 
sector is therefore scarce, with the exception of Schumacher and Boland’s (2005a) study for 
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the U.S. food economy. Nevertheless, as indicated above, their study is based on a different 
estimation technique which does not quantify the structural firm and industry characteristics 
that determine profit persistence. However, their results reveal that industry effects are more 
important for profit persistence than corporate effects. Some of the studies focusing on entire 
manufacturing sectors also present separate results on the long-run value ( ipˆ ) for individual 
subsectors. These results are summarized in Odagiri and Yamawaki (1990a: 183, Table 10.6). 
However, food industry firms only make up a small fraction of the analyzed firms in most of 
these studies (between 20 in Canada and 61 for the U.S.). The respective results therefore do 
not appear reliable and are not reported here.  
The present thesis aims at contributing to this literature not only by providing evidence 
for profit persistence and its determinants in the EU food industry based on a large sample of 
firms, but also by improving the standard estimation technique.  
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Appendix 
 
Figure 11: Development of the EU-27 population by age groups (2010-2060) 
 
Data source:  Own calculations based on Eurostat (2012b) 
 
 
Table 31: NACE Rev. 1.1 section D-Manufacturing 
D - Manufacturing 
DA15 - Manufacture of food products and beverages 
DA16 - Manufacture of tobacco products 
DB17 - Manufacture of textiles 
DB18 - Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing; dyeing of fur 
DC19 - Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear 
DD20 - Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw    
             and plaiting materials 
DE21 - Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products 
DE22 - Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 
DF23 - Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 
DG24 - Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
DH25 - Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
DI26 - Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
DJ27 - Manufacture of basic metals 
DJ28 - Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 
DK29 - Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
DL30 - Manufacture of office machinery and computers 
DL31 - Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 
DL32 - Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 
DL33 - Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 
DM34 - Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
DM35 - Manufacture of other transport equipment 
DN36 - Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 
DN37 - Recycling 
Source: Eurostat (2009) 
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Table 32: NACE Rev. 1.1 division DA-15 Manufacture of food products and beverages 
DA15 Manufacture of food products and beverages 
15.1 Production, processing and preserving of meat and meat products 
15.11 Production and preserving of meat 
15.12 Production and preserving of poultrymeat 
15.13 Production of meat and poultrymeat products 
15.2 Processing and preserving of fish and fish products 
15.20 Processing and preserving of fish and fish products 
15.3 Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables 
15.31 Processing and preserving of potatoes 
15.32 Manufacture of fruit and vegetable juice 
15.33 Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables n.e.c. 
15.4 Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats 
15.41 Manufacture of crude oils and fats 
15.42 Manufacture of refined oils and fats 
15.43 Manufacture of margarine and similar edible fats 
15.5 Manufacture of dairy products 
15.51 Operation of dairies and cheese making 
15.52 Manufacture of ice cream 
15.6 Manufacture of grain mill products, starches and starch products 
15.61 Manufacture of grain mill products 
15.62 Manufacture of starches and starch products 
15.7 Manufacture of prepared animal feeds 
15.71 Manufacture of prepared feeds for farm animals 
15.72 Manufacture of prepared pet foods 
15.8 Manufacture of other food products 
15.81 Manufacture of bread; manufacture of fresh pastry goods and cakes 
15.82 Manufacture of rusks and biscuits; manufacture of preserved pastry goods and cakes 
15.83 Manufacture of sugar 
15.84 Manufacture of cocoa; chocolate and sugar confectionery 
15.85 Manufacture of macaroni, noodles, couscous and similar farinaceous products 
15.86 Processing of tea and coffee 
15.87 Manufacture of condiments and seasonings 
15.88 Manufacture of homogenized food preparations and dietetic food 
15.89 Manufacture of other food products n.e.c. 
15.9 Manufacture of beverages 
15.91 Manufacture of distilled potable alcoholic beverages 
15.92 Production of ethyl alcohol from fermented materials 
15.93 Manufacture of wines 
15.94 Manufacture of cider and other fruit wines 
15.95 Manufacture of other non-distilled fermented beverages 
15.96 Manufacture of beer 
15.97 Manufacture of malt 
15.98 Production of mineral waters and soft drinks 
Source: Eurostat (2009) 
 
 
Polynomial-convergence model (PCM) 
 
Some of the earlier studies of profit persistence (e.g. Mueller, 1977; Schohl, 1990; 
Kambhampati, 1995) model the adjustment process by regressing abnormal profits on the 
inverse of time: 
(9) itiiit
t
 
1
, 
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where it  is an error term with zero mean and constant variance. Equation (9) is usually 
denoted as the ‘polynomial convergence model’ (PCM). Starting in 1t  with iii  1   
abnormal profits converge to i  as t . The constant iˆ  therefore indicates long-run 
profit persistence. If iˆ  is positive, the respective firm is estimated to earn abnormal profits 
above the competitive norm that persist in the long run. The absolute value of i  reflects the 
rate at which convergence of abnormal profits on the long-run level takes place. The higher 
this value, the slower the convergence to the long-run level i , and the higher short-run 
persistence. Figure 12 depicts the possible profit paths for the simple case where 0i . As 
can be seen, the form of the profit path is determined by the algebraic sign of i . If 0i  
the initial value of abnormal profits exceeds the long-run value i  while 0i indicates that 
the initial value is below the long-run value (Schohl, 1990).  
 
 
Figure 12: The polynomial-convergence model (PCM) 
 
Source: Own illustration based on Mueller (1986, Figure 2.1, p.11). 
 
 
According to Odagiri and Yamawaki (1986) the most obvious shortcoming of the 
standard model is that a monotonic convergence of it  to
 
i
 
is assumed. In order to better 
capture the fluctuations of abnormal profits over time equation (9) can be generalized as 
follows: 
(10) itj
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where j is the number of polynomials added to the equation. Most of the studies that 
implement the PCM estimate equations with up to third order polynomials and then, similar to 
the ‘best lag model’, choose the ‘best fit equation’ for each firm based on the adjusted 2R .  
Another deficit of this model is the fact that the estimates will depend heavily on the 
chosen time unit. Thus, for example, depending on whether time is introduced as 
2008.....,,1991,1990t  or as 19.....,,2,1t  the results will significantly differ.98 
Due to these disadvantages the PCM did not establish in the profit persistence 
literature while the autoregressive model of order one and its extensions in form of the ‘best 
lag’ framework have become the main econometric method to estimate profit persistence. 
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Chapter 2:  The determinants of firm profitability differences in EU food    
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Abstract: This paper decomposes the variance in food industry return on assets into year, country, industry, and 
firm effects. In addition to estimating conventional approaches such as ANOVA and components of variance a 
multilevel approach is implemented which apart from its methodological improvements offers the possibility to 
estimate the impact of several covariates within each effect level. The results show that firm characteristics are 
far more important than industry structure in determining food industry profitability. In particular, firm size and 
industry concentration are drivers of profitability while firm risk and age as well as the industry growth rate have 
a negative influence. 
 
Key words: ROA, food industry, variance decomposition, hierarchical linear model. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In a perfectly competitive market, firm performance that deviates from the average should not 
exist in the long run. However, such deviations are not an exemption to the rule but the 
normal case. While classical industrial organization (IO) theory (e.g. Bain, 1956) and the 
‘market-based view’ (Porter, 1980) mainly attribute such ‘abnormal’ profits to industry 
characteristics, proponents of the ‘resource-based view’ (Barney, 1991) assume that 
performance differentials can be better explained by firm properties. In order to resolve this 
debate, a series of contributions following Schmalensee’s (1985) seminal paper, has used 
components of variance analysis (COV) and analysis of variance (ANOVA) to decompose the 
variation in firm profitability into firm and industry effects (McGahan and Porter, 2002; 
McNamara et al., 2005). Subsequent papers have also looked at the impact of year and, more 
recently, of country effects on firm profitability (e.g. Goddard et al., 2009) as the increasing 
relevance of integrated economic areas, such as the EU or NAFTA, provides an interesting, 
but yet neglected opportunity to disentangle the profitability effects of country versus area-
wide economic fluctuation. Nevertheless, inconsistencies in the results of studies based on 
ANOVA and COV lead to the consensus that these methods are unreliable (Misangyi et al., 
                                                          
99
 This chapter is the first revision of a paper that has been published as Hirsch, S., Schiefer, J., Gschwandtner, 
A. and Hartmann, M. (2014): The determinants of firm profitability differences in EU food processing. Journal 
of Agricultural Economics, DOI: 10.1111/1477-9552.12061.  
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2006). A new strand of research addresses the disadvantages of classical COV and ANOVA 
and uses the multilevel approach of hierarchical linear modelling (HLM) in order to 
decompose the variance in profitability (Hough, 2006; Misangyi et al., 2006; Short et al., 
2006; Chaddad and Mondelli, 2012). Additionally, while ANOVA and COV are only 
descriptive approaches, a crucial advantage of the HLM method is that, besides the magnitude 
of effects, the influence of specific structural covariates can be determined.   
The present study contributes in the following ways. First, in order to address the 
methodological shortcomings of previous studies, in addition to COV and ANOVA, we 
implement the more sophisticated HLM approach. Second, evidence for the food sector is as 
yet sparse since past research has focused on other manufacturing sectors or entire economies. 
Few exceptions are Schumacher and Boland (2005) and Chaddad and Mondelli (2012). 
However, these studies focus on the U.S. sector. In order to fill these gaps, this study aims to 
provide evidence for the determinants of corporate profitability in the EU food industry.   
The food industry is the largest sector within EU manufacturing, contributing 15 % to 
turnover in 2010 (Eurostat, 2012). Nevertheless, food processors are confronted with 
increasing price volatility in their input markets and high concentration in the downstream 
sector (Wijnands et al., 2007). Here pressure on the industry is further reinforced by 
increasing importance of retailer’s private labels, which achieve a market share of 27 %100 
(Datamonitor, 2006). Thus, due to its high economic importance and its special structural 
characteristics the EU food industry deserves further investigation regarding the drivers of 
firm profitability.  
The paper is structured as follows. After providing an overview of the theoretical and 
empirical background, we introduce the data used. In the methodology section we first 
identify and replicate best-practices applied in previous papers (ANOVA and COV) in order 
to assure comparability to earlier work. The focus, however, is put on the HLM approach. 
This is followed by the presentation of our results and a comparison to earlier work. In the 
final section, we discuss our findings and conclude. 
 
2. Background 
 
The conventional model of perfect competition states that profits that diverge from the 
competitive norm can only occur in the short run. Since this neo-classical standard model 
offers no explanations for the phenomenon of abnormal profits, numerous other models have 
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been developed to deal with this issue. Within industrial organization (IO) the focus is put on 
the characteristics of industries as the main determinants of performance differentials. This 
perspective is summarized in the structure-conduct-performance model. In this paradigm, it is 
assumed that performance mainly depends on the conduct of suppliers (e.g., their inclination 
to invest, to innovate, and to collude) which in turn is determined by industry structure (e.g., 
concentration, product differentiation, and vertical integration). Structure, conduct and 
performance, in addition, are influenced by a set of basic industry conditions including 
demand elasticity and technological features such as economies of scale. Since performance 
in this model ultimately depends on industry-level characteristics, IO theory generally asserts 
a deterministic link between industry membership and economic return.  
During the 1980s, the so called ‘market-based view’ (MBV) has been developed 
within the realm of strategic management. According to Porter (1980), firms can achieve 
abnormal profits if they manage to position themselves in an attractive industry. While this 
assumption is consistent with the IV, Porter (1980) also assumes that the choice of strategy 
within a given market has a strong influence on corporate performance by creating cost and/or 
differentiation advantages.
101
 Therefore, although industry attractiveness is perceived as an 
important driver of performance, the MBV also recognizes the importance of strategic 
positioning within the market as a cause of abnormal profits. 
In the 1990s, the attention turned to a competing school of thought known as the 
‘resource-based view’ (RBV). Proponents of this viewpoint expect industry membership to 
have little explanatory value since the factors responsible for superior profits are believed to 
be connected to the firm and its resources. Based on the assumption of heterogeneity in 
resource endowment, superior profits are assumed to result from the utilization of tangible 
and intangible resources that are rare and costly to copy or imitate (Day and Wensley, 1988; 
Barney, 1991; Hunt and Morgan, 1995). Due to the difficulty to copy such advantages, the 
RBV primarily predicts firm-specific deviations from the general level of industry economic 
return.
102
 
The disagreement between the aforementioned theories is mainly on inter vs. intra-
industrial variation in profits while justification for systematic differences in profitability 
between countries is not provided. Trade theory suggests that if capital can move freely, the 
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 Similar to the notion of entry barriers in IO, strategy-related advantages that lead to superior profitability are 
assumed to persist due to mobility barriers, which make the switch from one strategic group to another costly 
(Tremblay, 1985). 
102
 Drawing on similar ideas, Prahalad and Hamel (1990) introduced the term ‘capabilities’, which are defined as 
complex combinations of resources. Since, due to complexity, such capabilities are difficult to imitate, abnormal 
profits are believed to persist in the long run.  
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rate of return will be equal between countries, as capital will flow to where its return is 
greatest. As the elimination of barriers to free trade is the main motive of the formation of the 
EU single market it might be argued, that within the EU, the influence of country-specific 
determinants on profitability should be small (Goddard et al., 2009). However, Chen (2002) 
shows that national borders strongly restrict trade within the EU and that intra-national trade 
exceeds international trade by an average factor of 4.3. In addition, savings and investments at 
the national level are strongly correlated which implies that the bigger part of capital does not 
cross national borders in pursuit of the greatest return (Goddard et al., 2009). Several other 
country-specific aspects such as resource endowments, financial infrastructures, technical 
sophistication or institutional and legal issues (e.g., common law tradition in the UK vs. civil 
law in many continental EU countries) can be expected to be important drivers of country 
specific differences in profitability (e.g. Wan and Hoskisson, 2003; Goddard et al., 2009). 
According to trade theory, differences in national profitability levels can also be 
industry specific. Such industry-specific country effects can arise as a consequence of the 
formation of the EU single market which is expected to lead to stronger specialization of 
firms. As a result cross-border industry clusters will develop, within which firms are 
characterized by horizontal or vertical integration. These integration processes enable firms to 
achieve absolute cost advantages and external economies of scale (Porter, 1990; Goddard et 
al., 2009).  
Besides variation across countries, profitability can also vary systematically over time. 
Numerous earlier papers have incorporated a general ‘year’ effect and referred to it as a 
component capturing the macroeconomic cycle (McGahan and Porter, 1997; Makino et al., 
2004). While economic fluctuation may equally affect all actors in an economy, it may also be 
limited to subsets of firms active in certain geographical locations or in specific industries. 
Such asymmetric shocks or cycles (Buti and Sapir, 1998) are usually the result of abrupt 
changes in aggregated supply or demand, e.g., due to the imposition of a consumption tax in a 
certain region or industry or an unexpected shortage in the supply of a crucial input. Country-
specific shocks have been addressed by a stream of research dealing with the synchronization 
of business cycles in economic unions (Clark and Wincoop, 2001; Ramos et al., 2003; Artis et 
al., 2004).  
In the following, we will give an overview of the studies decomposing corporate 
profitability (cf. Table 33) and summarize, in how far the theoretical perspectives have 
received support in past empirical research. Initiated by Schmalensee (1985) a whole range of 
studies has emerged estimating the relevance of different effects as drivers for firm 
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performance. Schmalensee (1985) was the first to apply ANOVA and COV to U.S. 
business-unit profits. He finds evidence for the importance of industry effects which account 
for 20 % of the variance in business-unit profits while firm effects turn out to be negligible. 
Schmalensee’s results therefore support the IV. Rumelt (1991), however, finds significant 
business-unit
103
 effects that strongly outperform industry and corporate effects and thus 
confirm the RBV. The predominance of firm effects relative to industry effects prevails in the 
subsequent literature (Roquebert et al., 1996; McGahan and Porter, 1997, 2002; Goddard et 
al., 2009). This also holds for more recent studies based on the HLM method (Hough, 2006; 
Misangyi et al., 2006; Chaddad and Mondelli, 2012).  
While the debate has mainly focused on firm and industry effects most studies have 
also integrated year effects. The impact, however, seems to be negligible as this effect class 
only accounts for around 1 % in most studies (e.g. McNamara et al., 2005). A few studies 
additionally consider interaction effects between year and industry (e.g. Schumacher and 
Boland, 2005; Goddard et al., 2009). This effect class is in general stronger as the single year 
effect, indicating that economic fluctuations are stronger for subgroups of firms operating in 
specific industries. As the majority of studies focus on the U.S. country effects cannot be 
estimated. Goddard et al. (2009), however, analyze the EU manufacturing sector and find, that 
country affiliation is only responsible for 1 % of the variance in profitability. Previous studies 
therefore provide no evidence for the importance of macroeconomic and trade theory in 
explaining firm profits. 
Regarding firm performance in the agribusiness sector, Schumacher and Boland 
(2005) analyzing the U.S. food economy also find evidence for the superiority of firm effects 
which contribute 49 % to variance in profitability. However, within their COV framework, 
industry effects, which contribute 20 %, also have a crucial impact. Chaddad and Mondelli 
(2012) are the first to implement HLM to firm profitability in the agribusiness sector. Their 
results indicate that business-unit and corporate effects are more important than industry 
effects. Furthermore, several structural characteristics such as firm size, industry capital 
intensity or corporate R&D intensity have a significant impact on profitability. 
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 Most of the studies analyzing the U.S. market are based on the Compustat database which provides data on 
each business unit. In those studies the firm effect consists of a business-unit and a corporate effect. The present 
study, however, is based on the corporate level. 
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Table 33: Previous studies decomposing firm profits based on ANOVA, COV and HLM 
 
 
 
Effect class (%) 
Authors Country Method Firm
a
  Industry  Year   Ind.*Year Country  
Schmalensee 
(1985)
1 
U.S. COV 0.6 19.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Rumelt (1991)
2 
U.S. ANOVA 
COV 
34.0 – 41.4 
44.2 – 46.4 
9.8 – 17.9 
4.0 – 8.3 
0.0 – 0.1 
n.a. 
6.8 – 9.8 
5.4 – 7.8 
n.a. 
Roquebert et 
al. (1996)
3 
U.S. COV 37.1 10.1 0.4 2.3 n.a. 
McGahan & 
Porter (1997)
4 
U.S. ANOVA 
COV 
35.1 
31.7 
9.4 
18.7 
0.3 
2.4 
n.a. n.a. 
McGahan & 
Porter (2002)
5 
U.S. Simultaneous  
ANOVA 
36.0 10.3 0.4 n.a. n.a. 
Hawawini et al. 
(2003)
6 
U.S. COV 35.8 8.1 1.0 3.1 n.a 
Ruefli and 
Wiggins 
(2003)
7 
U.S. Ordinal 
regression 
12.3 0.1 0.01 n.a. n.a. 
Hawawini et al. 
(2004)
8
  
U.S., UK, 
De, 
Benelux 
COV 23.8 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.2 
Makino et al. 
(2004)
9
  
Japan COV 28.2 – 31.4 5.0 – 6.9 0.1 n.a. 4.3 – 5.5 
McNamara et 
al. (2005)
10 
U.S. COV 43.8 9.1 1.0 4.0 n.a. 
Schumacher & 
Boland 
(2005)
11 
U.S. food 
economy 
ANOVA 
COV 
48.7 
49.3 
3.1 
19.9 
0.8 
1.0 
5.8 
2.0 
n.a. 
Hough (2006)
12 
U.S. HLM 40.1 5.3 < 1.0 n.a. n.a. 
Misangyi et al. 
(2006)
13 
U.S. HLM 36.6 7.6 0.8 n.a. n.a. 
Short et al. 
(2006)
 14
 
U.S. HLM 45.0 8.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Goddard et al. 
(2009)
15 
Europe ANOVA 9.3 – 32.2 2.4 – 5.7 0.3 – 0.7 2.4 – 11.9  0.8 – 1.0 
Chaddad and 
Mondelli 
(2012)
16
 
U.S. food 
economy / 
processing 
HLM Economy: 36.1 
Processing: 36.7 
7.0 
7.5 
0.5 
1.0 
n.a. n.a. 
Source: Own literature review 
a
 In the U.S. studies (with the exception of Short et al., 2006) the firm effect is split into a business-unit and a corporate 
effect whereat the business unit effects are reported as firm effects. 
1 
Table 1, p. 348  
2
 Tables 2 and 3, p. 177 f. depending on the sequence of effect introduction and on samples (A and B) 
3 
average values over different samples. Table 3, p. 660 
4 
Tables 4 and 5, p 27f. Industry introduced before business unit effect 
5 
Table 4, p. 845 
6 
Table 5, p. 11 
7
 Table 7, p. 874 
8 
Table 8, p. 132  
9
 Table 2, p. 1036 
10 
Table 1, p. 1078 
11
 Table 2 and 3 p. 104 f. 
12 
Table 2, p. 55 
13
 Table 3, p. 579 
14
 Table 2, p. 273 
15
 Table 5, p. 503 
16
 Table 4, p. 13  
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3. Data 
 
AMADEUS, a commercial pan European balance sheet database, is used as the data source. 
We employ return on assets (ROA), which is defined as a firm’s profit/loss before taxation 
and interest
104
 divided by total assets.
105
 The industry classification systems used by most 
preceding papers were 4-digit SIC (Schumacher and Boland, 2005; Chaddad and Mondelli, 
2012) while a few are based on 3-digit SIC (Hawawini et al., 2004) and 3-digit NACE 
(Szymański et al., 2007). As AMADEUS provides information at the NACE-4 level, we 
define industry membership along this level of aggregation, which is between 3 and 4-digit 
SIC. This is a limitation of our study compared to studies based on 4-digit SIC as data with 
finer classification allows to subdivide firm effects into business-unit and corporate effects 
while our data only enables us to estimate firm effects at the corporate level. The sample was 
constructed by including all firms listed in any NACE-4 food processing industry (32 
categories between NACE-1511 and NACE-1599) from the five countries Belgium, France, 
Italy, Spain and the UK for which complete ROA data (Makino et al., 2004: 1033) for the 
period 2004 to 2008 were available. The countries were chosen due to their contribution to 
total EU-27 food industry turnover and overall data availability.
106
   
Firms assigned to the ‘miscellaneous industry’ - NACE 1589: ‘manufacture of other 
food products not elsewhere classified’ - were deleted from the sample as enterprises in this 
category may be active in very different industries. Since AMADEUS does not provide data 
at the level of individual business units but on corporations as a whole, we also removed firms 
active in more than one NACE-4 industry from the database. This was necessary, because we 
use corporate ROA to estimate industry effects and therefore secondary activities would bias 
the estimation results of this effect class. Additionally, observations in the top and bottom 5 % 
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 To make ROA independent of the source of funds used, interest has to be included in the numerator. 
105
 There has been an extensive debate regarding the suitability of ROA as a measure of economic profit since 
accounting profit data can be biased by profit-smoothing and cross-subsidization, and therefore do not 
necessarily reflect real economic profit (Fisher and McGowan, 1983; Long and Ravenscraft, 1984). Additionally, 
in an international context, differences in the national reporting regulations and practices can bias the estimation 
of country effects. For instance, firms in market-oriented financial systems (e.g., the United Kingdom), as 
opposed to banking-oriented economies (such as France) tend to more positively appraise performance, which 
may lead to an overestimation of profitability in those countries. An alternative indicator of economic 
performance recently used in the literature is economic value added (EVA), a measure of economic returns 
generated for shareholders, developed by Stern Steward & Co. However, EVA has drawbacks as well. As Biddle 
et al. (1997) show, EVA is outperformed by earnings as a performance measure. The variable provided by 
AMADEUS which appears most similar to EVA is value added (VA). However, data availability on VA is poor 
and the results are not expected to differ significantly since correlation between ROA and VA turned out to be 
strongly significant. For this reason and to assure comparability with the previous literature, ROA was chosen as 
the best available measure for firm performance.  
106
 The five countries studied account for 56 % of the enterprises and 54 % of turnover of the EU-27 food 
industry in 2010 (Eurostat, 2012) meaning that a high share of the industry is covered by the analysis. 
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of the distribution in each year were deleted from the sample in order to avoid biases in the 
results due to outliers.   
AMADEUS has the advantage that it only has marginal restrictions regarding firm 
size. This is an important issue in the EU food industry since 96 % of the firms are small and 
micro sized (Eurostat, 2012). Thus, while most previous studies use databases which are 
restricted to publicly quoted firms (Cubbin and Geroski, 1990; Schumacher and Boland, 
2005) or use minimum firm size criteria based on specific balance sheet items (Schmalensee, 
1985; McGahan and Porter 1997; Brito and Vasconcelos, 2006), the present study 
incorporates micro and small sized firms.
107
   
The final sample comprises 5,494 enterprises. The average firm in the sample has a 
ROA of 4.9 %. On average the highest ROA is generated by large firms (5.5 %) followed by 
micro firms (5.1 %) while small and medium firms show lower mean values (4.3 % and 4.5 
%).
108
 
To assess whether the sample adequately represents the population of EU food 
processing firms, Table 34 presents the allocation of firms to the five countries indicating that 
Italian firms are underrepresented. In addition, Table 34 provides a comparison by size class 
which shows that micro sized firms are underrepresented, especially for Italy, the UK and 
Spain.  
 
 
Table 34: Comparison of the sample with the population by country and size class
 
 Belgium France Italy Spain UK 
# obs. in the sample in 2008 
# obs. in the population in 2008 
 
Size class
a
 shares in % (2007) 
 
Large 
Medium 
Small 
Micro 
841 
7,834 
 
 
 
4.7   (0.8) 
6.5   (3.1) 
18.9 (15.8) 
69.8 (80.4) 
2,786 
70,823 
 
 
 
3.6   (0.5) 
5.8   (1.5) 
16.7 (8.7) 
73.9 (89.3) 
596 
  72,691 
 
 
 
5.5   (0.2) 
35.4 (1.1) 
51.5 (9.3) 
7.6  (89.4) 
1,043 
28,632 
 
 
 
5.2   (0.8) 
14.9 (3.4) 
37.0 (18.4) 
42.9 (77.4) 
228 
7,439 
 
 
 
30.7 (5.0) 
30.7 (11.4) 
32.0 (28.0) 
6.6  (55.6) 
Source: Own calculations based on AMADEUS and Eurostat (2012). 
Note: Shares for the population in parentheses are derived from Eurostat (2012).  
a 
Size classes according to the SME definition of the European Commission (2005): Micro: < 10 employees and 
total assets < EUR 2 million; Small: < 50 employees and total assets < EUR 10 million; Medium: < 250 
employees and total assets < EUR 43 million. Due to data availability, firms in the population are size-classified 
according to the number of employees, while firms in the sample are classified by their total assets.  
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 Although micro and small-sized firms only account for 21 % of the EU-27 food industry turnover 
(Eurostat, 2012), which might justify a minimum size criterion, since the estimation considers all firms equally 
regardless of economic relevance, the large number of small firms is a characteristic of the industry that should 
be taken into consideration appropriately. 
108
 The entire descriptive statistics on ROA can be found in the appendix (Table 40). 
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With regard to shares of observations by industry, Table 35 reveals that enterprises 
active in NACE 158 (manufacture of ‘other’ food products) are underrepresented in the 
sample, while the opposite holds for most other industries.  
 
 
Table 35: Comparison of the sample and the population by industry 
 Shares in sample and population in % (2008) 
(NACE Code), industry description
a
 
Sample 
(N= 5,494) 
Population                  
(N = 177,575 ) 
(158) Manuf. of other food pro. 37.2 68.4 
(151) Production, proc. & pres. of meat & meat pro. 24.1 11.0 
(159) Manuf. of beverages 13.4 6.4 
(155) Manuf. of dairy pro. 7.3 4.4 
(156) Manuf. of grain mill pro., starches & starch pro. 5.7 1.5 
(157) Manuf. of prepared animal feeds 4.7 1.4 
(153) Proc. & pres. of fruit & vegetables 4.4 2.9 
(152) Proc. & pres. of fish & fish pro. 2.6 0.9 
(154) Manuf. of vegetable & animal oils & fats 0.6 3.1 
Source: Own calculations based on AMADEUS and Eurostat (2012). 
Note: ‘Population’ refers to all firms active in the manufacturing of food products and beverages in the five 
countries Be, Fr, It, Sp and UK (according to Eurostat, 2012).  
Proc. & pres. = processing and preserving; Manuf. = manufacturing; Pro. = products 
a
 For the purpose of clarity, population and sample shares are compared at NACE-3, instead of NACE-4 level 
(ANOVA,COV and HLM rely on NACE-4 classifications). 
 
 
4. Estimating effect magnitude using ANOVA and COV 
4.1. Methodology 
 
Most preceding studies are based either on nested ANOVA or on COV. As regards ANOVA, 
the order in which the effects are introduced has a significant influence on the estimates. 
Another disadvantage of ANOVA is the assumption that each effect class contains a certain 
amount of effect levels, which are all present in the data. COV assumes that the effect levels 
of each effect class in the data set are randomly drawn from a finite population of effect 
levels. Due to this random-effects assumption, COV results allow for a generalization of the 
results to a larger group of effects, not necessarily present in the data (Searle et al., 2006). 
Therefore, in the given case, COV is superior since we aim to infer from firm effects in a 
sample of firms to the size of firm effects in general, from a selection of accounting periods to 
all year effects, from a subset of industries to every industry within food processing, and from 
an incomplete list of member states to the EU as a whole. However, the COV technique can 
result in negative variance components or in unreliable estimates which underestimate the real 
magnitude of effects (Hough, 2006; Misangyi et al., 2006). Moreover, COV does not provide 
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a reliable test for effect significance. In addition, both ANOVA and COV are based on the 
assumption that correlation between effects is not present (Misangyi et al., 2006).  
As a basis for comparison with the previous literature, this study first employs 
ANOVA and COV and extends the methodological framework by estimating a hierarchical 
linear model, which addresses the drawbacks of both COV and ANOVA. 
The ANOVA is based on the following descriptive model: 
 
(1) tkicicctitcikttkicr   , 
 
where tkicr  is year t  ROA of firm k which is active in industry i of country c. In (1)   is the 
grand mean across all ROA observations in the sample while t , k , i  and c  are year, 
firm, industry and country effects, respectively. Besides the four main effects, similar to 
Goddard et al. (2009), two-way interactions of year, industry and country effects are 
introduced, whereat it  and ct  are transient industry and country effects, respectively. The 
industry*country interaction is captured by ic . The term tkic  represents the residual variation 
in ROA. 
As the nested ANOVA results can strongly depend on the order of effect introduction, 
based on Schmalensee (1985), we design a rotation scheme for all effect classes contained in 
the model. The result is an effect-introduction pattern (Figure 13) which includes all 
reasonable combinations
109
 of effect class introduction. 
In accordance with Hough (2006) in the first step of the nested ANOVA a ‘null 
model’ is estimated with ROA as a dependent variable and the grand mean as explanatory 
variable. In the next step the ‘null model’ residuals are regressed on a first main effect (i.e. 
year, country or industry). Gradually, effects are introduced by regressing the latest residuals 
on a new effect until all effects have been added to the model according to Figure 13. In each 
estimation step the F-Test indicates if the latest effect has a significant impact. The 
contribution of the introduced effect to the model’s explanatory power can be measured by 
the increment to R². Therefore, the average increment to R² over all steps in which a specific 
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 Although the rotation design leaves some room for maneuver, it is subject to some logical constraints. For 
example, two-way interactions cannot be considered before the introduction of their respective main effects. The 
following example serves to illustrate this: if one first introduces industry*country interactions and stores the 
residuals, these correspond to differences from average ROA in each industry-country combination. Since the 
mean of all residuals in such a combination is zero, the mean residuals for each industry (and country) will also 
be zero. For this reason, industry (and country) effects cannot be significantly different from zero after the 
introduction of their interactions.  
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effect significantly increases explanatory power can serve as an indicator of its overall 
magnitude.  
 
 
Figure 13: Nested ANOVA effect-introduction pattern 
industry, country, 
year effects, year 
country 
interactions, and 
firm effects
industry, country, 
year effects, year-
industry 
interactions, and 
firm effects
industry, country, 
year effects, 
industry-country 
interactions, and 
firm effects
industry, country, 
year effects, and 
year-industry 
interactions
industry, country, 
year effects, and 
industry-country 
interactions
industry, country, 
year effects, and 
year-country 
interactions
year effects country effects industry effects year effects
industry and year 
effects
country and year 
effects
industry and 
country effects
industry, country 
and year effects
 
 
 
For the COV approach, it is assumed that the effects are random variables with 
expected values of 0 and constant variances. Residuals are assumed to be uncorrelated, with 
expected values of 0 and constant variances. We decompose the total variance in ROA using 
restricted maximum likelihood (REML)
110
 techniques (Norusis, 2008): 
 
(2) 
222222222
  r . 
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 The standard maximum likelihood estimator does not adjust for the degrees of freedom which may result in a 
downward bias. We therefore employ the REML estimator as it corrects for this bias and is therefore generally 
considered as superior (Liao and Lipsitz, 2002). See, e.g., Rao (1997) and Searle et al. (2006) for in-depth 
explanations of COV and its estimation methods. 
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4.2. ANOVA and COV estimation results 
 
The ANOVA results are reported in Table 36. First, the contribution of each effect when 
introduced as a single effect class is presented. As regards the main effects, the year only 
accounts for a negligible proportion (0.7 %) of the variance in profitability. Similarly, the 
contributions of industry (1.0 %) and country effects (2.3 %) as well as the interaction terms 
(2.6 % to 3.5 %) are rather small. Firm effects are the strongest effect class explaining 54 % 
of the variation in profitability. According to the F-Tests all effects have a significant impact 
when introduced as a single effect. Table 36 also shows the mean increments to R² of each 
effect arising from the combinations of effect introduction as depicted in Figure 13. The 
results show that when controlling for other effects the firm remains the strongest effect class 
contributing on average 53.1 % to the variation in profitability. The average impact of year, 
country and industry effects remains negligible. However, the average contribution of the 
interaction terms is considerably smaller in comparison with the introduction in the first step 
due to the fact that the corresponding main effects have been introduced previously. The 
impact of all effects remains significant, independent of the step of their introduction. The 
final models (with all effects introduced) on average explain around 59 % of the variance in 
profitability. 
 
 
 Table 36: ANOVA results (Contribution of effects to R² and adj. R²)  
     
Effect class 
Contribution of effect when 
introduced  first 
Mean contribution
a
 
 
R²   Adj. R² R² Adj. R²  
     
     
Year  0.007*** 0.007 0.007 0.007 
     
Industry  0.010*** 0.009 0.007 0.006 
     
Country  0.023*** 0.023 0.019 0.019 
     
Y-I interactions 
Y-C interactions 
I-C interactions 
 
0.026*** 
0.032*** 
0.035*** 
0.021 
0.031 
0.031 
0.010 
0.002 
0.008 
0.005 
0.001 
0.004 
Firm  0.540*** 0.425 0.531 0.414 
      
a
 Average contribution of the effect to R² and adj. R² over all steps in which it is introduced according to  
Figure 1. 
*** significant at the 1 % level or less. 
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COV results are depicted in Table 37. All effect classes together account for 47 % of 
the variance in ROA. The results provide strong evidence for the predominance of firm effects 
which are responsible for almost 40 % of the variation in ROA.
111
 While year and country 
effects are restricted to zero by the estimation
112
, the magnitude of industry effects which only 
account for 0.2 % of the variation in firm profitability is negligible. Regarding the interaction 
terms industry*country and year*industry only contribute marginally while year*country 
interactions account for 6.1 % of the variability in ROA giving hints for idiosyncratic business 
cycles across the five countries.  
 
 
Table 37: COV results
a
 
   
Variance component  % 
Year  
 
0.0%
b
 
Country  
 
0.0%
b
 
Industry  
Firm  
 
I-C interactions 
Y-I interactions 
 
0.2% 
39.9% 
 
0.2% 
0.6% 
Y-C interactions 
 
6.1% 
error  
 
53.0% 
 
a
 Estimated using the restricted maximum 
 likelihood (REML) method. 
b
 Restricted to zero by the estimation  
 
 
When comparing the results to preceding research based on ANOVA and COV our 
study confirms the dominance of firm effects which in general contribute more than 30 % to 
total variance in ROA (e.g. McGahan and Porter, 1997, 2002; McNamara et al., 2005). The 
negligible 1 % contribution of year effects is also in line with most previous studies (e.g. 
Hawawini et al., 2003). The same holds for country effects (e.g. Goddard et al., 2009). 
Regarding studies on the food sector our ANOVA results are mainly in line with those of 
Schumacher and Boland (2005) for the U.S. food economy. However, within their COV 
framework they find industry effects that contribute around 20 % to the variance in ROA. 
This divergence in the results might be caused by the fact, that the industry classification 
system used in the present study (NACE 4) is much broader than the one used by Schumacher 
and Boland (SIC 4) and thus observations in each industry more heterogeneous. As a result 
industry effects may appear less important in our study.  
                                                          
111
 This implies that firm effects make up 84.9 % of the total variance explained. 
112
 Goddard et al. (2009) also report year effects which are restricted to zero. 
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5. Hierarchical Linear Model 
5.1. Methodology 
 
In contrast to classical ANOVA and COV, HLM addresses the correlation between effects 
through complex error structures within each effect class (Hough, 2006). Additionally, HLM 
provides the possibility to analyze the effect of structural variables by modelling appropriate 
relationships at each level of the analysis. Thus, in addition to ANOVA and COV, a 
multilevel hierarchical linear model (HLM) is estimated using the framework provided by 
Raudenbush and Bryk (2002). 
At first a three-level model without structural covariates is estimated which partitions 
the total variance in ROA into a time, a firm and an industry component by means of 
iteratively estimated nested regressions. At the first level, ROA at each time period is 
modelled as mean ROA over time plus a random error:
113
    
 
(3) tkikitki er  0  
 
with the indices t, k and i denoting time, firms and industries, respectively. ki0  is mean ROA 
over time of firm k in industry i and tkie  is the random time-level error which is normally 
distributed with mean zero and variance 2 . Therefore, 2  represents variance within the 
firms across time. This variance is assumed to be unique for the observations within each of 
the k firms.  
At level two, mean firm ROA over time ki0  is modelled as an outcome varying 
randomly around the industry mean: 
 
(4) kiiki 0000    
 
where i00  is mean ROA of firms in industry i. ki0  is the random firm-level error which is 
assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variance  . The variance between 
firms in each industry is therefore captured by  . It is assumed that this variance is equal 
only for firms within the same industry.  
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 A detailed description of the model can be found in Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) Chapters 2 and 8 or in 
Misangyi et al. (2006). 
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At the third level, mean ROA of firms in industry i ( i00 ) is modelled as an outcome 
varying randomly around the grand mean: 
 
(5) ii 0000000    
 
where 000  is the grand mean of all ROA observations. The random industry-level error ( i00 ) 
is normally distributed with a mean of zero and variance   which measures between-
industry variance.  
Since the model specified by equations (3) - (5) does not contain explanatory variables 
it is referred to as fully unconditional (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). The percentage of 
variance ascribed to each effect in the unconditional model can then be calculated as 
)( 22     for variance across time, )(
2
    for variance between firms 
and )(
2
    for variance between industries. 
The magnitude of year effects is estimated by incorporating corresponding dummy 
variables at the time level.
114
  Thus, equation (3) becomes:  
 
(3a) tkitkikitkikitkikikitki eYearYearYearr  )5(...)2()1( 5210   
 
where Year 1, Year 2, ..., Year 5 are dummy variables for each of the five years analyzed in 
this study (2004 - 2008). Year effects are therefore represented by 
ki1 , ki2 ,... , ki5
  and ki0  
can now be interpreted as mean ROA over time of firm k in industry i adjusted for year 
effects. The magnitude of year effects is calculated by the reduction in time-level variance  
( 2 ) compared to the unconditional model. Country effects can be incorporated by means of 
dummy variables at the firm level. Equation (4) then becomes: 
 
(4a) kikiikiikiiiki CountryCountryCountry 0050201000 )5(...)2()1(    
 
where Country 1, Country 2, ..., Country 5 are country dummies and 
i01 , i02 ,... , i05  
thus 
represent country effects. Consequently i00  can now be interpreted as mean ROA of firms in 
industry i adjusted for country effects. The degree of country effects is calculated as the 
reduction of variance at the firm level that occurs when country dummies are introduced in 
                                                          
114
 Within the HLM framework, incorporation as a level is only meaningful for effects with at least 20 
manifestations (Hox, 2008). Since only 5 years of data are available and 5 countries are considered the respective 
effects have to be incorporated by means of fixed-effect dummy variables. 
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relation to total variance of the model including only year effects. Finally, firm and industry 
effects are calculated by adjusting the firm- and industry-level variance estimated in the 
unconditional model by year and country effects. 
 
5.2. Effect magnitude results using HLM 
 
The results of the unconditional HLM model are reported in the upper panel of Table 38 and 
indicate that firm and industry effects are statistically significant with the firm explaining 
42 % and the industry 0.8 % of the variance in ROA. Around 57 % of the variance in ROA 
can be attributed to the time level which corresponds to the error components of COV and 
ANOVA.    
The magnitude of year effects is reflected by the proportional reduction in variance at 
the time level which occurs when year dummies are introduced at this level (substituting 
equation (3) by (3a)). As summarized by the second panel of Table 38, year effects account 
for 0.9 % of the variance in ROA.
115
 Similarly, country effects are calculated by comparing 
the firm-level variance of the model incorporating both year and country dummies with the 
respective variance of the model including only year dummies and thus account for 1.8 % of 
the variance in ROA.
116
 The significance of year and country effects can be determined by a 
Wald test which indicates whether the inclusion of explanatory variables leads to a significant 
improvement in comparison to the null model. According to this test, both year and country 
effects contribute significantly.  
Finally, the percentage of variance attributable to the time-, firm- and industry level 
after adjusting for year and country effects has to be determined. This is done by relating the 
variance of the time-, firm- and industry level of the model incorporating year and country 
dummies to total variance in ROA as estimated by the unconditional model.
117
 The final 
results are presented in the bottom panel of Table 38 and indicate that firm effects account for 
40.2 % of the total variance in ROA while 0.4 % is attributable to industry effects and 56.5 % 
occurs at the time level.  
Regarding firm and year effects our results are in line with previous studies based on 
HLM which also indentify firm effects as crucial while year effects only contribute 
                                                          
115
 Calculated as: [
2
unconditional model 
– 
2
model with year dummies at time level
]/(
 
 2 ) unconditional model.  
116
 Calculated as: [  model with year dummies –  model with year and country dummies]/( 
 2 ) model with year dummies.  
117
 For example, the magnitude of firm-effects is calculated as  model with year and country dummies /( 
 2 ) 
unconditional model
. 
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marginally (Misangyi et al., 2006; Chaddad and Mondelli, 2012). An important difference of 
our results is the smaller impact of industry effects. Chaddad and Mondelli (2012) in their 
study of the U.S. food industry find industry effects which account for 7 % of the variance in 
ROA. However, similar to Schumacher and Boland (2005) their study is based on 4-digit SIC 
which might be a reason for more distinct industry effects.   
 
 
Table 38: HLM estimates of firm, industry, country and year effects  
   
Level Variance 
components 
Percentage 
   
Unconditional model 
Time level 
Firm level 
Industry level 
 
  0.0022471 
  0.0016377*** 
  0.0000319*** 
 
57.37 % 
41.81 % 
0.82 % 
 
Model with year dummies introduced at time level 
Time level 
Firm level 
Industry level 
Variance explained by year-
effects 
Wald 
2
4 =358.83*** 
  0.0022113 
  0.0016450*** 
  0.0000319*** 
 
 
 
0.91 % 
 
Model with year dummies introduced at time level and  
country dummies at the firm level 
Time level 
Firm level 
Industry level 
Variance explained by 
country-effects 
Wald 
2
4 =208.92*** 
0.0022113 
0.0015736*** 
0.0000160*** 
 
 
 
 
1.84 % 
Final results 
Time 
Firm 
Industry 
Year 
Country 
 56.46 % 
40.18 % 
0.41 % 
0.91 % 
1.84 % 
   
Dependent variable: Return on assets (ROA) 
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively.  
Wald
2  for country effects refers to a model with country dummies only 
 
 
As regards the contribution of the theoretical approaches in determining corporate 
profitability our results provide strong evidence for the validity of the RBV since firm effects 
are the dominant effect class. Proponents of the IV and MBV would expect relatively large 
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industry effects. These schools of thought are therefore not supported by our results. The 
same holds for the relevance of trade theory as country effects and industry*country 
interactions only contribute marginally. Similarly, most effect classes that represent 
macroeconomic fluctuation are weak. An exception are year*country interactions which, in 
the COV framework, account for 6.1 % of the variance in ROA. Artis et al. (2004) analyze the 
European business cycle and find evidence for idiosyncratic business cycles across European 
countries. They identify a high correlation between the cycles of a core group of countries 
such as Belgium, France and Italy while the UK’s business cycle progresses independently.  
 
5.3. The impact of structural factors on firm profitability 
 
In order to estimate the effect of specific structural factors on ROA, firm and industry 
characteristics are included in the unconditional model. It is important to determine whether 
these variables should be treated as transient (incorporation at the time level) or stable 
(incorporation at the firm or industry level). Treating a variable as transient implies that all 
available observations across the analyzed time span are considered, thus estimating the 
variable’s impact on ROA across time. In contrast, a stable variable is incorporated by means 
of its average across time, hence explaining cross-sectional variance in ROA between firms or 
industries (Misangyi et al., 2006). In order to determine if specific variables should be treated 
as transient or stable Misangyi et al. (2006) use intra-class correlation analyses to estimate the 
portions of variance in each variable which occur across time and across firms (industries), 
respectively. Variables for which the majority of variance occurs across time are treated as 
transient and thus incorporated at the time level. Those variables for which the greater part of 
variance arises in a cross-sectional manner are treated as stable and therefore added to the 
model at their respective higher level. A similar analysis was conducted for the explanatory 
variables used in the present study with the result that for the majority of variables a 
significant amount of variance occurs across time.
118
 Additionally, treating variables as stable 
by incorporating their mean values leads to a considerable loss of information and therefore 
appears unfavorable. Therefore, it appeared most reasonable to treat all explanatory variables 
as transient hence adding them to the model at the time level. 
Equation (3) then becomes:
 
  
 
(3b) tkitkinnkitkikitkikitkikikitki eXXXXr  )(...)()()( 3322110   
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 For each explanatory variable the transient and stable parts were determined by means of a COV analysis 
which decomposes the variance into a year and a firm (industry) effect. Results are available upon request. 
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where lX  with nl ,...,2,1  are n firm and industry characteristics such as firm size or industry 
concentration. These characteristics are assumed to be fixed, meaning that their effect on 
ROA is constrained to be the same for all firms: 1001  ki , 2002  ki , ..., 00nnki   . 
The results of the model incorporating explanatory firm and industry characteristics 
are reported in Table 39. The variables were chosen due to data availability and were 
constructed by means of AMADEUS and the Eurostat (2012) database.
119
 
Market Share (MS) is measured as firm i’s sales divided by total sales of the 4-digit 
NACE industry in which the firm operates. In the present study market share has no 
significant impact on ROA. Given the empirical evidence for a positive relationship of market 
share and profitability (e.g. Szymanski et al., 1993) this result is rather surprising. 
Firm age (Age) can account for life-cycle effects. Usually, costs are expected to 
decrease with age due to learning effects leading to higher profits. However, the impact on 
ROA is significantly negative. Loderer and Waelchli (2010) show, that a negative relationship 
can occur if corporate aging is aligned with organizational rigidities, slower growth, and 
assets which become obsolete with time. 
Firm size (Ln TA) is measured by the logarithm of total assets. While many previous 
studies find a positive impact (e.g. Misangyi et al., 2006; Chaddad and Mondelli, 2012; 
Hirsch and Gschwandtner, 2013), there is also evidence for the inefficiency of large firms 
(e.g. Goddard et al., 2005). However, the latter does not seem to hold for the food sector since 
firm size has a significant positive impact. Due to the fact that price competition is the 
dominant competition strategy among food processors (e.g. Sutton, 1991), achieving 
economies of scale seems to be a crucial matter.
120
 Furthermore, large firms tend to be more 
adept at counteracting the superiority of a highly concentrated retailing sector.
121
 The impact 
of firm growth (Gr. TA) measured as the growth rate of a company’s assets122 has no 
significant impact.  
Two proxies for firm risk were derived from AMADEUS. Short-run risk (1/Curr) is 
measured by the ratio of current liabilities to current assets
123
 and long-run risk is measured 
by the firm’s gearing ratio (Gear), defined as the ratio of non-current liabilities plus loans to 
shareholders’ funds. While risk theory states that firms with higher risk should achieve higher 
                                                          
119
 Descriptive statistic on these variables can be found in the appendix (Table 40). 
120
 Ollinger et al. (2000), e.g., show that U.S. chicken slaughtering plants which are twice as large as the average-
sized plant have 8 % lower per unit costs. 
121
 In most EU countries, the top 5 retail chains have a market share of around 70 % (Wijnands et al., 2007).  
122
 Since it can be expected that the impact of growth in assets occurs with a time lag, we use the growth rate in 
t-1  in order to explain profits in t. 
123
 This corresponds to the reciprocal of a firm’s current ratio. 
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profits, Bowman’s (1980) ‘risk-return paradox' assumes a negative relationship. In accordance 
to Bowman both risk proxies have a significant negative impact. Chaddad and Mondelli 
(2012), also find that gearing has a negative impact on food-processors’ profits. 
Industry concentration (HHI) is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. While 
Chaddad and Mondelli (2012) find no impact of concentration on ROA, similar to Misangyi 
et al. (2006) we find a positive effect which indicates that firms in highly concentrated 
industries might have the ability to prevent entry which in turn leads to higher profit levels.  
Industry size (NF) is measured by the number of firms in an industry divided by 
industry sales while industry growth (Gr. NF) is measured by the corresponding growth rate. 
The respective net effect on ROA is, however, not totally unambiguous. On the one hand, in 
larger industries with rapid growth, the ability of incumbents to maintain their market shares 
might decrease, leading to a reduction of oligopolistic discipline with stronger competition 
and a decrease in ROA. On the other hand, if industries grow and reach a particular size due 
to increasing demand, the pressure on firms to reduce prices in order to increase sales is 
reduced and therefore high profits might result. The results show that industry size has no 
significant impact, however, growth in the number of firms leads to lower profits. 
Research and development (R&D) measured by the ‘share of R&D expenditure in 
total industry value added’ is expected to be a basis for product differentiation and for the 
creation of entry barriers, and should therefore have a positive impact on ROA.
124
 
Surprisingly the impact is insignificant. Chaddad and Mondelli (2012) also find an 
insignificant impact of industry R&D intensity for the U.S. food sector. These results can be 
explained by the fact that R&D in the food industry has a different character compared to 
other industries. As Stewart-Knox and Mitchell (2003) show, only 7-25 % of the newly 
launched food products can be considered as being completely novel and the vast majority 
(72-88 %) of the products brought to the market fail. Hoban (1998), however, shows that the 
failure rate of entirely new products is only 25 %, leading to the conclusion that the 
insignificant coefficient of R&D is a result of the large share of small and rather insignificant 
innovations. 
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 Since the benefits of R&D expenditure are not likely to occur in the same period we use lagged R&D 
expenditure. 
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Table 39: HLM estimates of structural variables  
Intercept 
 
0.04414 (0.00456) 
 
Firm characteristics 
 
MS 
Age 
Ln TA 
Gr. TA 
1/Curr 
Gear  
 
Industry characteristics 
 
HHI 
NF 
Gr. NF 
R&D 
 
Variance components 
 
Time (level 1) 
Firm (level 2) 
Industry (level 3) 
 
 
 
-0.00000  
-0.00010**  
0.00102**   
-0.00101   
-0.00151***  
-0.00001***  
 
 
 
0.02672**    
-0.00100   
-0.00766*** 
-0.00141 
 
 
0.001764 
0.001664*** 
0.000058*** 
 
 
 
(0.00000)  
(0.00005)  
(0.00049)  
(0.00134)  
(0.00027)  
(0.00000)  
 
 
 
(0.01140) 
(0.00077) 
(0.00183) 
(0.00112) 
 
Wald 
2
10  190.15*** 
 
  
Dependent variable: Return on assets (ROA) 
Firm variables: MS = firm sales/industry sales; Age = firm age; Ln TA = natural  
logarithm of total assets; Gr.TA= growth rate of total assets; Gear = gearing ratio;  
1/Curr = 1/current ratio.  
Industry variables: HHI = Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; NF = number of firms  
in industry adjusted by industry sales; Gr. NF = Growth rate of NF; R&D = Share  
of R&D expenditure in industry value added. CR5 = Five-firm concentration  
ratio of the food retail sector. 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. 
 
 
The Wald test indicates that the inclusion of the explanatory variables leads to a 
significant improvement of the model. The percentage of variance in ROA which is explained 
by the explanatory variables is reflected by the proportional reduction in variance attributed to 
the time level, which occurs when structural firm and industry variables are introduced to the 
model. All structural variables together explain 12.3 % of the variance in food industry 
ROA.
125
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 Calculated as follows: [
2
unconditional model 
– 
2
model with firm and industry variables at time level
]/(
 
 2 ) 
unconditional model
. That is (0.0022471-0.0017639)/0.0039167=0.1234. 
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6. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The results are robust across the employed methods - COV, ANOVA and HLM - and provide 
strong evidence for the predominance of firm effects in the EU food industry. Depending on 
the method used, firm effects account for 39.9 to 53.1 % of the variance in firm profitability. 
Year, country and industry effects as well as the corresponding two-way interactions only 
contribute marginally with the exception of year*country effects which in the COV 
framework explain 6.1 % of the variance in profitability.  
Previous findings were confirmed by our analysis with regard to the dominance of 
firm effects, as well as the relatively small contributions of year effects (e.g. McGahan and 
Porter, 1997; Schumacher and Boland, 2005), country effects (Makino et al., 2004; Brito and 
Vasconcelos, 2006; Goddard et al., 2009), and two-way interactions (e.g. Hawawini et al., 
2004; Schumacher and Boland, 2005). However, there is less agreement on the relevance of 
industry effects. Similar to our analysis, a number of studies found that industry effects 
account for less than 5 % in ROA variation (e.g. Ruefli and Wiggins, 2003; Hawawini et al., 
2004; Szymański et al., 2007). Others estimated this effects class to be larger than 18 % (e.g. 
McGahan and Porter, 1997; Schumacher and Boland, 2005). As some authors focused on 
specific sectors, and others looked at the general economy, this variation may partly be due to 
differences in industry heterogeneity. In addition to this, industry effects seem to be smaller if 
their estimation is based on a broader industry classification system, and on the corporate 
level rather than business-unit level. The restriction of the given data to NACE 4-digit and the 
corporate level is therefore a major limitation of our study. Furthermore, our data does not 
allow us to assess the impact of related or unrelated diversification on profitability which is an 
interesting issue within the food industry. Dorsey and Boland (2009), e.g., show that 
diversification of food processors in unrelated activities outside the food economy is 
unsuccessful while the opposite holds for related diversification.
126
 
The HLM results show that several firm characteristics are related to profitability. 
While firm size, seems to be an important driver of firm performance in the food industry, age 
and risk tend to have a negative impact. Furthermore, the results show that industry 
concentration has a positive and industry growth a negative impact on ROA. Many other 
variables have been related to profitability by previous studies such as advertising, or import 
and export activity. Especially within the food sector, industry advertising intensity can act as 
a barrier to entry that leads to higher firm profit margins (e.g. Sutton, 1991; Chaddad and 
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 Chaddad and Mondelli (2012) also find that related corporate diversification positively effects ROA. 
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Mondelli, 2012). However, due to data limitations these variables could not be considered in 
this study. 
Regarding the contribution of the discussed theoretical viewpoints, our results show 
that macroeconomics seems to provide little potential for explaining performance differentials 
in the food industry. The only exception are year*country interactions which contribute 6.1 % 
to the variance in ROA within the COV framework which is an indication for idiosyncratic 
business cycles across the five countries analyzed. Furthermore, as most effect classes 
emphasized by IO and trade theory were weak, while firm effects were strong, our results 
provide support for the validity of the RBV in EU food processing. This is further reinforced 
by the fact that several firm characteristics such as firm size, age and risk are estimated to 
have a significant impact on ROA. Nevertheless, it would be misleading to deny the influence 
of the industry dynamics and competitive context in which firms operate since concentration 
and industry growth are estimated to have a significant influence on profitability.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 40: Descriptive statistics of firm and industry characteristics (2004-2008) 
Label  Variable Obs. Mean SD Min. Max. 
 Firm characteristics 
ROA  Return on assets (%) 27,420 4.86 6.26 -76.40 40.72 
ROA by 
size class
a
 
                                                       Micro 
                                                       Small 
                                                       Medium 
                                                       Large 
16,017 
6,888 
3,088 
1,427 
5.10 
4.45 
4.26 
5.50 
7.02 
5.06 
4.61 
5.20 
-76.40 
-24.00 
-19.83 
-11.01 
40.72 
29.68 
32.87 
29.43 
MS  Market share 18,742 0.03 0.38 0.00 0.32 
Age  Age  27,370 30.64 18.44 12 199 
Ln TA  Logarithm of total assets  27,420 7.33 1.91 2.77 15.85 
Gr. TA  Growth in total assets  27,420 0.06 0.27 -0.94 11.10 
1/Curr  Current liabilities / Current assets  27,382 1.21 2.67 0.01 200.00 
Gear  Gearing ratio  26.969 1.50 4.08 0.00 99.31 
 Industry characteristics 
HHI  Herfindahl index 26,838 0.09 0.11 0.00 1 
NF  Number of firms in the industry 21,454 1,262 5,205 1 49,173 
Gr. NF  Growth in the number of firms 21,448 0.02 0.28 -0.78 4.29 
R&D  Research and development 22,895 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 
Source: Own calculations based on AMADEUS and Eurostat (2012). 
a 
Size classes according to the SME definition of the European Commission (2005): Micro: < 10 employees and 
total assets < EUR 2 million; Small: < 50 employees and total assets < EUR 10 million; Medium: < 250 
employees and total assets < EUR 43 million. Due to data availability, firms in the population are size-classified 
according to the number of employees, while firms in the sample are classified by their total assets. 
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Chapter 3:  Profit persistence in the food industry: evidence from five       
                     European countries
127
 
 
 
Abstract: The present article is the first that analyzes profit persistence in the European food industry. Based on 
the Arellano and Bond GMM estimator, the degree of profit persistence and the drivers of persistence are 
quantified for a large sample of food processing firms. The analysis reveals that the degree of profit persistence 
in the food industry is lower compared with other manufacturing sectors due to strong competition among food 
processors and high retailer concentration. Furthermore, firm size is an important driver of persistence, while 
firm age, risk and R&D intensity have a negative influence. 
 
Key words: profit persistence, competitive environment hypothesis, food industry. 
JEL Classification: L12, L66, M21 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
It is commonly observed that actual profit rates differ heavily between firms, contradicting the 
proposition of the competitive environment hypothesis (e.g. Carlton and Perloff, 2005). 
Starting with Mueller’s studies (1977, 1986), a number of articles aiming to analyze 
the persistence of such ‘abnormal’ profitability has emerged. Most of these studies confirm 
the existence of a considerable number of firms with ‘abnormal’ profits that persist in the long 
run. While those studies generally consider entire manufacturing sectors, differentiated 
studies which only focus on the food industry are rare. To provide further evidence for this 
important sector, the present article estimates profit persistence and its determinants for food 
processors in five European Union (EU) member countries - Belgium, France, Italy, Spain 
and the UK - for the period 1996-2008. 
With a 13 % share of total turnover in 2007, the food industry
128
 is the largest 
economic sector within EU manufacturing (Eurostat, 2010). European food markets are 
characterized by high market saturation and strong competition. Beyond that, food processors 
are confronted with a high concentration in the retail sector and by increasing price volatility 
in their input markets (Wijnands, van der Meulen and Poppe, 2007: 10). Due to these special 
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 This chapter is published as Hirsch, S. and Gschwandtner, A. (2013): Profit persistence in the food industry: 
evidence from five European countries. European Review of Agricultural Economics 40 (5), 741-759. 
128
 Manufacture of food products and beverages excluding tobacco according to NACE Rev. 1.1 division DA15. 
NACE is the statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community. The present study is 
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characteristics and the high economic importance of the food industry, carrying out a 
differentiated examination of it in terms of profit persistence is both useful and necessary. 
Besides being the first analysis of profit persistence in the European food industry, this 
study’s contribution to the field is twofold. First, in contrast to most of the previous studies, 
which have either been restricted to publicly quoted firms or to a minimum firm size criterion, 
this study is based on data which have almost no restrictions regarding firm size, making a 
more precise representation of the industry possible. This is particularly important for the EU 
food industry, where 96 % of all producers are small firms
129
 (Eurostat, 2010). Second, while 
the autoregressive model of order one AR(1) has become the general econometric method to 
investigate profit persistence, this study improves the methodology by implementing dynamic 
panel models based on Arellano and Bond’s (1991) GMM estimator. This approach accounts 
for some of the econometric drawbacks of the AR(1) standard approach and is thus expected 
to yield more reliable results. 
The article is organized in the following way. Section 2 reviews the existing literature 
on persistence of firm profitability. The models used to estimate profit persistence and its 
determinants are introduced in Section 3, while a description of the data is provided in 
Section 4. Section 5 presents the empirical results and Section 6 closes the article with some 
conclusions. 
 
2. Literature background 
 
The question as to why firms have persistent ‘abnormal’ profits is an important research 
theme both from a theoretical point of view as well as from the perspectives of strategic 
management and accounting and finance. The traditional ‘Structure-Conduct-Performance’ 
paradigm, emerging with the seminal contributions of Bain (1956, 1968), explains persistent 
‘abnormal’ profitability with the help of industry-level determinants of competition such as 
concentration and economies of scale as well as entry and exit barriers (e.g. Caves and Porter, 
1977; Waring, 1996; Slater and Olson, 2002). According to this approach, the main drivers of 
abnormal profitability are therefore the structural characteristics of the industry. 
The so-called ‘new learning’ theory, in contrast, emphasizes the importance of firm-
level differences in explaining the variations observed in firm profitability. Several studies 
find that firm characteristics such as market share (MS), firm growth, R&D and advertising, 
rather than industry effects, account for the differences in long-term profits (e.g. Teece, 1981; 
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Conner, 1991; Levinthal, 1995; Roquebert, Phillips and Westfall, 1996; Barney, 2001; 
Hawawini, Subramanian and Verdin, 2003). Within the ‘new learning’ theory, the ‘resource-
based view’ sees both the firm’s tangible internal resources, like financial and physical factors 
of production, as well as its intangible internal resources, such as technology, management 
skills, quality reputation and customer loyalty, as the firm’s main strengths, which lead to 
sustained profitability (e.g. Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Wernerfelt, 1984; Prahalad and 
Hamel, 1990; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Brush, Bromiley and Hendrickx, 1999; Bowman 
and Helfat, 2001; Winter, 2003). 
In an attempt to clarify the debate about the importance of industry and firm 
characteristics, Schmalensee (1985) applies ANOVA and variance decomposition analysis 
(COV) to U.S. business unit profitability data. His results reveal strong evidence for the 
importance of industry effects, which account for 20 % of the variance in business unit 
returns. In contrast, Rumelt (1991) reports significant business-unit effects that strongly 
outweigh industry and corporate effects. Many subsequent studies find support for stronger 
business-unit effects compared with industry effects (e.g. McGahan and Porter, 1997, 2002; 
Goddard, Tavakoli and Wilson, 2009). As regards the food sector, Schiefer and Hartmann 
(2009), using ANOVA and COV, quantify firm, industry, year and country effects on 
profitability in the EU food industry and find evidence for the relevance of firm-specific 
characteristics as determinants of superior performance. 
All these studies are based on cross-sectional data or on panel data with a short time 
series dimension of up to 5 years. Most of the more recent contributions, however, are based 
on panel data with longer time series dimensions, thus offering the possibility of examining 
the persistence of ‘abnormal’ firm profitability (e.g. Geroski and Jacquemin, 1988; Mueller, 
1990; Kambhampati, 1995; Goddard and Wilson, 1999; McGahan and Porter, 1999, 2003; 
Maruyama and Odagiri, 2002; Yurtoglu, 2004; Gschwandtner, 2005; Cable and Mueller, 
2008; McMillan and Wohar, 2011; Gschwandtner, 2012). While the majority of these studies 
are based on simple autoregressive models of order one, which are estimated by means of 
ordinary least squares (OLS), Goddard, Tavakoli and Wilson (2005) are the first to estimate 
profit persistence using the more sophisticated GMM approach by Arellano and Bond (1991). 
The evidence regarding profit persistence in the food and agribusiness sector is, 
nevertheless, still insufficient. Schumacher and Boland’s (2005) study of profit persistence in 
the U.S. food economy is the only exception so far. Their approach proportions the 
persistence in abnormal profits into a firm/corporate and industry component by means of a 
sequential weighted-least-squares technique leading to the result that industry effects are more 
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important for persistence than corporate effects. However, in contrast to the present study, 
Schumacher and Boland’s analysis only assesses the impact of entire effect classes (i.e. 
firm/corporate effects vs. industry effects) on profit persistence while the structural firm and 
industry characteristics (e.g., firm size or industry concentration) that determine profit 
persistence are not quantified. It can be expected that some of these variables have a different 
impact in the food industry compared with other manufacturing sectors. Nonetheless, 
Schumacher and Boland’s study has the advantage that it focuses on four different sectors of 
the food economy (industry, retail, wholesale and restaurant) while the present study, as a 
consequence of data limitations, only focuses on the food industry. 
Thus, the food sector deserves further investigation due to its special characteristics 
and its crucial position within manufacturing. Furthermore, there is hardly any other sector 
with more intensive debate about the balance of market power between the industry and the 
retail sector (Wijnands, van der Meulen and Poppe, 2007: 277).
130
 
 
3. Methodology 
 
The standard method
131
 that has been used in the profit persistence literature so far is based on 
two estimation steps. In the first step, the degree of profit persistence is examined by means of 
a simple autoregressive process of order one AR(1), at which profits of firm i at a given point 
in time ( ti, ) are regressed on the immediate previous level: 
 
(1) titiiiti ,1,,    , 
 
where ti ,  is a white noise error term with zero mean and constant variance. Most previous 
studies use OLS regressions in order to estimate equation (1).  
This approach yields two persistence measures. The first one is the coefficient on 
lagged profit ( iˆ ) which reflects the ‘stickiness’ of profits from period to period. The 
coefficient iˆ  can be, therefore, interpreted as ‘short-run persistence’, and as a measure for 
the speed of adjustment to the long-run level. Small values of iˆ , i.e. close to zero, indicate a 
quick erosion of short-run rents as well as high fluctuations in profits over time and therefore 
a low degree of persistence. In contrast, values for iˆ  close to 1 are an indication for high 
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 A comprehensive description of the standard methodology can be found in Mueller (1990). 
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profit persistence and, therefore, a slow adjustment to the competitive norm as well as low 
fluctuations of profits over time. In the literature, the mean value of iˆ  across all firms in a 
sample usually serves as an indicator for the degree of profit persistence within it. 
The second persistence measure is the long-run average of the autoregressive process. 
This value, defined as )ˆ1/(ˆˆ iiip   , is the steady-state equilibrium value to which, 
according to the model, the series is ultimately heading. Thus, ipˆ  is a measure of ‘permanent 
rents’, which are not eroded by competitive forces. Since 0ˆ ip  implies a long-run return on 
assets (ROA) equal to the competitive norm, the percentage of long-run projections 
significantly different from zero in a given sample can be used as a measure of the degree of 
long-run profit persistence.  
Some studies (e.g. Gschwandtner, 2005) have extended this classical methodology by 
estimating AR models up to order four for each company and employing Schwarz Bayesian 
Information Criterion in order to decide which model best describes the adjustment path.  
The majority of studies based on AR models implement a second estimation step in 
order to explain profit persistence, where specific firm and industry characteristics are 
regressed on the two persistence parameters iˆ  and ipˆ . 
Nonetheless, this standard method has its drawbacks. It is assumed that the error term 
in (1) is composed of a time-invariant component which includes all unobserved firm-specific 
effects ( i ) and an observation-specific error ( ti , ). The basic problem is that ti,  is a 
function of i , meaning that 1, ti  is also a function of i . Therefore, the independent 
variable in (1) is correlated with the error term even if there is no autocorrelation between the 
ti , ’s, implying that the OLS estimator is biased and inconsistent (Baltagi, 2008). Thus, in 
order to overcome these shortcomings, the present study implements a dynamic panel model 
for each country as formulated in (2), using the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator 
which is especially applicable to samples with small T and large N:
132
 
 
(2) tititij
j
jtitij
j
jti XX ,1,,,1,,,, )()(     , 
 
where tiiti ,,   . Within this framework, the autoregressive parameter ( ˆ ) serves as the 
measure for short-run persistence. In addition, specific firm and industry characteristics (X j’s) 
that are expected to influence profit persistence are added to the model. Here, the impact of 
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the jX ‘s on short-run persistence can be evaluated by the jˆ ‘s. The dynamic panel approach 
does not yield a long-run persistence measure comparable with the ipˆ  of the standard 
approach. However, the jˆ ’s reflect the impact of the jX ’s on abnormal profits over the 
entire time period analyzed and it can be assumed that the direction of this impact prevails in 
the long run. It is therefore possible to assess the direction of change in long-run profit 
persistence for a given change in the variables jX  by means of the algebraic signs of the  
jˆ ‘s.  
The GMM estimator is transforming the equation by means of first differentiation, 
hence removing the individual time-invariant firm effects ( i ). The differentiated equation 
can then be estimated using instruments from within the data set. While the lagged-dependent 
variable and the interaction terms with the lagged-dependent variable are endogenous, all 
other independent variables are treated as exogenous similar to Goddard, Tavakoli and Wilson 
(2005). The endogenous variables are instrumented by their lagged levels while the 
exogenous variables ordinarily instrument themselves (Roodman, 2009).
133
 
While the standard approach yields short-run persistence measures for each individual 
firm and then takes the mean across the sample as a measure for short-run persistence, the 
panel model provides coefficients that are common to all firms in each sample analyzed. The 
persistence measures ˆ  and the mean of iˆ  are, however, not directly comparable across the 
methods. Thus, in order to assure comparability to previous studies, results of the standard 
two-step methodology are provided in the appendix. However, due to the methodological 
shortcomings of the standard AR method the focus is put on the dynamic panel estimation. 
 
4. Data 
 
The firm data were taken from Bureau van Dijk’s AMADEUS, a trans-European database of 
financial information. Data availability restricts the analysis to the time span 1996 through 
2008. Most studies of profit persistence are based on longer time spans of ~ 15-25 years. 
However, these studies mainly analyze entire manufacturing sectors, which makes the data 
availability easier. In contrast, the 13-year time span in the present study is the longest 
available specifically for the European food industry. 
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The profitability of firm i in year t ( ti, ) is measured as the deviation of a firm’s ROA 
from the competitive norm in t, which is usually approximated by mean ROA across the 
sample of firms. ROA is calculated as a firm’s profit–loss before taxation and interest divided 
by its total assets. Interest are included in the numerator in order to make the profit measure 
independent of the source of funds used. The normalization of profits by the competitive norm 
serves two ends. First, it removes the impact of macroeconomic cycles. Second, by taking the 
sample mean as a proxy for normal profit, we can interpret ti,  as deviations from the 
competitive norm or as ‘abnormal’ profitability.  
It has to be noted that accounting profit data can be subject to criticism since they 
might be biased by profit-smoothing and cross-subsidization and therefore do not necessarily 
reflect real economic profit.
134
 However, alternative measures of performance - such as 
economic value added (EVA) developed by Stern Steward & Co, which measures the 
economic returns generated for shareholders - are not without problems, either. Biddle, 
Bowen and Wallace (1997), e.g., show that EVA is outperformed by earnings as a 
performance measure. Thus, due to data availability and to assure comparability to the 
previous literature, ROA was chosen as the best measure for firm performance. 
The data were screened by eliminating firms for which fewer than 13 years of ROA 
data were available. In fact, firm exit during the time span analyzed is considered as a sign for 
profit ‘non-persistence’. However, due to the already short time series available it is not 
possible to check for a survivorship bias by estimating persistence for firms with fewer than 
13 observations. Gschwandtner (2005) analyses survivors and exiters separately and comes to 
the result that exiters have lower short-run persistence on average. Thus, it can be expected 
that the results will overestimate the real value of profit persistence to some degree. However, 
only 1.4 % of the firms with fewer than 13 observations are reported as bankrupt while the 
remainder of firms with fewer than 13 observations is likely a consequence of mergers and 
acquisitions or of flaws in the database.
135
 Thus, although it is not possible to quantify the 
extent of overestimation, it should not be significant. Additionally, all firms not assigned to a 
4-digit NACE industry, and firms active in the ‘miscellaneous category’ - NACE 1589: 
‘manufacture of other food products not elsewhere classified’ - were removed from the 
database. Regarding the size of firms in the sample the preceding literature has either 
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food industries of the five analyzed countries are reported as bankrupt during the analyzed time span.  
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implemented minimum firm size criteria (e.g. McGahan and Porter, 1999)
136
 or is restricted to 
publicly quoted firms (e.g. Cubbin and Geroski, 1990; Schumacher and Boland, 2005). For 
the European food industry, a minimum size criterion would lead to a tremendous loss of 
information, since small enterprises make up 96 % of the EU food industry corporations 
(Eurostat, 2010). It is true that small firms only account for 21 % of industry turnover in 2007 
(Eurostat, 2010), which might indicate the usefulness of a minimum size criterion, since the 
estimation considers all firms in an equal way regardless of economic importance. However, 
the large number of micro- and small-sized firms is a characteristic of the industry that should 
not be neglected. In contrast to other databases, AMADEUS has the advantage that it has 
almost no restrictions regarding firm size or legal form.  
Observations lying in the top and bottom 5 % of the distribution in each year were 
removed from the sample in order to prevent the results from being excessively influenced by 
outliers. Like Goddard, Tavakoli and Wilson (2005), the elimination of a single profit rate 
observation means that there are fewer than 13 years of ROA data available for any particular 
firm, leading to its overall elimination from the sample. 
 
 
Table 41: Comparison of the sample with the population (2007)
 
 
 
Belgium France Italy Spain UK 
# observations in the sample 
# observations  in the population 
 
% shares by size class
a
 
 
Large 
Medium 
Small 
Micro 
841 
7,511 
 
 
 
4.7 (0.8) 
6.5 (3.1) 
18.9 (15.8) 
69.8 (80.4) 
2,786 
70,823 
 
 
 
3.6 (0.5) 
5.8 (1.5) 
16.7 (8.7) 
73.9 (89.3) 
596 
72,691 
 
 
 
5.5 (0.2) 
35.4 (1.1) 
51.5 (9.3) 
7.6 (89.4) 
1,043 
28,657 
 
 
 
5.2 (0.8) 
14.9 (3.4) 
37.0 (18.4) 
42.9 (77.4) 
228 
7,027 
 
 
 
30.7 (5.0) 
30.7 (11.4) 
32.0 (28.0) 
6.6 (55.6) 
Note: Shares for the population (in parentheses) are derived from Eurostat (2010).  
a 
Size classes according to the SME definition of the European Commission (2005): Micro: < 10 employees 
and total assets < EUR 2 million; Small: < 50 employees and total assets < EUR 10 million; Medium: < 250 
employees and total assets < EUR 43 million. Due to data availability, firms in the population are classified by 
size according to the number of employees while firms in the sample are classified by their total assets.  
 
 
The countries considered were selected according to data availability. Five countries 
are comprised: Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and the UK. Together they account for 59 % of 
the enterprises and 51 % of the turnover of the EU-27 food industry in 2007 (Eurostat, 2010). 
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 McGahan and Porter only include firms with at least USD 10 million in total assets.  
Profit persistence in the EU food industry 
118 
The final sample comprises four of the top five countries regarding food industry turnover
137
 
with a total of 5,494 firms active in 30 4-digit NACE industries. 
The allocation of firms to the five countries can be found in row one of Table 41. 
Table 41 further provides a comparison of the sample with the population by size class for 
each country. Despite the fact that only a minor size criterion is used, micro enterprises are 
still underrepresented in all country samples. This is particularly true for Italy and the UK. 
To avoid repetition, data on firm and industry characteristics which serve as covariates 
for profit persistence are described when introduced in Section 5.  
 
5. Estimation results 
 
Table 42 shows the results of the dynamic panel estimations for each of the five countries 
according to equation (2). The short-run persistence parameters ˆ  are significant at the 1 % 
level for all countries. This implies that abnormal profits persist from year to year and that the 
forces of competition are not strong enough to erode all abnormal profits within 1 year. Short-
run profit persistence ( ˆ ) turns out to be highest in the UK (0.304) followed by Spain 
(0.250), France (0.205), Italy (0.151) and Belgium (0.110). However, the degree of short-run 
profit persistence in the food industry tends to be lower compared with other manufacturing 
sectors. Goddard, Tavakoli and Wilson (2005) who analyze the entire manufacturing sectors 
of the same five countries find ˆ  values between 0.323 for the UK and 0.452 in Italy.138 
Gschwandtner (2012) finds values between 0.549 and 0.722 for the U.S manufacturing 
sector.
139
 The present results therefore indicate a high degree of competition and market 
saturation in the European food industry.  
The coefficients (
jˆ ) of the interaction terms of the explanatory variables with the 
lagged-dependent variable (e.g., R&D* 1, ti ) show the impact of the specific variables on 
short-run persistence and the coefficients ( jˆ ) of the explanatory variables show their impact 
on long-run persistence. 
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 According to Eurostat (2010) Germany, France, the UK, Spain and Italy are the European leaders regarding 
food industry turnover while Belgium takes the eighth place. Unfortunately, Germany, the European leader 
regarding food industry turnover, is not covered by the study due to lack of data. 
138
 Goddard, Tavakoli and Wilson (2005) analyze the period 1993-2001. Their study is also based on 
AMADEUS. 
139
 For the periods 1984-99 and 1950-66, respectively. 
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Table 42: Dynamic panel model estimation results 
 
Variable Belgium France Italy Spain UK 
πi,t-1
 
0.110 (7.12)*** 0.205 (21.07)*** 0.151 (9.49)*** 0.250 (15.95)*** 0.304 (10.27)*** 
MS * πi,t-1
 
-0.004 (-2.52)** 0.000 (0.46) -0.000 (-0.02) -0.001 (-1.20) -0.002 (-1.11) 
Age * πi,t-1
 
-0.019 (-3.57)*** -0.005 (-2.47)** 0.013 (0.81) 0.001 (0.62) -0.001 (-0.41) 
Ln TA * πi,t-1 -0.013 (-0.22) 0.049 (2.12)** -0.248 (-1.56) 0.038 (1.80)* 0.125 (2.71)*** 
Gr. TA * πi,t-1 -0.084 (-1.00) -0.055 (-1.55) -0.995 (-1.72)* -0.147 (-2.80)*** -0.375 (-2.44)** 
Gear * πi,t-1 -0.000 (-0.17) 0.000 (1.76)* -0.000 (-0.76) -0.000 (-3.49)*** 0.000 (0.24) 
1/Curr * πi,t-1 -0.067 (-4.88)*** -0.018 (-1.52) 0.720 (1.16) -0.066 (-2.36)** 0.124 (3.48)*** 
HHi * πi,t-1
 
4.091 (3.75)*** -1.785 (-1.76)* 11.905 (0.68) -0.327 (-0.96) 0.482 (0.57) 
NF * πi,t-1 -0.000 (-1.88)* -0.000 (-2.71)*** -0.000 (-0.26) -0.000 (-1.58) 0.000 (1.05) 
Gr. NF * πi,t-1 -0.781 (-4.36)*** -0.787 (-3.68)*** -0.618 (-0.17) 0.081 (1.42) 0.387 (0.67) 
R&D * πi,t-1 -2.478 (-3.64)*** -0.048 (-1.70)* 0.031 (0.33) -0.004 (-0.13) 0.058 (0.75) 
CR5 * πi,t-1 -43.503 (-7.34)*** -3.498 (-2.98)*** -3.925 (-1.63)* -0.605 (-3.48)*** -0.021 (-0.03) 
MS
 
-0.000 (-1.47) 0.000 (0.46) 0.001 (1.62)* 0.000 (2.14)** -0.000 (-0.46) 
Age
 
a
 -0.026 (-2.98)*** 
a 
-0.000 (-0.43) 0.000 (0.08) 
Ln TA 0.037 (1.70)* 0.009 (1.04) -0.037 (-0.38) 0.000 (0.61) 0.003 (1.11) 
Gr. TA -0.006 (-0.97) -0.002 (-0.75) -0.031 (-0.37) -0.011 (-5.07)*** -0.018 (-1.78)* 
Gear -0.000 (-3.58)*** -0.000 (-5.85)*** 0.000 (0.64) -0.000 (-2.23)** 0.000 (-0.50) 
1/Curr -0.004 (-2.96)*** -0.004 (-3.50)*** 0.020 (0.94) -0.004 (-2.77)*** 0.004 (1.15) 
HHi
 
0.636 (1.57) 0.662 (0.63) 2.840 (0.93) 0.016 (0.97) 0.066 (1.52) 
NF 0.000 (1.19) 0.001 (4.07)*** -0.000 (-0.87) 0.000 (2.35)** 0.000 (0.72) 
Gr. NF -0.027 (-4.03)*** 0.002 (0.07) -0.022 (-0.31) 0.004 (1.90)* 0.003 (0.09) 
R&D 0.041 (1.37) 0.011 (1.60) 0.009 (1.03) -0.002 (-1.27) -0.004 (-1.25) 
CR5 0.003 (0.01) 2.885 (1.06) 0.082 (0.98) -0.005 (-1.12) 0.004 (0.20) 
Wald χ²(21) = 246.62*** 
p=0.000 
χ²(25) = 364.95***  
p=0.000 
χ²(24) = 192.45***  
p=0.000 
χ²(22) = 472.58*** 
p=0.000 
χ²(22) = 318.88***  
p=0.000 
AR(2) z = -1.64 p=0.100 z = 1.30 p=0.195 z = -1.924 p=0.054 z = -0.28 p=0.777 z = -1.04 p=0.296 
Sargan-Hansen χ²(3) = 3.33 
p=0.344 
χ²(11) = 100.98*** 
p=0.000 
χ²(24) = 30.91 
p=0.157 
χ²(6) = 5.30 
p=0.506 
χ²(34) = 41.45 
p=0.178 
Dependent variable: πi,t. Firm variables: MS = firm sales/industry sales; Age = firm age; Ln TA = natural logarithm of total assets; 
Gr.TA= growth rate of total assets; Gear = gearing ratio; 1/Curr = 1/current ratio. Industry variables: HHI = Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; 
NF = number of firms in industry; Gr.NF = Growth rate of the number of firms in the industry; R&D = Share of R&D expenditure in 
industry value added; CR5 = Five-firm concentration ratio of the retail sector 
Numbers in parentheses are z-values.  
a dropped due to multicollinearity 
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively.  
 
 
MS is measured as firm i’s total sales divided by total sales in J, where J is the 4-digit 
NACE industry to which the firm is assigned by AMADEUS.
140
 Usually one would expect a 
positive effect on profitability (e.g. Szymanski, Bharadwaj and Varadarajan, 1993). However, 
the impact has not always been entirely unambiguous from a theoretical point of view. For 
instance, Prescott, Kohli and Venkatraman (1986) suggest that the effect can depend on the 
environment in which firms operate. As the estimations show, the impact on long-run 
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 Technically, market share should be measured as firm i’s sales in industry J divided by total sales in J. 
However, AMADEUS does not provide information about the diversification of firm activity in different NACE 
industries. Since the majority of firms in the present study are small and therefore presumably not greatly 
diversified, the formula used here should be an adequate measure of market share. 
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profitability is significantly positive in Italy and Spain. However, with regard to the Belgian 
food industry, a higher MS leads to a decrease in short-run persistence (as indicated by the 
coefficient of MS* 1, ti ) and therefore stronger profit fluctuation. 
Firm age (Age) calculated by means of incorporation dates can account for life-cycle 
effects. One might expect that ageing decreases costs due to learning effects within the firm 
and learning spillovers from other firms. In contrast, Majumdar (1997) suggests that 
increasing age can lead to inertia and bureaucratic ossification which in turn leads to a 
reduced capacity of reaction to changing economic circumstances and thus to higher profit 
fluctuations and lower short-run persistence. This seems to hold for the Belgian and the 
French food industry where age has a negative impact on short-run persistence. In addition, 
Loderer and Waelchli (2010) show that the relationship between firm age and profitability is 
negative. They argue that corporate aging is attended by organizational rigidities, slower 
growth and assets which become obsolete with time. Loderer and Waelchlis’s results also 
seem to hold for the French food industry where age has a negative impact on long-run profit 
persistence.  
The relationship between firm size (Ln TA) measured as the logarithm of total assets 
and firm profitability has not always been unequivocal. In a recent study, Goddard, Tavakoli 
and Wilson (2005) find evidence for the inefficiency of large firms in the case of 
diseconomies of scale. However, the opposite holds for the food industry, since firm size has 
a significant positive impact on short-run persistence in France, Spain and the UK. In 
addition, the effect on long-run persistence is significantly positive in Belgium. These results 
emphasize the fact that being of sufficient scale is a very important matter in the food 
industry. Larger firms seem to be able to countervail the superiority of retailers, to offer lower 
prices and, furthermore, tend to be less affected by administrative burdens such as pre-market 
approval
141
 or the handling of EU legislation regarding, e.g., food safety, animal welfare or 
packaging and labeling. 
The impact of firm growth (Gr. TA) measured as the growth rate of a company’s 
assets is, however, mainly negative. Spain and the UK show significant negative coefficients 
for short- and long-run persistence. For Italy, the impact on short-run persistence is 
significantly negative. If firms aim to grow through diversification because they have 
exhausted growth in their original field of action, a negative impact of growth on long-run 
profitability may result. Dorsey and Boland (2009), e.g., find that the diversification of food 
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 In particular, pre-market approval for new additives, novel foods, genetically modified organisms (GMOs) 
and health claims are out of reach for the majority of small food processors in the EU (Wijnands, van der Meulen 
and Poppe, 2007). 
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processors in unrelated activities outside the food economy is unsuccessful. The negative 
impact on short-run persistence might be a result of increasing profit fluctuation due to the 
high costs of growth. 
Two risk proxies, one for short-run risk and one for long-run risk could be derived 
from AMADEUS. Short-run risk (1/Curr) is measured by the ratio of current liabilities to 
current assets, which is the reciprocal of a firm’s current ratio. As a proxy for long-run risk, 
the firm’s gearing ratio (Gear) has been used, which is defined as the ratio of non-current 
liabilities plus loans to shareholder funds. According to risk theory, firms with higher risk 
should have, on average, a higher profit level. In strategic management literature, however, a 
negative relationship between risk and returns, also known as the Bowman’s (1980) ‘risk-
return paradox', seems to be a long-established fact (e.g. Andersen, Denrell and Bettis, 2007). 
In contradiction with risk theory but reinforcing Bowman’s ‘risk-return paradox’, the impact 
of firm risk appears to be negative. Both risk measures have a negative impact on long-run 
persistence in Belgium, France and Spain confirming the negative risk profitability 
relationship already found in previous literature (e.g. Ben-Zion and Shalit, 1975; 
Gschwandtner, 2005). Additionally, taking higher risks is expected to increase fluctuations in 
firm profitability, leading to a decrease in short-run persistence. The latter could be detected 
for Belgium and Spain. However, some puzzling results arise for France where the gearing 
ratio has a positive impact on the short-run value and the UK where an increase in the 
reciprocal of the current ratio leads to increasing short-run persistence and thus less profit 
fluctuations. 
Industry characteristics were constructed from Eurostat’s (2010) ‘Annual detailed 
enterprise statistics on manufacturing subsections DA-DE and total manufacturing’.  
Concentration is the industry characteristic one would most likely expect to affect the 
level of profit persistence. In the present study, concentration is measured by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) which is calculated as the sum of the squared MSs of the 50 largest 
firms in each 4-digit NACE industry. Firms in industries characterized by high concentration 
might have the ability to prevent entry, leading to a higher degree of long-run profitability and 
smaller fluctuations. However, there is also the possibility that high concentration leads to 
very strong rivalry between a few firms resulting in a negative impact on persistence. The 
results show, that the former holds for the Belgian food industry while the latter appears to be 
the case in France.  
Industry size (NF) is measured by the number of firms in an industry, and industry 
growth (Gr. NF) is measured by the corresponding growth rate. The effect on profit 
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persistence is, however, ambiguous at the theoretical level. On the one hand, in larger 
industries with rapid growth, the ability of incumbents to maintain their MSs might decrease, 
leading to a reduction of oligopolistic discipline with stronger competition, higher profit 
fluctuations and a low long-run profit level. On the other hand, if industries grow and reach a 
particular size due to increasing demand, the pressure for firms to reduce prices in order to 
reach an increase in sales is reduced and therefore high long-run profits and smaller 
fluctuations might result. The results indicate that firms operating in large and fast-growing 
industries in Belgium and France are characterized by lower short-run persistence and thus 
higher profit fluctuations. However, the impact on long-run profit persistence is mainly 
positive. For Spain both industry size and growth lead to an increase in long-run persistence. 
Firms operating in large industries in France obtain higher long-run profit values, while 
Belgian firms operating in fast-growing industries show lower long-run values.  
Research and development (R&D) measured by the ‘share of R&D expenditure in 
total industry value added’ might account for some of the differences in profit persistence. It 
has to be recognized, though, that R&D in the food industry has a different character from 
R&D in, for example, the electronics industry. Conventional foods and beverages have been 
in this world for a long time and the invention of completely new ones is rather unusual. 
Overall, innovation tends to be ‘more process, marketing and management oriented and less a 
technology push based on science’ (Wijnands, van der Meulen and Poppe, 2007: 11). In 
general, one might expect that R&D is a basis for product differentiation and for the creation 
of entry barriers. Waring (1996) finds that industry-level R&D intensity has a positive impact 
on short-run persistence. Surprisingly, R&D has a negative influence on short-run persistence 
in Belgium and France. These results corroborate Stewart-Knox and Mitchell’s (2003) 
findings that the vast majority of new food products (72-88 %) fail. However, only 7-25 % of 
these newly launched food products can be considered as being truly novel. Hoban’s (1998) 
results emphasize that the failure rate of truly new products is only 25 %, which might explain 
to some degree the negative impact of R&D. In their analysis of the impact of retailer 
concentration on product innovation in German food manufacturing, Weiss and Wittkopp 
(2005) find that, as a result of retailers’ upstream market power, food processors achieve 
lower profits, which reduces their incentive for cost-intensive product innovation. Baumol 
(2010) shows how the over-optimism and prospects of psychic compensations of R&D 
activity can lead to the under-payment of innovative entrepreneurs.
142
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 The negative influence of R&D might be reinforced by the fact that R&D during period t is used to explain 
persistence in t. Even though the time span until economic returns of R&D occur is expected to be rather short in 
the food industry, it is likely that the benefits of R&D will not occur in the same period. Therefore, lagged R&D 
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As expected, retailer concentration measured by the five-firm concentration ratio
143
  
negatively affects short-run persistence in all countries except the UK, underlining the 
assumption that pressure on the part of retailers increases profit fluctuations. However, the 
impact of retailer concentration on long-run persistence is not significant. This result is 
surprising since the bargaining power of retailers is reinforced by an increasing importance of 
private labels, which achieve a MS of 27 % in the European food sector
144
 (Datamonitor, 
2006). Regarding the five countries under analysis Italy has the lowest MS of private labels in 
2009 (17 %) followed by France (34 %), Spain (39 %) and Belgium (40 %). With 48 % the 
highest share of private labels in the EU is found for the UK (European Commission, 2011). It 
would thus be interesting to assess the impact that the share of private labels has on profit 
persistence in each country. However, due to data limitations - values are barely available for 
the analyzed period - this variable could not be incorporated.  
While studies based on the two-step standard approach in general report rather low 
values of R² (e.g. Gschwandtner, 2005), Gschwandtner and Crespo Cuaresma (2013) stress 
that the results of the dynamic panel model are in general more robust. For example, 
Gschwandtner (2012) provides results based on the same dataset with very low R² values for 
the standard methodology and rather high R² values using a GMM dynamic panel estimation 
method. However, the Arellano and Bond GMM estimator implemented in the present study 
does not provide R² values. Nevertheless, other parameters describing the model fit are 
available and confirm the overall fit of the models. 
In fact, the Wald test, which indicates the joint significance of the independent 
variables, is significant at the 1 % level or less for all countries and thus confirms the overall 
fit of the models. All other model diagnostics are also proper. For none of the models the null 
hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation is rejected, which is an important requirement 
for the Arellano and Bond estimator being consistent (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Based on 
the results of the Sargan-Hansen test of overidentification restrictions, lags of second order or 
higher are used as instruments for the transformed endogenous variables. The Sargan-Hansen 
test does not reject the null hypotheses that the instruments are implemented in an adequate 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
should ideally have been used. However, due to the rather poor data availability of R&D and the short period 
analyzed, this approach seemed to be disadvantageous.  
143
 Here, the five-firm concentration ratio had to be used since data on the Herfindahl index was not available for 
the food retailing sector. 
144
 Data for 2006. 
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way in any model except for France. Here, the statistic remains significant even after various 
attempts of instrument specification have been implemented.
145
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This analysis of profit persistence in the European food industry indicates that, in general, 
profits converge towards a competitive norm. Nevertheless, a considerable degree of 
persistence can be found, as the impact of past abnormal profits on today’s abnormal profit is 
significant at the 1 % level in each of the five countries under investigation. This implies that 
abnormal profits persist from year to year and that the process of convergence is incomplete. 
The results reveal that short-run profit persistence is highest in the UK, followed by Spain and 
France, and lowest in Italy and Belgium.  
It was shown that young, large firms in particular, which are also characterized by low 
risk, are the ones earning high persisting profits. Additionally, the level of industry R&D 
expenditure has a negative impact on the degree of profit persistence in some countries while 
retailer concentration has, as expected, a negative impact on short-run profit persistence. 
The most obvious difference to other manufacturing sectors is that profit persistence 
within the food industry is considerably lower, as indicated by the lower ˆ  values. It has to 
be noted though, that exit of firms during the analyzed time span could not be considered, 
which is one of the limitations of the present study and - with a few exceptions (e.g. 
Gschwandtner, 2005) - of the profit persistence literature in general. This implies that profit 
persistence in the food industry could indeed be even lower. Nonetheless, this bias should be 
rather low as only 1.4 % of the firms in the database are reported as bankrupt under the period 
of investigation. The low ˆ  values can be related to a high degree of market saturation, 
strong price competition and high concentration in the food retailing sector which exceeds 
70 % in most EU countries (Wijnands, van der Meulen and Poppe, 2007).
146
 Bargaining 
power of the retail sector is further reinforced by a high and still increasing share of private 
labels. As mentioned previously, this issue could not be incorporated due to a lack of 
available data, which is another limitation of this study. 
 Another striking difference is the importance of firm size. While many previous 
studies find evidence for the inefficiency of large firms, being of sufficient scale is a very 
important matter in the food industry. Finally, the special nature of R&D and its negative 
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 Goddard, Tavakoli and Wilson (2005) also report significant Sargan test statistics for some of the countries 
analyzed in their study. 
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 Values refer to 2004. 
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influence on profit persistence in some countries has to be pointed out. Nevertheless, the 
negative impact of R&D on profit persistence should not lead to the wrong conclusion that 
R&D in the food sector is bad and should not be pursued or subsidized. On the contrary, it 
should lead to the conclusion that it is important to encourage and subsidize the 'right' 
innovations that lead to success within the food sector, namely truly new product innovations. 
Any measures taken to reduce concentration among retailers and to shift the market power 
from retailers towards producers as well as measures to increase collaboration between 
producers and retailers would also seem beneficial. 
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Appendix 
 
Results of the standard two-step approach 
 
 
This section reports the results of the standard approach according to equation (1). The two 
persistence measures iˆ  and ipˆ  have been estimated by means of OLS regression for each 
firm. The results are based on the extended version (e.g. Gschwandtner, 2005) which 
implements AR processes up to order four and afterwards decides based on the SBC which of 
the four models best describes the adjustment path. Short-run persistence iˆ  is then defined 
as 


L
j
jtii
1
,
ˆˆ  , where L is the number of lags of the ‘best’ AR process. Consequently the 
long-run profit rate becomes: )ˆ1/(ˆˆ
1
,


L
j
jtiiip  .  
 
 
Table 43: Choosing between AR(1)-AR(4) based on SBC
a
 
Country AR(1) AR(2) AR(3) AR(4) 
Belgium 
France 
Italy 
Spain 
UK 
58.76 
67.29 
84.85 
68.28 
64.36 
24.30 
14.37 
4.93 
13.26 
15.96 
7.51 
6.52 
7.30 
6.81 
6.38 
9.43 
11.82 
2.92 
11.65 
13.30 
a 
Percentages of firms for which the AR(1) to AR(4) is chosen based 
on the SBC. 
 
 
The distribution of firms on AR(1) to AR(4) based on the SBC is summarized for each 
country in Table 43. The table reveals that even though the AR(1) is the model which best 
describes the adjustment path for the bigger part of firms, models with higher order lags are 
more efficient for a significant percentage of firms in all countries, thus justifying the best lag 
methodology.  
Table 44 presents the mean values of iˆ  per country. The highest mean value of iˆ   
can be found for the UK (0.232), followed by Spain (0.201) and France (0.188). The lowest 
short-run persistence is found for Italy (0.143) and Belgium (0.057). Hence, the ranking order 
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corresponds with the short-run persistence values ( ˆ ) estimated with the Arellano and Bond 
dynamic panel model.
147
 
 
 
Table 44: Mean iˆ  values per country
 
Country Mean     
Belgium 
France 
Italy 
Spain 
UK 
0.057 
0.188 
0.143 
0.201 
0.232 
 
 
Again the values for the food industry turn out to be rather small compared to other 
studies based on entire manufacturing sectors. Goddard and Wilson (1999), e.g., give an 
overview of previous studies for entire manufacturing sectors based on the AR(1) model. For 
six of the seven countries considered, the mean iˆ  values exceed 0.4.
148
  
Table 45 provides an overview of the long-run profit persistence parameters per 
country. The percentage of long-run projected profit rates significantly different from zero in 
row one reflects the share of firms within each country that do not converge to the 
competitive norm in the long run. This percentage is around 40 % for all countries. Rows two 
and three reveal that for Belgium, France, Spain and the UK, the percentage of firms with a 
significantly positive ipˆ  value is more or less similar to the percentage of firms with a 
significantly negative ipˆ  value. For Italy, in contrast, the percentage of firms showing 
significantly negative ipˆ ’s is much higher than the percentage of firms with significantly 
positive values. This suggests that within the Italian food industry, competition forces operate 
better for firms with profits above the norm than for firms with profits below the norm. 
Overall, these results show that a significant proportion of the firms analyzed tend to earn 
profits both above and below the norm that persist in the long run.  
The bottom row of Table 45 shows the percentage of equations with a R² >0.1. For all 
countries except Italy, this share is larger than in previous studies
149
, indicating that the best 
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 The values of the Arellano & Bond GMM estimator cannot be directly compared to the mean iˆ ’s of the AR 
processes due to the differences in methods. 
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 An additional overview with similar results can be found in Gschwandtner (2012: 180). 
149
 For four of the seven countries analyzed in Mueller’s (1990) study this percentage is smaller than 50 %. 
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lag structure has a greater explanatory power and is more efficient than the AR(1) model on 
which most previous studies are based. 
 
 
Table 45: An overview of the long-run persistence parameter 
                                                                      Belgium         France         Italy         Spain         UK 
% of ipˆ ’s significantly different from 0
a
 38.0         39.0  38.3      42.0         40.4 
% of ipˆ ’s significantly >0  20.6         18.1  11.5      21.7         18.6 
% of ipˆ ’s significantly <0  17.4         20.9  26.8      20.3         21.8 
% of equations with R² >0.1  64.4         66.2  40.5      67.4         75.5 
a 
significant at the 5 % level or less.
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Chapter 4:  Persistence of firm-level profitability in the European dairy              
                     industry
150
 
 
 
Abstract: Based on autoregressive (AR) models and Arellano-Bond dynamic panel estimation this article 
analyses profit persistence in the European dairy industry. The sample comprises 590 dairy processors from the 
following five countries: Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and the UK. The AR models indicate that cooperatives 
which account for around 20 % of all firms in the dairy sector are not primarily profit oriented. In addition, the 
results point towards a high level of competition as profit persistence is rather low even if cooperatives are 
excluded. The panel model reveals that short- as well as long-run profit persistence is influenced by firm and 
industry characteristics. 
 
Keywords: profit persistence, competition, dairy industry.    
JEL Classification: L12, L66, M21 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The competitive environment hypothesis postulates that profits below or above the 
competitive norm cannot persist in the long run. In the real world, however, profits diverging 
from the norm which are often referred to as ‘abnormal profits’ are commonly occurring. 
From a theoretical perspective, concepts that aim to explaining profit differentials have their 
origin in industrial economics. Bain’s (1968) ‘Structure-Conduct-Performance’ (SCP) 
paradigm, which is the core of traditional industrial organization (IO), presumes that specific 
industry characteristics such as concentration, economies of scale, or entry and exit barriers 
have an influence on firm conduct and thus firm performance. Contrary to IO, the resource-
based view (Barney, 1991) focuses on specific internal firm resources as a driver for abnormal 
profits. Due to its focus on firm characteristics, this theory is also known as the firm-view 
(FV). Within IO, persisting inter-industry profit differentials are feasible while the FV allows 
for persisting profit differentials among firms within a specific industry. 
From an empirical point of view, extensive literature has emerged initially analyzing 
profit differentials only at a specific point in time (e.g. Schmalensee, 1985; Rumelt, 1991; 
McGahan and Porter, 1997, 2002; Schiefer and Hartmann, 2009). Another branch of studies 
                                                          
150
 This chapter is the first version of an article that has been submitted to an international agricultural economics 
journal as Hirsch, S. and Hartmann, M.:  Persistence of firm-level profitability in the European dairy industry. 
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starting with Mueller’s seminal contributions (1986 and 1990) are based on panels with larger 
time series dimensions, thus facilitating the investigation of persistence of profit differentials 
over time. Further important studies that emerged within profit persistence literature are, e.g.: 
Geroski and Jacquemin (1988), Kambhampati (1995), Goddard and Wilson (1999), McGahan 
and Porter (1999 and 2003), Glen et al. (2001), Maruyama and Odagiri (2002), Gschwandtner 
(2005), Cable and Mueller (2008) and Gschwandtner (2012).  
While most of these contributions cover all manufacturing sectors, studies focusing on 
the food industry or its subsectors are still rare. Exceptions are the papers of Schumacher and 
Boland (2005) for the U.S. food economy and Hirsch and Gschwandtner (2013) for the EU 
food industry. Schumacher and Boland’s (2005) results show that the level of persistence 
differs between the analyzed food subsectors (restaurant, retail, processing) but that for all 
subsectors industry persistence effects are greater than corporate persistence effects. Hirsch 
and Gschwandtner (2013) find that profit persistence in the food sector is in general lower 
when compared to the results of studies covering other manufacturing sectors. In addition, 
their results indicate that having sufficient scale plays an important role for firms in the food 
sector to achieve higher degrees of profit persistence. The present study adds to this literature 
by bringing evidence for the level and determinants of profit persistence in the European dairy 
industry
151
.  
Contributing 14 % of total EU-27 food industry turnover
152
, the dairy industry is the 
third largest sector within the food industry following the meat and the beverage sector
153
 
(Eurostat, 2011). In 2008 the industry processed around 134 million tons of raw milk into a 
wide range of products, for both consumption and as supplements for the production of other 
food products or animal feeds (Eurostat, 2011a). An important characteristic of the sector is 
the fact that it is heavily regulated by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and that 
interventions in the European dairy market are in flux. Milk quotas have been increased over 
the last years and the quota system, introduced in 1984, will be abandoned in 2015. In 
addition, intervention prices for butter and skimmed milk powder have been considerably 
reduced since 2005/06 while direct payments have been introduced to stabilize agricultural 
income. With EU dairy prices aligning more closely with world prices, price volatility for 
dairy commodities has increased considerably in the EU (Keane and Connor, 2009). While 
these fluctuations affect all firms in the EU dairy sector, the impact will be more pronounced 
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 Manufacture of dairy products regarding to NACE Rev. 1.1 group 155. 
152
 Data for 2007.  
153Since NACE 158 “Manufacture of other food products” actually would take first place regarding turnover in 
2007 due to its broad definition, including a variety of large subsectors such as “Manufacture of sugar” or 
“Processing of tea and coffee” it was split into its 4-digit subsectors to eliminate this bias. 
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for those firms more dependent in their cost structure on the raw material milk and thus firms 
that primarily produce bulk products such as butter, milk powder or milk. Another feature of 
the EU dairy sector is the high number of cooperatives. As cooperatives in general pay out 
part of the profit to farmers, which are the owners of the cooperatives, via the price of raw 
milk, this likely will influence the results on profit persistence (Tacken, 2009). 
The contribution of the present study is twofold. First, the analysis is based on a 
database which has nearly no restrictions regarding firm size and legal form. This is a crucial 
point for a study of the dairy industry where the majority of enterprises are either micro or 
small sized.
154
 In addition, micro and small sized firms play an important role regarding 
competition within industries and therefore also for the examination of profit persistence. 
Second, while the autoregressive model of order one AR(1) has become the econometric 
workhorse of the persistence of profits literature, this study is based on an improved 
methodology at which autoregressive models up to order four are estimated for each firm and 
the ‘best lag model’ is chosen for further analysis. This approach is crucial, since the 
dynamics of firm profits can be more complex than what the simple AR(1) process can 
capture (Gschwandtner, 2012). Beyond that, a dynamic panel model based on the Arellano 
and Bond (1991) GMM estimator is used in order to determine the factors that have an 
influence on profit persistence. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology 
used to estimate profit persistence and its determinants. Section 3 gives a description of the 
data while section 4 presents the empirical results. Finally a conclusion is presented in 
section 5. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
Starting with Mueller (1986), the simple autoregressive process of order one AR(1) has 
become the econometric cornerstone of the empirical profit persistence literature.
155
 The 
AR(1) is a simple regression of firm  ’s profit at time   (    ) on its lagged value: 
 
(1a) titiiiti ,1,,     
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 According to Eurostat (2011) 94 % of the firms in the dairy industry are either micro or small sized whereat 
the classification is based on size classes according to the SME definition of the European Commission (2005). 
155
 For an extensive description of the model see Mueller (1986 and 1990). 
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where      is a white noise error term with zero mean and constant variance and      is firm 
profitability which is measured as the deviation from the competitive norm with the sample 
mean considered as the norm. Therefore,                      , where     denotes return on 
assets and           its mean across the sample of firms. This normalization removes the 
variations in profits which are induced by, e.g., business cycle and external influences with an 
equal impact on all firms. This implies that firm profitability can be interpreted as deviations 
from the competitive norm or as ‘abnormal’ profitability. 
Similar to Gschwandtner (2005) the present study extends the classical methodology 
by estimating autoregressive processes up to order four for each firm (equation 1b) and 
afterwards using Schwarz-Bayesian Information Criterion (SBC) in order to decide which 
model best describes the adjustment path. The AR process with the lowest SBC is the ‘best 
lag model’ and is chosen for further analysis.  
 
(1b)   
j
tijtiijiti ,,,
ˆ   
 
where           is the number of lags of the ‘best’ AR process. This improvement is 
important as it allows for more dynamics in the adjustment path than the simple AR(1) and at 
the same time maintains comparability with most of the previous literature. 
Equation 1a and 1b yield two profit persistence measures, respectively. The first one is 
the coefficient     (or 
j
iji 
ˆˆ  for the ‘best lag model’) which indicates the speed of 
convergence of profits to the long-run level. Since     also reflects the fluctuations of profits 
from period to period, it can be interpreted as short-run persistence. A value of       implies 
that the competitive process works fast enough to completely erode abnormal profits within 
one to four periods. Small values of     close to zero therefore imply that competitive forces on 
firm   are rather strong while persistence is low. On the other hand,       means that firm   
is not affected by the competitive process and that persistence is complete. In the literature the 
mean value of     across the analyzed firms has become the main measure for persistence (e.g. 
Mueller, 1990).  
The second measure is long-run persistence. It is reflected by the long-run average of 
the AR(1) process (see equation 2a) or a higher order process (see equation 2b), respectively.  
 
(2a) )ˆ1/(ˆˆ iiip    
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(2b) )ˆ1/(ˆˆ 
j
ijiip   
 
This measure is the steady-state equilibrium value to which, according to the model, 
the series is ultimately heading and therefore indicates ‘permanent rents’, which are not 
eroded by competitive forces in the long run. The percentage of       significantly different 
from zero in a given sample can therefore be interpreted as an additional indicator of the 
degree of profit persistence. 
In order to assure stability, and convergence upon a finite steady state,       has to be 
smaller than one. AR processes with         are implausible due to their explosive dynamics. 
Since the measure for long-run persistence     is not defined for unit root processes with 
       a panel KPSS test was employed in order to test for stationarity.
156
 
Though the AR approach allows comparison of the results with most of the previous 
literature, it is based on the following shortcoming. It is assumed that the error term in 
equations (1a) and (1b) consists of a time-invariant component which includes all unobserved 
firm specific effects ( i ) and an observation specific error ( ti , ). Since ti,  is a function of 
i , it immediately follows that 1, ti  is also a function of i . Therefore, the independent 
variable in (1a) and (1b) is correlated with the error term even if serial correlation among the 
ti , ’s is not present. This implies that the OLS estimator is biased and inconsistent (Baltagi, 
2008). Therefore, a dynamic panel model based on equation (3) has been estimated using the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator
157
 which is particularly suited for panels having a 
small time series dimension and a large number of firms:  
 
(3) tititij
j
jtitij
j
jti XX ,1,,,1,,,, )()(      
 
with tiiti ,,   . 
Besides the autoregressive parameter ( ), which serves as the measure for short-run 
persistence within this framework, specific firm and industry characteristics )( jX  
that are 
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 The custom to test for non-stationarity has its roots in macroeconomics, where specific variables can show 
explosive behavior. However, non-stationarity seems to be a far smaller problem for firm profit time series since 
competition is expected to prevent a permanent upward development of profits while a continuous downward 
trend will drive a firm out of the market. Nonetheless, the consequences of non-stationarity for profit persistence 
are very important and are extensively discussed in Crespo Cuaresma and Gschwandtner (2006). 
157
 See, e.g., Baltagi (2008) for a detailed description. 
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expected to have an impact on profit persistence are integrated into the model.
158
 Here, the  
 j ‘s indicate the effect of the firm and industry characteristics on short-run persistence while 
the direction of change in long-run profit persistence for a given change in the variables jX  
is represented by the 
j ‘s.
159
 
The Arellano and Bond GMM estimator uses first differentiation in order to remove 
the individual firm specific effects ( i ). This transformed equation can then be estimated 
using instruments from within the dataset. At this, the lagged dependent variable and the 
interaction terms with the lagged dependent variable are endogenous while all other 
independent variables are treated as exogenous similar to Goddard et al. (2005). The 
endogenous variables can then be instrumented by their lagged levels while the exogenous 
variables are instrumented by themselves (Roodman, 2009). 
Despite the methodological shortcomings, the best-lag AR processes are estimated in 
order to assure comparability to previous literature since the autoregressive parameter of the 
dynamic panel model ( ) is not directly comparable with the mean     values of the AR 
processes. The autoregressive parameter of the dynamic panel model ( ) shall serve as an 
additional indicator of short-run persistence.
160
 
 
3. Data 
 
ROA data was constructed from AMADEUS, a trans-European database of financial 
information provided by Bureau van Dijk. While most studies of profit persistence are based 
on time spans of about 15 to 25 years the present study is based on the 13 year period 1996 
through 2008 since this is the longest available for the EU dairy industry.
161
 As previously 
mentioned, firm profitability in year t (    ) is measured as the firms ROA in year t 
normalized by mean ROA of that year whereas ROA is calculated as a firm’s profit/loss 
before taxation and interest divided by total assets. To assure that ROA is independent of the 
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 Subsequent to the estimation of the autoregressive processes the preceding literature in most cases 
implements a second estimation step based on OLS regressions in order to determine the impact of specific firm 
and industry characteristics on the two persistence parameters     and   . However, these studies use mean values 
of the explanatory factors which leads to a tremendous loss of information. The panel structure therefore appears 
more efficient. 
159
 A detailed description of the dynamic panel estimation in terms of profit persistence can also be found in 
Gschwandtner and Crespo Cuaresma (2013) or Goddard et al. (2005). 
160
 The panel model does not provide the possibility to derive a long-run persistence measure such as the limit of 
the AR process (   ). 
161
 Most previous profit persistence studies analyze whole manufacturing sectors or entire economies which 
makes data availability over longer time spans simpler than for specific sectors such as the dairy industry. 
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financial means used to create total assets, interest are added to the numerator.
162
 The sample 
was constructed by choosing all firms active in the NACE classes 1551 (Operation of dairies 
and cheese making) and 1552 (Manufacture of ice cream) for which ROA data for the entire 
13 year time span 1996 to 2008 were available. However, firm exit can be part of profit 
‘non-persistence’, and eliminating firms with fewer than 13 ROA observations might 
therefore lead to a survivorship bias.
163
 To prevent the results from being biased by outliers, 
observations in the top and bottom 5 % of the distribution in each year were dropped from the 
sample.
164
 After screening, the sample contains 590 firms active in NACE 1551 and 1552 in 
the following five countries: Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and the UK. These countries were 
chosen by means of sample sizes and by total dairy industry turnover. Overall these five 
countries account for 51.6 % of total EU-27 dairy industry turnover in 2007 (Eurostat, 2011). 
The country selection also highlights the contrast between northern and southern countries as 
well as the contrast between continental and Anglo-Saxon countries. Germany, the largest raw 
milk producer in the EU (Tacken, 2009) could not be included in the sample due to a lack of 
data availability as a consequence of minor legal regulations regarding the publication of 
financial statements during the time span analyzed. 
Most of the preceding studies only include firms of specific size (e.g. McGahan and 
Porter, 1999, 2003)
165
 or use databases comprised only of publicly quoted firms (e.g. 
Schumacher and Boland, 2005). However, a characteristic of the EU food industry which also 
applies to the dairy industry is that the majority of firms (94 %) are either micro or small sized 
(Eurostat, 2011). For an analysis of the dairy industry, a minimum firm size criterion or a 
restriction to publicly quoted firms would disqualify a large number of firms. Although micro 
and small sized firms in the dairy industry only account for 16.7 % of industry turnover
166
 
(Eurostat, 2011), disregarding these firms would mean neglecting a special characteristic of 
the industry.
167
 Compared to other databases, AMADEUS has the advantage that firms are 
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 Even though most previous profit persistence studies are based on ROA as a profit measure, it has to be noted 
that accounting data can be subject to criticism since it might be biased due to profit smoothing or cross 
subsidization of subsidiaries. See Grant and Nippa (2006: 66 ff), Fisher and McGowan (1983) as well as Long 
and Ravenscraft (1984) for a discussion on how well accounting profits reflect real economic profits.  
163
 Nonetheless, due to the short time series of 13 years firms with fewer observations cannot be incorporated. 
See Gschwandtner (2005) for a study analyzing survivors and exitors separately. 
164
 The elimination of a single ROA observation means that there is less than 13 years of data available for that 
firm leading to its overall elimination from the sample.  
165
These studies implement minimum firm size criteria based on specific balance sheet items. E.g. McGahan and 
Porter (1999, 2003) only include firms with at least 10 million US$ in total assets and in sales in their sample. 
166
 Regarding the five countries analyzed in the present study. Data refers to 2007.  
167
 However, it has to be noted that the estimation considers all firms in an equal way regardless of firm size a 
fact that has to be kept in mind when interpreting the results. 
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included regardless of firm size or legal form. The present study therefore incorporates firms 
of all size classes. 
 
 
Table 46: Comparison of the sample with the population by size class, sub-sectors and     
                 countries (2007)
 
 Observations in the sample Observations in the population 
 # % # % 
Size Class
a
 
   Large 
   Medium 
   Small 
   Micro 
 
Sub-Sectorss
b
 
   1551 
   1552 
 
Countries 
   Be 
   Fr 
   It  
   Sp 
   UK 
 
 
47 
129 
215 
199 
 
 
511 
79 
 
 
72 
178 
228 
81 
31 
 
7.97 
21.86 
36.44 
33.74 
 
 
86.61 
13.39 
 
 
12.20 
30.17 
38.64 
13.73 
5.25 
 
115 
372 
1320 
6350 
 
 
5869 
2288 
 
 
411 
1457 
4325 
1446 
518 
 
1.41 
4.56 
16.18 
77.85 
 
 
71.95 
28.05 
 
 
5.04 
17.86 
53.02 
17.73 
6.35 
Note: Values for the population were derived from Eurostat (2011).  
a 
Size classes according to the SME definition of the European Commission (2005): Micro: < 10 employees and 
total assets < EUR 2 million; Small: < 50 employees and total assets < EUR 10 million; Medium: < 250 
employees and total assets < EUR 43 million. Due to data availability firms in the population are size-classified 
by the number of employees while firms in the sample are classified by their total assets.  
b 
Subsector is 4-digit NACE 
 
 
Table 46 evaluates how well the sample reflects the population. Despite the fact that 
AMADEUS includes firms of all sizes micro sized firms are underrepresented in the sample. 
Table 46 also shows that the subsector NACE 1552 ‘Manufacture of ice cream’ and the 
country Italy are underrepresented in the sample while the opposite holds for Belgium and 
France. 
In order to determine the factors that have an impact on profit persistence, data on firm 
and industry characteristics which are expected to influence persistence are included in the 
analysis. AMADEUS provides data on the following firm-level characteristics which have 
been included as explanatory factors: Market share, firm age, firm size, firm growth, and two 
risk proxies. Data on industry characteristics that are expected to have an impact on 
persistence are constructed from Eurostat’s ‘Annual detailed enterprise statistics on 
manufacturing subsections DA-DE and total manufacturing’ and AMADEUS. The following 
industry-level variables are included: concentration in the sector and at the retail level, 
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industry size and growth as well as expenditure on research and development. To avoid 
repetitions these variables are explained when discussed in section 4.2.  
 
4. Empirical results 
 
First the results of the two persistence parameters     and     are presented. Next, section 4.2 
introduces and discusses the findings of the dynamic panel estimation, aimed at explaining 
profit persistence. 
 
4.1.  Profit persistence 
 
The two persistence parameters     and     were estimated for each firm in the sample using 
equation (1b). As previously mentioned, in order to assure convergence, only firms with       
smaller than one are considered in the analysis reducing the initial sample to 439 firms.
168
 The 
KPSS test reveals that almost 86 % of the series in the reduced sample are stationary.
169
 
Table 47 presents the distribution of the best autoregressive models based on the SBC 
and reveals that the AR(1) is the model which best describes the adjustment path for the 
majority of firms. However, for around 30 % of the firms an AR process of higher order 
describes the dynamics in profitability best, thus justifying the use of higher order lags. 
 
 
Table 47: Choosing between AR(1)-AR(4)
a 
  AR(1) AR(2) AR(3) AR(4) 
# 
% 
304 
69.25 
58 
13.21 
43 
9.79 
34 
7.74 
a 
Percentages of firms for which the AR(1) to AR(4) is 
chosen based on the SBC. 
 
 
Table 48 shows the frequency distribution of the short-run persistence measure    . 
Here, the large fraction of negative values (41 %) which considerably exceeds the share found 
in previous studies
170
 is remarkable. Negative     values indicate that profits fluctuate heavily 
                                                          
168
 129 (21.86 %) of the firms were showing    ’s outside -1 and 1. Furthermore, 22 firms with     values lying in 
the top and bottom 2.5 % of the distribution were removed from the sample since for    ‘s close to one     is 
poorly defined leading to extremely high values of the latter. 
169
 See Table 53 in the Appendix. 
170
 E.g. Gschwandtner (2012) finds for U.S manufacturing fractions of negative values between 8 and 14.5 %. 
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over time. According to Gschwandtner (2005) negative     values can be commonly observed 
for small firms and those which are about to exit the market due to bankruptcy.
171
 The large 
fraction of negative     values could therefore be a consequence of the considerable share of 
small and micro sized firms in the present sample which are in general excluded in most 
previous studies. Additionally, due to the relatively short time span analyzed, it is possible 
that the sample contains a significant number of firms which are on the verge of exiting the 
market. Finally, recent CAP reforms which aim at opening EU agricultural markets to world 
markets have led to increasing price volatility in raw materials which may be reflected in 
more pronounced profit fluctuations and therefore low short-run persistence for those dairy 
firms for which the costs of raw milk account for a large share in total costs (von Ledebur and 
Schmitz, 2011). 
Furthermore, Table 48 shows that the mean value of     for the dairy industry is 0.094, 
thus indicating a very low level of profit persistence. Goddard and Wilson (1999) give an 
overview of previous results of profit persistence studies based on the AR model for 
manufacturing sectors of seven countries
172
 presenting mean values for     between 0.183 and 
0.509.
173
 Hirsch and Gschwandtner (2013) found for the entire food industry mean     values 
of 0.057 in Belgium, 0.143 in Italy, 0.188 in France, 0.201 in Spain and 0.232 in the UK and 
concluded that short-run profit persistence for the food industry is rather low compared to 
other manufacturing sectors. Therefore, the mean     value for the EU dairy industry of 0.094 
is not only low compared to previous results analyzing entire manufacturing sectors but also 
lower compared to the entire food industry with the exception of Belgium. With 20 % the 
share of cooperatives in the dairy sector is higher than in other sectors. The question is 
whether the specifics of this legal form can explain the low mean     value as well as the high 
share of negative    ’s discussed earlier.
174
 To investigate this hypothesis the differences 
between cooperatives and other legal forms are summarized in Table 48. The results provide 
support for the above hypothesis. While the mean value of     is negative for cooperatives  
(-0.184) meaning that profits of these firms fluctuate heavily over time, the respective value 
                                                          
171
 Gschwandtner finds that the fraction of negative    ’s is 20 % for firms exiting the market during the analyzed 
time span while the fraction for surviving firms is only 7 %.  
172
 UK, France, Germany, U.S., Canada, Japan and India. 
173
 Additionally, Glen et al. (2001) present results for manufacturing firms in seven emerging countries ranging 
from 0.221 in India to 0.421 in Zimbabwe, whereat Brazil showing a value of only 0.013 seems to be a lower 
outlier. 
174
 According to AMADEUS the share of cooperatives in the population of the dairy industries in the five 
countries analyzed is 19 % while 20 % (88 firms) in the present sample are cooperatives. 
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for all other legal forms equals 0.163 and thus is comparable to the findings for the entire food 
industry obtained in Hirsch and Gschwandtner (2013).
175
 
  
Table 48: Short-run persistence (   )
 
 Whole sample (n=439) Cooperatives (n=88)b Sample w/o cooperatives 
(n=351)
c
 
Interval
 a
 #    % #    % #    % 
-1 to 0 
0 to 1 
178 
261 
40.55 
59.45 
63 
25 
71.59 
28.41 
115 
236 
32.76 
67.24 
Mean      0.094 -0.184 0.163 
a 
Only     values between -1 and 1 are considered in the analysis since only for these values convergence to the  
norm is assured. 
b 
only cooperatives 
c 
all firms except cooperatives
 
 
 
In order to further investigate the pattern of profit persistence, the firms in the sample 
were divided into six subgroups of equal size according to firm profits in the starting year of 
the analysis      . Table 49 shows the mean initial profits      , mean    ’s and mean    ’s for 
each of the six groups. The majority of cooperatives are thereby in the groups with the lowest 
initial profits (groups 1 and 2). The findings reveal that though convergence of profits closer 
to the competitive norm takes place, profits persist to some degree. The latter is revealed by 
the fact that the group ordering stays the same in the long run with the exception of the first 
two groups, meaning that those firms earning initially the lowest/highest profits also tend to 
earn the lowest/highest profits in the long run. These results are affirmed by the correlation 
coefficient between initial profits and long-run profits, which is positive and significant at the 
1 % level.  
Usually one would expect a pattern, where mean     values for the firms in the middle 
groups, whose initial profits are already close to the norm, should be relatively high compared 
to the respective mean values of the peripheral groups. The pattern depicted in Table 49, 
however, indicates fast upward convergence for firms with lower initial profitability and 
slower convergence for firms with high initial profits. Thus, competition in the dairy sector 
seems to quickly improve the performance of firms earning low initial profits
176
 while it 
reduces above normal profitability at a lower speed.  
 
                                                          
175
 The difference between mean      for all firms and the mean for all firms except cooperatives is statistically 
significant at the 5 % level based on a t-test. 
176
 The fast improvement of below average profits could also be reinforced by the fact that firm exit cannot be 
considered by the analysis.  
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Table 49: Mean   ’s and    ’s for subgroups (all firms in the sample) 
# Obs. Group Mean     Mean     Mean            
74 
73 
73 
73 
73 
73 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
-10.48 
-3.86 
-1.88 
0.47 
4.09 
12.40 
0.0102 
-0.0655 
0.0062 
0.1513 
0.1766 
0.2850 
-2.85 
-3.01 
-2.16 
-1.81 
-0.42 
0.50 
0.181*** 
          = correlation coefficient between initial profits       and long-run profits     .  
***significant at the 1 % level 
 
 
Table 50 presents the results for all legal forms except cooperatives.
177
 Although, the 
group ordering with respect to initial and long-run profits does not stay the same, the 
respective correlation is again significant at the 5 % level. The mean long-run values are 
somewhat higher if cooperatives are excluded while the pattern of mean    ’s per group also 
indicates in this case faster upward convergence for firms in low initial groups and slow 
downward convergence for firms in higher initial profit groups. 
 
 
Table 50: Mean   ’s and    ’s for subgroups (without cooperatives) 
#Obs. Group Mean     Mean     Mean            
59 
59 
58 
58 
58 
59 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
-11.27 
-2.88 
-0.49 
1.97 
5.48 
13.67 
0.0849 
0.1200 
0.1002 
0.1127 
0.2334 
0.3287 
-1.96 
-2.51 
-1.46 
-1.45 
0.47 
0.08 
0.124** 
         = correlation coefficient between initial profits       and long-run profits      . 
**significant at the 5 % level 
 
 
Table 51 provides more detailed information with respect to the long-run persistence 
measure (   ). For the complete sample, the share of long-run projected profit rates 
significantly different from zero is 41.2 % meaning that profits of these firms do not converge 
to the norm in the long run. However, the percentage of firms showing significant negative 
   ’s (31.4 %) is much higher than the percentage of firms with significant positive values 
                                                          
177
 The number of cooperatives in the sample is too small for a separate group analysis of these firms. 
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(9.8 %). Firms with significant positive long-run values presumably possess special 
advantages or are protected by entry barriers. On the contrary, firms with significant negative 
long-run values are probably hampered to exit the market due to sunk costs or other sorts of 
exit barriers. It must be noted, that a negative long-run value does not necessarily mean that a 
firm is making financial losses but only that the firm is making profits below the competitive 
norm which can indeed be larger than zero. Around 77 % of cooperatives show long-run 
projected profit rates significantly different from zero. However, all of these values are 
negative underlining the fact that these firms are not primarily profit oriented. For all other 
legal forms the share of long-run projected profit rates significantly different from zero is 
32.2 % with 12.3 % of the firms showing long-run values significantly larger than zero. 
Regarding entire manufacturing sectors, Gschwandtner (2012) shows for the U.S. that around 
30 % of the firms achieve long-run profits above the norm while 11 % of the firms have 
negative     values. Hirsch and Gschwandtner (2013) find for the entire food industry that in 
the five European countries analyzed around 40 % of the firms show significant    ’s with an 
equal portion of positive and negative values. Within the dairy industry the share of firms 
with    ’s significantly larger than zero is therefore smaller even if cooperatives are excluded 
from the sample. 
 
 
Table 51: Long-run persistence      
 All firms Coop.
b
 All other
c
 
% of   ’s significantly
a
 different from 0 
% of   ’s significantly
a
 >0 
% of   ’s significantly
a
 <0 
% of equations with        
41.2 
9.8 
31.4 
49.9 
77.3 
0.0 
77.3 
15.9 
32.2 
12.3 
19.9 
58.4 
a 
Significant at the 5 % level or less 
b 
Cooperatives 
c 
All other legal forms except cooperatives 
 
 
The last row of Table 51 reveals that only for 16 % of cooperatives more than 10 % of 
the variation in profitability is explained by the autoregressive process. This raises suspicion 
that the AR approach, which is based on the assumption that firms are profit maximizers, is 
not suited to analyze cooperatives which can be assumed to be not primarily profit oriented. 
Among all other legal forms 58.4 % of the firms show R² values larger than 10 %. This share 
exceeds the one found in previous studies based on AR(1) processes, indicating that for all 
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firms except cooperatives considering the best lag structure increases the explanatory power 
of the model.
178
  
 
4.2.  Explaining profit persistence 
 
So far the results reveal a relatively low level of short-run profit persistence. Nevertheless, 
around one out of three firms in the dairy sector earns long-run profits above or below the 
norm. To better understand this issue, the main drivers of profit persistence must be identified.  
Table 52 therefore presents the results of the dynamic panel estimations based on equation (3) 
excluding cooperatives in the further analysis. The coefficient on lagged abnormal profits ( ) 
which serves in this model as the measure for dairy industry short-run persistence is equal to 
0.174. Hirsch and Gschwandtner (2013) find values between 0.110 and 0.304 for the entire 
food industries of selected European countries using the same approach. Thus, similar to the 
AR model, the short-run value for the dairy industry in the dynamic panel model is of about 
the same size as the values for the entire food industry.
179
  
The coefficients ( j ) show the impact of the explanatory variables )( jX  
on long-run 
persistence while the coefficients ( j ) of the interaction terms of the explanatory variables  
( jX ) with the lagged dependent variable (e.g., R&D*πi,t-1) show their impact on short-run 
persistence.   
Market Share (MS), which is measured as the ratio of firm sales to industry sales at the 
country level, is expected to be an important determinant of profit persistence. Many previous 
studies find a positive relationship between market share and profitability or profit persistence 
(e.g. Szymanski et al., 1993; Yurtoglu, 2004). In the present study, market share has as 
expected a positive impact on short-run persistence while its effect on long-run persistence is 
negative which is puzzling. This result might be due to the fact that in this study market share 
could only be measured as the share of firm i’s total sales in total sales in J, where J is the 
4-digit NACE industry to which the firm is assigned.
180
 However, firms are often not only 
active in one of the 4-digit NACE industries. Especially for the dairy sector recent studies 
indicate that the high price volatility has induced a higher diversification in the sector (e.g. 
Ife, 2012). This development is likely more pronounced among larger enterprises, e.g., those 
                                                          
178
 Mueller (1990) finds for four of the seven countries analyzed in his study based on AR(1) that this percentage 
is smaller than 50 %. 
179
 Due to the difference in methods, the value of the dynamic panel estimation cannot be directly compared to 
the mean     of the AR processes. 
180
 Correctly market share should be measured as firm i’s sales in industry J divided by total sales in J. However, 
AMADEUS does not provide information about the diversification of firm activity in different NACE industries.  
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with a higher market share. Unfortunately, AMADEUS does not provide information about 
this kind of diversification of firm activity. Diversification into other sectors reduces volatility 
of profits if the streams of rent in the different business segments are imperfectly correlated. 
This ‘coinsurance effect’ therefore increases short-run profit persistence (e.g. Qureshi et al., 
2012). At the same time several studies show that diversification in sectors that are not 
directly linked to the primary area of operation can lead to a negative impact on profitability. 
Dorsey and Boland (2009), e.g., show that diversification of food industry firms in unrelated 
sectors outside the food economy has a negative impact on profitability. Thus, as far as 
market share is linked to diversification this could explain the results obtained for long-run 
persistence.  
Firm age (Age) can be expected to lower the level and fluctuations of costs due to the 
realization of learning effects which may lead to higher long-run profits and smaller profit 
fluctuations. On the contrary, Loderer and Waelchli (2010) find a negative impact on profits 
which is caused by a corporate aging problem with organizational rigidities, slower growth, 
and assets which become obsolete with time. They also predict that corporate governance is 
perishing and CEO
181
 pay is increasing as firms grow older. In addition, Majumdar (1997) 
supposes that firm age can lead to inertia and bureaucratic ossification which in turn leads to a 
reduced capacity of reaction to changing economic circumstances and thus to higher profit 
fluctuations. As Table 52 shows, the latter is supported by the results since firm age has a 
significant negative impact on short-run persistence.
182
 
In a previous study by Hirsch and Gschwandtner (2013), firm size (Ln TA) measured 
by the logarithm of total assets turned out to be an important driver of profit persistence for 
food industry firms. The impact of firm size can first of all be attributed to a simple cost-scale 
effect (e.g. Ollinger et al., 2000).
183
 However, in the dairy industry it seems that several 
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 This issue is mainly important for larger firms. 
182
 The variable measuring the impact of firm age on long-run persistence (age) was dropped from the estimation 
due to collinearity. 
183
 Nonetheless, in the case of diseconomies of scale firm size can as well have a negative impact on profit 
persistence (see, e.g. Goddard et al., 2005). 
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Table 52: Dynamic panel estimation of equation 3
 
 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
πi,t-1
 
0.174 (5.19)*** 
MS * πi,t-1
 
0.001 (2.40)** 
Age * πi,t-1
 
-0.045 (-6.31)*** 
Ln TA * πi,t-1 0.136 (1.76)* 
Gr. TA * πi,t-1 0.006 (2.11)** 
Gear * πi,t-1 -0.000 (-1.85)* 
1/Curr * πi,t-1 -0.408 (-2.98)*** 
HHI* πi,t-1
  
9.060 (3.32)*** 
NF * πi,t-1
 
 -0.605 (1.40) 
Gr. NF * πi,t-1
 
-2.211 (-4.77)*** 
R&D * πi,t-1
 
 -1.961 (-7.76)*** 
CR5 * πi,t-1
 
 -11.925 (-9.51)*** 
MS 
 
-0.000 (-2.02)** 
Ln TA  0.007 (1.44) 
Gr. TA 0.001 (2.14)** 
Gear  -0.000 (-1.71)* 
1/Curr  -0.023 (-2.99)*** 
HHI 
 
0.177 (0.89) 
NF  -0.092 (-2.64)*** 
Gr. NF  0.014 (1.46) 
R&D  0.024 (0.40) 
CR5
 
-0.137 (-2.94)*** 
Wald 
Hansen  
AR(2)
 
χ²(21) = 222.86***  p=0.000 
χ²(36) = 45.48 p=0.134 
z = -1.61 p=0.108 
Dependent variable: πi,t
  
(abnormal profit)   
Firm variables: MS = firm sales/industry sales; Age = firm age; Ln TA = natural logarithm of total 
assets; Gr.TA= growth rate of total assets; Gear = gearing ratio; 1/Curr = 1/current ratio. Industry 
variables: HHI = Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; NF = number of firms in industry divided by industry 
sales; Gr.NF = Growth rate of NF; R&D = Share of R&D expenditure in industry value added; CR5 = 
Five-firm concentration ratio of the retail sector. 
Age was dropped from the model due to multicollinearity. 
Numbers in parentheses are z-values based on robust standard errors.  
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively.  
 
additional factors play an important role for the impact of firm size on profit persistence. For 
instance, larger firms are more capable of countervailing the superiority of a highly 
concentrated retailing sector and are less affected by the handling of EU legislation.
184
 It is 
only the largest firms that can afford to integrate food law as a tool in their business strategy, 
e.g., by employing staff responsible for legal affairs (Poppe et al., 2009). Similar to firm size 
firm growth (Gr. TA) measured as the growth rate of firm assets is in general expected to 
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 Especially the burdens coming along with pre-market approval for new additives, novel foods or genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs) are too severe for the majority of small food processors in the EU (Wijnands et al., 
2007). 
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increase profits and the degree of persistence.
185
 These points also hold for the dairy industry 
where firm size and firm growth significantly increase short-run persistence and firm growth 
has a significant positive effect on long-run persistence.  
AMADEUS provides two risk proxies. The first one is short-run risk (1/Curr) which is 
measured by the ratio of current liabilities to current assets. This is equal to the reciprocal of 
the firms’ current ratio.186 Additionally, the firms’ gearing ratio (Gear) calculated by the ratio 
of non-current liabilities plus loans to shareholder funds is used as a measure for long-run 
risk. Higher risk is expected to increase fluctuations in profits therefore leading to lower 
short-run persistence. In addition, risk theory states that higher risk should on average lead to 
higher profit levels. However, within strategic management it is an approved fact that the 
relationship between risk and profitability can be negative as summarized by the 'Bowman’s 
risk-return paradox' (Bowman, 1980; Andersen et. al., 2007). Both risk measures have a 
significant negative impact on short- and long-run persistence, thus reinforcing 'Bowman’s 
risk-return paradox' and the fact that higher risk increases profit fluctuations.  
According to IO the persistence of abnormal profits can also be explained by industry 
factors. Concentration is the industry characteristic that is first and foremost linked to profit 
persistence. In the present study, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is used to measure 
concentration. As regards the impact on profitability there are two different perspectives. 
Concentration can lead to entry barriers and high long-run profits as well as less fluctuations 
for incumbent firms. Using different considerations, high concentration can cause strong 
competition between a few firms leading to a negative relationship between concentration and 
the persistence measures. The results indicate that the former is the case for the dairy sector in 
the five EU countries under consideration as concentration turns out to significantly increase 
short-run persistence. No significant impact of concentration could be detected regarding 
long-run persistence. 
Industry size (NF) is measured by the number of firms in an industry adjusted by the 
sales of the industry while the growth rate of this variable serves as a measure for industry 
growth (Gr. NF). A large number of firms in an industry might provide an indication for a 
high level of competition while an increase in the number of firms decreases the ability of 
incumbents to maintain their market shares, thus as well leading to stronger competition. 
                                                          
185
 However, if firms aim at growing through diversification in activities unrelated to the primary field of action, 
a negative effect on long-run profitability might be the consequence as suggested by Dorsey and Boland (2009). 
Diversification, however, should reduce risk hence leading to lower fluctuations in profits and therefore to higher 
short-run persistence. Nonetheless, growth is usually associated with high costs which might in turn lead to 
higher fluctuations in profits. 
186
 The reciprocal was taken in order to make interpretation of the results easier since a high current ratio implies 
low risk and the other way around. 
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Therefore, both explanatory variables likely increase profit fluctuations and decrease long-run 
profit levels. As the results show, this is to some degree true for the dairy industry as the size 
of the industry has a negative effect on long-run persistence while industry growth has a 
negative impact on short-run persistence. 
Research and development (R&D) is assumed to be an important driver of product and 
process innovation. Respective investments of a firm are in general expected to increase the 
firm’s short- as well as long-run profit persistence. In fact, most previous studies (e.g. Waring, 
1996) find a positive impact of a firm’s R&D expenditure on profit persistence.187 Due to data 
limitations we were only able to consider R&D at the sector level by using the ‘share of 
expenditure for research and development in total industry value added’ as a proxy. R&D at 
the sector level can be assumed to serve as an entry barrier in growing sectors thereby 
increasing short- and long-run profit persistence for the incumbent firms. In declining sectors 
it is an indication for the fight to stay in the market and thus an indication for the high level of 
competition in the sector. The dairy, cheese and ice cream industries fall in the second group.  
This is partly supported by the results since the impact of R&D on short-run persistence turns 
out to be negative for the dairy sector.
188
 
Finally, retailer concentration (CR5)
189
 was included in the model. As expected, CR5 
has a negative influence on short- and long-run persistence indicating that high retailer 
concentration leads to strong bargaining power, putting processors under pressure. A high 
market share of private labels, which is larger than 25 % in most EU countries (Wijnands et 
al., 2007), further increases retailer bargaining power and is expected to reduce profit 
persistence. However, due to data limitations this variable was not included in the model. 
The Wald statistic which indicates the joint significance of the independent variables 
is significant and thus
 
confirms the overall fit of the model. All other model diagnostics are 
also proper. The correct implementation of the instruments is confirmed by the Hansen test 
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 Innovations in the dairy sector are usually simple product variations in the form of new ingredients while 
marketing- and process innovation or the introduction of completely new products is of minor relevance 
(Tacken, 2009). As Steward-Knox and Mitchell (2003) show, only 7-25 % of launched food products are truly 
new while the rest are simple product extensions. It is well established, however, that the vast majority of these 
extensions (72-88 %) fail while the failure rate of truly new products is only 25 % (Hoban, 1998). Thus, it is 
difficult to predict whether the relationship between R&D and firm profitability also holds for the dairy sector. 
188
 The negative influence might be reinforced by the fact that R&D during period t is used to explain persistence 
in t. Even though the time span until economic returns of R&D occur is expected to be rather short in the food 
industry, it is likely that the benefits of R&D will not occur in the same period. Therefore, ideally lagged R&D 
should have been used. However, due to the rather poor data availability of R&D, this seemed to be 
disadvantageous and attempts to implement first-order lags of R&D did not alter the results.  
Hirsch and Gschwandtner (2013) also find for the whole food industry that the relationship of R&D and profit 
persistence is negative in most countries. 
189
 Here the five-firm concentration ratio had to be used since data on the Herfindahl index was not available for 
the food retailing sector. 
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which does not reject the overidentification conditions. Furthermore, the test for serial 
correlation does not reject the null of no second-order autocorrelation which is an important 
condition for the consistency of the GMM estimator (Baltagi, 2008). 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The present study analyzes profit persistence in the European dairy industry, one of the most 
important sub-sectors of the European food industry, which is characterized by considerable 
policy intervention and a high share of cooperatives (20 %) relative to other sectors. The 
results indicate that the majority of firms’ profits converge towards the competitive norm. 
However, around 40 % of all firms are estimated to earn long-run profits partly above but 
mostly below the competitive norm indicating that the process of convergence is incomplete. 
This is further confirmed by a positive correlation between initial and long-run profits which 
is significant at the 1 % level. The results also reveal that short-run profit persistence 
measured by mean     is lower compared to other manufacturing sectors and lower in 
comparison to the entire food industry. However, it has to be kept in mind, that firm exit 
could not be considered by the analysis. This is one of the limitations of the present study 
meaning that profit persistence could indeed be even lower. 
The fact that most cooperatives (77 %) earn long-run profits significantly below the 
norm suggests that this legal form is not primarily profit oriented. Those enterprises were 
therefore excluded from the further analysis. This leads to short-run persistence values which 
are in the range of those for the entire food industry, although the fraction of firms earning 
profits above the norm in the long run (12.3 %) is still lower in the dairy sector compared to 
the entire food industry (20 %). Thus, the results provide evidence for a rather high level of 
competition and therefore indicate that the dairy sector is not objectionable under anti-trust 
law.  
Regarding the drivers of profit persistence, the results of the dynamic panel model 
indicate that c. p. profit persistence is higher for large and young firms, with low risk factors. 
As expected industry characteristics revealing a high level of competition in the sector such as 
the number and growth of firms or R&D investment reduce profit persistence. The same holds 
for a high level of concentration in the retail sector which is an indicator of retailer’s 
bargaining power.  
From an entrepreneurial point of view the results imply that besides reaching a 
sufficient scale firms need to keep liabilities and assets in balance to reduce their risk 
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exposure. From the perspective of policy, improvements on EU food legislation could be a 
useful measure in order to decrease administrative burdens especially for the large number of 
small enterprises. The results indicate at first sight no need for anti-trust measures as 
competition seems to work in the dairy sector. However, the findings clearly reveal that food 
retailer concentration has a negative impact on short and long-run persistence. Since 
concentration in the food retail sector exceeds 70 % in most EU countries
190
 this sector has 
recently drawn special attention of competition authorities. At this, the emphasis was 
particularly put on retailer’s buyer power vis-à-vis the producers (European Competition 
Network, 2012). Retailer power has been further strengthened in recent years by a high and 
still increasing share of private labels. This has induced an intensive debate focusing on the 
competition issues regarding private labels (e.g. Frank and Lademann, 2012). As mentioned 
above, due to a lack of available data this issue could not be incorporated which is another 
limitation of this study. While retailers see in private labels valuable alternatives for brands, 
producers of branded products criticize that private labels lead to an increase of power 
imbalance between the dairy industry and retailing. Since especially small and medium sized 
producers have to fear the delisting of their lesser-known brands as a consequence of private 
label introduction it is most likely that these producers have to reduce prices, thus implying a 
shift of profits from producers to retailers. In addition, if the introduction of private labels 
leads to a displacement of high-quality brands the overall quality of the product assortment 
may decrease. However, as retailers are directly linked to consumers the introduction of 
private labels can lead to a larger product assortment which better suits consumer preferences 
hence improving consumer welfare (Frank and Lademann, 2012). Thus, while increasing 
retailer bargaining power as a consequence of private label introduction further increases 
competitive pressure for producers and reduces the degree of profit persistence, the question 
in how far consumers may benefit from private labels remains debatable. 
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 Wijnands et al. (2007). With the exception of Italy and Greece were the CR5 is around 40 %. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 53: Percentages of stationary series
a
 
Sample Percentage 
Full sample 
Firms with |   |<1            
84.24 
85.88 
a 
Based on a KPSS test. 
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